People v Hopkins (Tanya)

[*1] People v Hopkins (Tanya) 2006 NY Slip Op 51041(U) [12 Misc 3d 130(A)] Decided on May 23, 2006 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 23, 2006
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., RIOS and BELEN, JJ
2005-111 Q CR.

The People of the State of New York, Appellant,

against

Tanya Hopkins, Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Fernando M. Camacho, J.), dated December 13, 2004. The order granted defendant's motion for a trial order of dismissal, set aside the jury verdict and dismissed the charge of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree.

Order affirmed.

In or about July 2003, defendant was charged with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05) and hindering prosecution in the third degree (Penal Law § 205.55). At the conclusion of the People's case, defendant moved for a trial order of dismissal. The trial court granted said motion as to the hindering prosecution charge (from which the People do not appeal) and reserved its decision as to the obstructing governmental administration charge until after the jury's verdict. The jury rendered a guilty verdict as to obstructing governmental administration. The court subsequently granted defendant's motion, set aside the jury verdict, and dismissed the obstructing governmental administration charge on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient (see CPL 290.10 [1]).

Pursuant to CPL 290.10 (1), a court may grant a motion for a trial order of dismissal upon a finding "that the trial evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged . . . or any lesser included offense." Evidence is legally sufficient when, if accepted as true, it would establish every element of an offense charged and defendant's commission thereof (CPL 70.10 [1]). In order to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, the People were required to establish that she [*2]"intentionally obstruct[ed], impair[ed] or pervert[ed] the administration of law or other governmental function or prevent[ed] or attempt[ed] to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act" (Penal Law § 195.05). In People v Case (42 NY2d 98 [1977]), the Court of Appeals held that "mere words alone do not constitute 'physical force or interference' such as to support the charge of obstructing governmental administration" since the word "physical" modifies both the words "force" and "interference" (id. at 101).

Herein, Detective Shepard testified that at about 8:00 or 8:30 A.M. on July 10, 2003, he went to an apartment on 98th Street, with other detectives, to execute a felony arrest warrant against a person named Newkirk. He knocked on the apartment door and someone answered from behind the door, about 15 seconds later. He identified himself as the police and said that he was looking for Newkirk. Someone said "hold on" from behind the door, and he heard the person walk away. He waited another 30 seconds before he knocked on the door for a second time, and, again, stated that he was looking for Newkirk. Someone came back to the door and, from behind the door, said "hold on." He then heard the person walk away from the door and, for about 3 to 4 minutes, he heard "people moving around in the apartment, like just shuffling." He knocked on the door a third time and said, "police, open the door." He again heard someone say "hold on," from behind the door, heard more shuffling, and then heard the lock unlatch. Defendant (whose voice Detective Shepard recognized as the person who told him to "hold on") opened the door and Detective Shepard told her that he was looking for Newkirk. He informed defendant that he had an arrest warrant for Newkirk, which he showed to her. Defendant stated that Newkirk was not there and she had not seen him. After entering the apartment, Detective Shepard went to the kitchen, looked out the window and saw a person going down the fire escape. Another detective followed this person down the fire escape. Detective Shepard radioed the officers stationed outside of the building, the person was apprehended and was identified as Newkirk.

The foregoing trial evidence was legally insufficient to establish every element of the crime of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and defendant's commission thereof. The conclusion that defendant's "hold on" statements and shuffling sounds heard by the detective, warned Newkirk of the detective's presence and intent to arrest him, thereby causing Newkirk to flee, simply was not established by the evidence presented at trial (cf. Matter of Davan L., 91 NY2d 88 [1997]). Moreover, since there was no testimony that Newkirk was ever observed inside the apartment, no testimony that the fire escape could only be accessed from the apartment, and no testimony as to the number of rooms in the apartment, the size of the apartment or the layout of the apartment, the trial evidence does not establish that defendant's statements, that Newkirk was not in the apartment and she had not seen him, were lies which prevented Detective Shepard from performing an official function.

We have reviewed the People's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, defendant's motion for a trial order of dismissal was properly granted by the trial court.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Belen, JJ., concur. [*3]
Decision Date: May 23, 2006