Whitehead v Amenia Motors

[*1] Whitehead v Amenia Motors 2010 NY Slip Op 51458(U) [28 Misc 3d 137(A)] Decided on August 12, 2010 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on August 12, 2010
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : NICOLAI, P.J., LaCAVA and IANNACCI, JJ
2009-1199 D C.

Stan Whitehead, Respondent,

against

Amenia Motors, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Amenia, Dutchess County (James J. Devine, J.), dated September 9, 2008. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,447.22.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed without costs.

In this small claims action, the record establishes that plaintiff purchased a new truck from defendant. At the time of the purchase, the truck had a dent which needed to be repaired. Defendant sent the truck to a third-party repair shop. Plaintiff claims that the repair was done improperly and seeks in this action to recover damages for the improper repair. After a nonjury trial, the Justice Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,447.22.

Upon a review of the record, we find that the evidence proffered by plaintiff was sufficient to establish defendant's liability as well as plaintiff's damages for the cost to repair the truck. In addition to his testimony and the testimony of his witness regarding the condition of the truck when defendant returned the truck to him, plaintiff also presented two itemized estimates which established, prima facie, "the reasonable value and necessity of" the repairs (UJCA 1804).

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see e.g. Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see e.g. Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of the trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as the trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see e.g. Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).

Defendant argues that because plaintiff was an official of the Town of Amenia, his action should not have been tried in the Justice Court of the Town of Amenia. We disagree. "[M]ere belief, suspicion or feelings" are not sufficient grounds for the granting of a motion to change venue (see Clausi v Hudson Cement Co., 26 AD2d 872, 873 [1966]). With respect to defendant's contention that the trial court should have recused itself because of a possible conflict of interest, [*2]the record does not establish that the trial court was statutorily required to recuse itself, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14.

In view of the foregoing, and as the Justice Court's findings and conclusions are supported by the record, we are of the view that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UJCA 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams, 269 AD2d at 126). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Nicolai, P.J., and Iannacci, J., concur.

LaCava, J., dissents in a separate memorandum.

LaCava, J., dissents and votes to reverse the judgment and dismiss the action in the following memorandum:

I respectfully disagree with my colleagues.

The issue in this small claims case is not whether the repair work (painting) done
to correct the condition was performed in such a manner as to aesthetically comport to
plaintiff's satisfaction, but rather whether the repair was performed in a workmanlike manner which conformed with applicable commercial and/or professional standards in the field. A threshold question would reasonably be whether properly authenticated photographs or an impartial inspection of the truck following the third attempt to correct the paint problem would support plaintiff's claim that the paint was a different color and that the truck could not be "pressure washed" because "the clear would be peeled right off the paint." Plaintiff simply lacked any professional qualifications to make such a statement.

Plaintiff's witness, Ray Coggins, a former employee of defendant, testified, without further specification, that, after the third attempt, "it still did not come out right and still was not right." Coggins was likewise not qualified to render such an opinion. Indeed, the testimony in support of plaintiff's case was as probative on the main issue as was the defense testimony that, after the third time, "it came out perfect, to meet commercial standards" and "there is nothing wrong with the truck." Although the foregoing raises issues of credibility, on which this case was decided, plaintiff nonetheless had the initial burden of showing that the final repair attempt was improperly accomplished. In this regard, there was a total lack of objective evidence that the repair was not properly performed; there were no photographs nor any expert testimony that the car had been inspected and did not conform to standards applicable to those in the car repair/painting business. It is noted that defendant even suggested an adjournment to allow plaintiff the opportunity to seek an inspection of the vehicle by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), which has established a complaint process for consumers with complaints against DMV-regulated dealers and repair shops, but the court refused to grant an adjournment. In fact, the court seemed to shift the burden of proof to defendant by suggesting that it was defendant's responsibility to produce a DMV witness, and then faulted defendant for not producing such a witness even after the defense witness explained that he had tried unsuccessfully to do so.

In addition, when plaintiff was asked if he had driven the truck to the courthouse so that everyone could take a look at it, plaintiff answered that he had not done so because the truck was dirty and he did not want the judge to see the truck in that condition. The defense witness stated, "the truck is fine. I wish it was here." The court then refused, in response to repeated requests [*3]by both parties, to adjourn the trial to permit plaintiff to drive the truck to the courthouse so that the court itself could take a look at the paint job, stating "I'm not the one to make a decision about that." I would suggest that it is the obligation of the court, at the very least under the circumstances of this particular case, to determine by visual inspection that a claim in fact lies in the matter.

With respect to defendant's argument regarding recusal, I note that it appears from the record that the trial judge seemed to know plaintiff personally, referring to him, at times, by his first name. When the defense witness questioned his impartiality, the judge talked about the separate status of the court and the town government, but never specifically stated that hewould judge the case fairly and impartially, without being influenced by his (unexplained) association with plaintiff. This is especially important since the judge appears to have decided the case before its conclusion. The trial transcript indicates that the judge stated that defendant's lawsuit shouldbe against the third-party repair shop, and that he cut off the defense witness after he said that he had no lawsuit against the repair shop (againsuggesting that defendant's lawsuit should be against the repair shop), after which the defense witness explained that he had no lawsuit against the repair shop because "his work after three times is fine. And there is nothing wrong with the quality of the work after he repaired it . . ."

In conclusion, I believe that "substantial justice has not been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UJCA 1807). There was no objective proof or expert testimony (whether by a DMV inspector or by a licensed auto repair shop owner) that the work was not appropriately and professionally done, and no proof as to the requisite standards for the repair and painting performed by a licensed auto repair shop. Although plaintiff and his witness testified that the work was shoddy, the court, when given the chance by both parties, did not even make an attempt to independently verify the claim. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and dismiss the action because I do not believe that plaintiff proved his claim by a preponderance of the credible evidence, and because "substantial justice" was not accomplished under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Decision Date: August 12, 2010