People v Rechin (Sedgewick)

[*1] People v Rechin (Sedgewick) 2010 NY Slip Op 51169(U) [28 Misc 3d 126(A)] Decided on June 29, 2010 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on June 29, 2010
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : NICOLAI, P.J., LaCAVA and IANNACCI, JJ
2006-777 W CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Sedgewick Rechin, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Cortlandt, Westchester County (Gerald M. Klein, J.), rendered April 10, 2006. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of official misconduct.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of official misconduct (Penal Law § 195.00 [1]). The sole issue on appeal pertains to the Justice Court's denial of defense counsel's applications during voir dire that two prospective trial jurors be excused for cause. We need not reach the merits of the Justice Court's denial of defense counsel's applications, because there was, in any event, no reversible error.

Criminal Procedure Law § 270.20, applicable to trials of indictments in superior courts (see CPL 260.10, 360.05), provides, in relevant part:
"§ 270.20 Trial jury; challenge for cause of an individual juror.
. . .
2. . . . An erroneous ruling by the court denying a challenge for cause by the defendant does not constitute reversible error unless the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges at the time or, if he has not, he peremptorily challenges such prospective juror and his peremptory challenges are exhausted before the selection of the jury is complete."
Subdivision 2 of Criminal Procedure Law § 360.25 ("Trial jury; challenge for cause of an individual juror") provides, in part, "The provisions of subdivision two of section 270.20 with respect to challenges are also applicable in the selection of a trial jury in a local criminal court." [*2]

With respect to the first of the two prospective jurors at issue here, even if the Justice Court's denial of defendant's challenge for cause was erroneous, the error was not reversible because defendant had not exhausted his peremptory challenges at the time of the denial and did not exercise a peremptory challenge against the prospective juror (see CPL 270.20 [2]; 360.25 [2]).

With respect to the second prospective juror, although defendant did exercise a peremptory challenge against him, there can be no reversible error with respect to the denial of a challenge for cause to a trial juror unless a defendant's peremptory challenges to trial jurors are exhausted before the selection of the trial jury is complete (CPL 270.20 [2]; 360.25 [2]). Here, defendant's peremptory challenges to trial jurors were not exhausted before the selection of the trial jury was complete. Contrary to what defendant suggests, the fact that he exhausted his independent peremptory challenge for alternate jurors (see CPL 360.35 [1]) after the selection of the trial jury was complete is a circumstance of no moment here. We note that the Justice Court's denials of the challenges in question did not operate to deprive defendant of the opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge against any prospective juror who was ultimately seated.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Nicolai, P.J., LaCava and Iannacci, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 29, 2010