People v Crandon (Estella)

[*1] People v Crandon (Estella) 2007 NY Slip Op 50659(U) [15 Misc 3d 130(A)] Decided on March 28, 2007 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 28, 2007
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., GOLIA and RIOS, JJ
2005-882 K CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Estella Crandon, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Suzanne M. Mondo, J.), rendered April 19, 2005. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of harassment in the second degree.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.

Defendant was charged with harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26) and attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00) in connection with an incident occurring on July 13, 2004 at the house in Brooklyn where defendant was residing. Defendant, after refusing access to real estate agents but granting access to two police officers, allegedly struck the back of the head of one of the two officers, complainant, before striking him about the face while both were beside
each other in a narrow hallway leading to steps descending to a basement. Complainant had just instructed his companion officer to let in the real estate agents. Defendant was convicted of harassment in the second degree, a violation (Penal Law
§ 240.26).

Contrary to defendant's contention, there was nothing inconsistent with respect to the guilty verdict for harassment and not guilty verdict for attempted assault (see People v Bartkow, 96 NY2d 770, 772 [2001] [distinguishing harassment from menacing]; People v Pirozzi, 237 AD2d 628, 631 [1997] [distinguishing aggravated harassment from assault]). The evidence amply established that while defendant lacked the necessary intent to cause a physical injury to [*2]complainant in the statutory sense, i.e., "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]; §§ 110.00, 120.00), she did possess the requisite intent "to harass, annoy or alarm" him when she struck him or otherwise subjected him to physical contact (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]; see also Pirozzi, 237 AD2d at 631).

By making only general motions to dismiss at the end of the People's case and after both sides had rested, defense counsel failed to preserve specific issues for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 62 [2001]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858, 859 [1987]; People v Udzinski, 146 AD2d 245, 250 [1984]; People v McKinney, 9 Misc 3d 136[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51693[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists], Iv denied 6 NY3d 778 [2006]). In any event, when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), it is legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant appears to have been piqued when complainant instructed his partner to bring the real estate agents into the house after she had denied access. Her defense, that she accidentally struck him in the back of the head and then accidentally cut his lip, was contradicted by the testimony of both officers and properly rejected by the trial court (see People v Collins, 178 AD2d 789 [1991] [the intent for harassment "may, and in most instances, must, be established by inferences drawn from the surrounding circumstances"]). Defendant's assertion that she had two attack pit bulls in the basement which she was trying to prevent complainant from reaching is belied by the lack of any evidence of noise from the dogs themselves, her failure to warn the officers of the dogs' location when she purportedly permitted both officers to start heading down into the basement on a first occasion, and her failure to mention them when complainant set out for the basement a second time.

Upon the exercise of our power to review the facts, we are satisfied that the guilty verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Under the circumstances, the determination of the trier of fact, which had the opportunity to view, hear, and observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, should not be disturbed (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495; People v Russell, 209 AD2d 650, 651 [1994]; People v Collins, 178 AD2d at 790).

The other issues raised herein are similarly lacking in merit.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 28, 2007