Brijadder v Uddin

[*1] Brijadder v Uddin 2010 NY Slip Op 50598(U) [27 Misc 3d 129(A)] Decided on April 2, 2010 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on April 2, 2010
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : RIOS, J.P., PESCE and STEINHARDT, JJ
2009-263 Q C.

Lancelot Brijadder, Respondent,

against

Nabir Uddin and REAZ PATWARY, Appellants.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diccia T. Pineda-Kirwan, J.), entered January 26, 2009. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $5,519.14.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover for damage sustained to his vehicle in an automobile accident. Following a nonjury trial, judgment was entered in plaintiff's favor in the principal sum of $5,519.14. Defendants appeal from the judgment.

Upon a review of the record, we find that plaintiff met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Reaz Patwary negligently drove defendant Nabir Uddin's car past a red light and was the sole cause of the intersection collision with plaintiff's vehicle (see generally Gayle v City of New York, 92 NY2d 936 [1998]; Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544 [1998]; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Langan, 18 AD3d 860 [2005]; Holliday v Hudson Armored Car & Courier Serv., 301 AD2d 392, 396 [2003]).

With regard to the identification of defendant Patwary as the driver, and defendant Uddin as the owner, of the other vehicle involved in the collision, plaintiff testified that he had called the police after the collision and that, when the police officer had arrived, plaintiff had told the officer what had happened. Plaintiff further testified that he had seen the officer write down the information that plaintiff had provided, and he agreed with the statements appearing on the police accident report. The report listed defendants Patwary and Uddin, respectively, as the driver and owner of the other car. The report was based upon the officer's personal observations, after the officer had examined the car's registration, and was prepared while carrying out the officer's police duties. Defendants did not object to the admission of the police report into evidence. The Civil Court properly found that the police report, which recorded the fact that the police officer [*2]was told by the driver of vehicle #1, Patwary, his version of the accident and which listed Patwary as the driver of vehicle #1 and recited that the car was registered to Uddin (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Langan, 18 AD3d 860; Holliday, 301 AD2d at 396), when taken in conjunction with plaintiff's testimony,sufficiently identified the driver and the owner of the car involved in the accident with plaintiff as the defendants herein.

The decision of the fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). Furthermore, the determination of the trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference as the court has the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, thereby affording the trial court a better perspective from which to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). We find that the record supports the trial court's conclusions and, accordingly, find no reason to disturb the judgment.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 02, 2010