People v Grant (Derwood)

[*1] People v Grant (Derwood) 2007 NY Slip Op 51987(U) [17 Misc 3d 131(A)] Decided on October 5, 2007 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 5, 2007
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : RUDOLPH, P.J., EMERSON and LaCAVA, JJ
2004-471 W CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Derwood Grant, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Greenburgh, Westchester County (Doris T. Friedman, J.), rendered March 16, 2004. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of bail jumping in the third degree.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.

It affirmatively appears from the record that defendant's guilty plea to the charge of bail jumping in the third degree (Penal Law § 215.55) was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered (see Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238 [1969]). Defendant was advised of various rights he was waiving; there were no protestations of innocence or indications of doubt as to guilt, and he had the opportunity to make a voluntary and
rational decision with proper advice in pleading guilty (see People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338 [1967], cert denied sub nom. Robinson v New York, 393 US 1067 [1969]). Essentially, defendant bases his claims that his plea was not knowing and intelligent and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel upon the ground that counsel failed to advise him correctly that he would be unable to raise an appellate challenge to the alleged denial of his statutory right to a speedy trial by pleading guilty (see People v Thill, 52 NY2d 1020 [1981]; People v Gooden, 151 AD2d 773 [1989]). However, these claims must be rejected since there is no "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have [*2]been different" (Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694 [1984]). Indeed, when the motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial is considered on the merits, it is patent that said motion was lacking in merit. Furthermore, it is clear that under the totality of the circumstances, defense counsel provided "meaningful representation" (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). Defendant was afforded the benefit of a plea bargain which included dismissal
of a class A misdemeanor charge and four traffic infraction charges, and a concurrent jail sentence was arranged and imposed. Accordingly, the guilty plea should not be disturbed.

Rudolph, P.J., Emerson and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 05, 2007