Guy v Washington

[*1] Guy v Washington 2014 NY Slip Op 51247(U) Decided on July 28, 2014 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on July 28, 2014
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : WESTON, J.P., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ.
2013-517 K C

Sue Ann T. Guy, Appellant,

against

Chris Washington, Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carol Ruth Feinman, J.), entered September 6, 2012. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, after a nonjury trial, awarded defendant the principal sum of $1,600 on his counterclaim.

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the counterclaim.

Plaintiff, defendant's former tenant, commenced this small claims action to recover a $1,600 security deposit, and defendant counterclaimed for $5,000 for unpaid rent. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,600 for the security deposit and awarded defendant the principal sum of $1,600, representing one month's rent, on his counterclaim. Plaintiff appeals from so much of the judgment as awarded defendant the principal sum of $1,600. Upon a review of the record, we find that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, failed to provide the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see CCA 1804, 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]).

The applicable rule of law is that where a landlord, before the end of the term, requests a tenant to vacate and the tenant complies, the landlord is estopped from enforcing the lease. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v Childs Co. (230 NY 285, 292-293 [1921] [citations omitted]), the Court of Appeals stated as follows:

"An estoppel rests upon the word or deed of one party upon which another rightfully relies and so relying changes his position to his injury. When this occurs it would be inequitable to permit the first to enforce what would have been his rights under other circumstances. Doubtless should a landlord, before the end of his term, request a tenant to vacate his premises and should the tenant comply, or should he directly or indirectly command that this be done, and should the tenant obey, the landlord might no longer enforce the lease because he would be estopped if for no other reason."

Here, defendant testified that he wanted to terminate the lease and so informed plaintiff on April 29, 2012. Defendant and his wife testified, as did plaintiff, that plaintiff left the premises on April 30, 2012. Thus, plaintiff is not liable for the May rent, and defendant's counterclaim should have been dismissed.

Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the counterclaim.

Weston, J.P., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: July 28, 2014