Babalola v City of New York
Annotate this CaseDecided on July 26, 2007
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON PATTERSON and RIOS, JJ
2003-1316 K C. x
Ayodeji Babalola, Respondent,
against
The City of New York and Detective William Wallace, Appellants. x
Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Bernadette Bayne, J.), entered March 14, 2002, and from an order of the same court, entered July 24, 2003. The judgment, upon a jury verdict, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $175,000 on her false arrest cause of action and the principal sum of $250,000 on her malicious prosecution cause of action. The order denied defendants' motion to settle the transcript.
Judgment reversed without costs and complaint dismissed.
Appeal from order dismissed as academic.
At the outset we note that the appeal from the order denying defendants' motion to settle the transcript has been rendered academic since the transcript has been settled.
Plaintiff was arrested on September 8, 1989 by defendant Detective William Wallace for allegedly committing the felony of burglary in the third degree on September 1, 1989. She was accused of stealing three bags of "exotic" clothing from the complainant's apartment valued at $91,000. She spent 60 hours in jail before she was released on her own recognizance. Six months later, the charge was dismissed at the request of the Assistant District Attorney. Plaintiff subsequently commenced the instant action seeking to recover for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Defendants appeal from the ensuing judgment, upon a jury trial, in favor of [*2]plaintiff, and we now reverse.
To establish a cause of action for false arrest, plaintiff was required to show that (1) Detective Wallace intended to confine her, (2) plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged (see Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975]; 2 NY PJI2d 28-40 [2007]). Where, as here, there has been an arrest without a warrant, the defendant has the burden of proving that the arrest was based on probable cause (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 458). The issue of probable cause can present a question of fact, or it can become a question of law to be decided by the court when the facts are undisputed or when only one inference can reasonably be drawn from such facts (see Lundgren v Margini, 30 AD3d 476, 477 [2006]; Foster v City of New York, NYLJ, Nov. 6, 1996 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Based on the record before us, the only inference to be drawn is that plaintiff's arrest, as a matter of law, was supported by probable cause.
At trial, Detective Wallace testified that prior to plaintiff's arrest, he had interviewed the complainant and received a list of the property allegedly stolen from her apartment. Thereafter, he interviewed the complainant's doorman, Vernon Bedeau, who placed the plaintiff at the complainant's building on the evening of the alleged burglary. Mr. Bedeau also told Detective Wallace that while he was momentarily distracted, he observed the plaintiff with three others enter the elevator, and within a short time later, return to the lobby with her companions and exit the building carrying bundles. Mr. Bedeau told Detective Wallace that the complainant used his telephone to call 911.
Detective Wallace further testified that prior to arresting plaintiff, he also had in his possession a statement from a witness taken by another police officer. The witness informed the other officer that he observed four people sitting in the lobby when he entered, and that they followed him into the elevator. The witness went to the complainant's apartment and was pushed in from behind. One of the four told the witness that the complainant owed them money and that they were taking three bags of clothing that belonged to the complainant until she paid them. The witness observed that the four then fled from the premises.
Vernon Bedeau testified at trial and corroborated Detective Wallace's recollection of his pre-arrest statement.
At trial, the plaintiff admitted that she was at the complainant's apartment on the evening in question, and that in her presence the complainant had telephoned 911.
On this record, we conclude, as a matter of law, that defendants sustained their burden of proving that plaintiff's arrest was based on probable cause. Information from an identified citizen is accorded a high level of reliability and is presumed to be reliable (see People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327 [1990]; Minott v City of New York, 203 AD2d 265 [1994]; People v Crowder, 198 AD2d 369 [1993]). Detective Wallace had the statements of two independent witnesses plus the information provided by the complainant. Probable cause does not require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed by the person arrested (People v August, 33 AD3d 1046 [2006]). Prior to making the arrest, Detective Wallace had sufficient information to support the belief that plaintiff had committed a crime. Unlike the circumstances in Haynes v City of New York (29 [*3]AD3d 521, 523 [2006]), the conduct of the police did not deviate so egregiously from acceptable police activity as to demonstrate an intentional or reckless disregard for proper procedures. Moreover, plaintiff presented nothing to refute Detective Wallace's testimony on the issue of probable cause. We thus conclude that no reasonable person could find a lack of probable cause under the circumstances presented and therefore, as a matter of law, the false arrest cause of action must be dismissed.
For the same reason, plaintiff's cause of action for malicious prosecution must also be dismissed. To recover for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) a criminal proceeding was commenced, (2) it was terminated in favor of the accused, (3) it lacked probable cause and (4) the proceeding was brought out of actual malice (see Cantalino v Danner, 96 NY2d 391 [2001]). While a lack of probable cause may, in some cases, support an inference of malice (see Lundgren v Margini, 30 AD3d at 477), here, as noted, Detective Wallace had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff's malicious prosecution cause of action similarly cannot survive.
Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 26, 2007
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