People v Sykes (David)

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[*1] People v Sykes (David) 2010 NY Slip Op 50703(U) [27 Misc 3d 133(A)] Decided on April 13, 2010 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on April 13, 2010
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : LaCAVA, J.P., TANENBAUM and IANNACCI, JJ
2009-890 OR CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

David K. Sykes, Appellant.

Appeal from judgments of the Justice Court of the Town of Monroe, Orange County (Jack J. Rosenthal, J.), rendered December 9, 2008. The judgments convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of crossing lines marking hazardous roadway conditions and stopping a vehicle upon a highway outside of a business or residence district.


ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are reversed, on the law, the accusatory instruments are dismissed, and the fines, if paid, are remitted.

The People charged defendant with stopping a vehicle upon a highway outside of a business or residence district (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1201 [a]), in that he failed to obey the arresting officer's direction that he move his vehicle off the paved portion of the road, and with crossing lines marking hazardous roadway conditions (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 [d]), in that he repeatedly crossed solid double yellow lines dividing the road. As defendant correctly argued at the trial, the People failed to prove that defendant improperly stopped his vehicle upon a highway "outside of a business or residence district" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1201 [a]). Similarly, the proof that defendant repeatedly drove his vehicle to the left of the solid double yellow lines that divide the directions of travel on Forest Road in the Town of Monroe (cf. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1126 [a]) did not establish a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 (d). Because solid double yellow lines may be crossed, for example, for the purpose of making a left turn (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1126 [b]), it is not inherently unlawful to cross such lines, and thus, such lines do not represent markings which indicate portions of a roadway where "crossing such markings would be especially hazardous" in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 (d).

In light of the foregoing, we need not address defendant's remaining contentions.

Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are reversed and the accusatory instruments are [*2]dismissed.

LaCava, J.P., Tanenbaum and Iannacci, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 13, 2010

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