Infinity Health Prods. Ltd. v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
Annotate this CaseDecided on April 27, 2012
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., RIOS and ALIOTTA, JJ
.
Infinity Health Products Ltd. as Assignee of BRENT SMITH, Respondent,
against
Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered March 5, 2010, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered March 24, 2010 (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neuman v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the March 5, 2010 order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denying defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,773.25.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, the order entered March 5, 2010 is vacated, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denying defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. After a judgment was entered, plaintiff appealed from the order. We deem plaintiff's appeal to be from the judgment (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neuman v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]).
The affidavit of defendant's claim specialist established that defendant had timely mailed requests and follow-up requests for verification (see St. Vincent's Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Contrary to the finding of the Civil Court, the affidavit of defendant's claim specialist was also sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to respond to those requests. It is noted that plaintiff never alleged that it had responded.
Consequently, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny plaintiff's claims did not commence to run and plaintiff's action is premature (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]). Thus, defendant's cross motion should have been granted. In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the order entered March 5, 2010 is vacated, [*2]plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant's cross motion for summary judgment is granted.
Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 27, 2012
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