People v Meachem (Matthew)
Annotate this CaseDecided on November 3, 2005
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON PATTERSON and GOLIA, JJ
2004-1178 K CR.
The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
against
Matthew B. Meachem, Appellant.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Richard Allman, J., at plea; Miriam Cyrulnik, J., at sentence), rendered June 28, 2004. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of assault in the third degree.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
The subject accusatory instrument alleges that defendant repeatedly punched a named person in the back of her head in the presence of her daughters, ages 4 and 6, causing her to suffer, inter alia, swelling on the back of the head, soreness on the back of the neck, pain and fear of further physical injury. The accusatory instrument itself is not expressly denominated either a misdemeanor complaint or an information (cf. People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 359 [2000]). The distinction between an information and a misdemeanor complaint appears, in any event, to be of no consequence in this case; herein the focus of the parties is whether under the language of the accusatory instrument, there was sufficient factual support for the element of "physical injury" with respect to the offense of assault in the third degree (see Penal Law § 10.00 [9]; § 120.00; CPL 100.15, 100.40).
Penal Law § 120.00 defines assault in the third degree as follows:
"A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when:1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person;2. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person. . . . "
The statute states, " Physical injury' means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]).
In People v Henderson (92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999]), the Court of Appeals indicated that a jury could "certainly" infer that a victim felt substantial pain where an information recited that "defendant, together with another and in an attempt to steal the victim's property, attempted to [*2]pull the victim from his motor scooter and kicked him in the legs, causing him to suffer contusions and swelling" (id.). The court further reasoned, "It is significant as well that these kicks were not the petty slaps [or] shoves . . . delivered out of . . . meanness' eschewed by the Legislature in its intended definition of physical injury,' but rather were the spearhead of a concerted physical attack aimed at forcefully taking the victim's property" (id.; see also Matter of Philip A., 49 NY2d 198 [1980]).
In light of the foregoing, we deem the accusatory instrument before us sufficient
to show, prima facie, that the victim sustained a "physical injury" within the meaning of "substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]; see also People v Pope, 174 AD2d 319
[1991]; People v Livoti, 177 Misc 2d 951 [1998]). We also note that when considering
the sufficiency of the allegations of an accusatory instrument with respect to physical injury in the sense of "substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]), "the prima facie case requirement is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial" (Henderson, 92 NY2d at 680).
Pesce, P.J., and Golia, J., concur.
Weston Patterson, J., dissents in a separate memorandum.
Weston Patterson, J., dissents and votes to reverse the judgment and dismiss
the accusatory instrument in the following memorandum.
In my view, the factual allegations contained in the accusatory instrument are insufficient to support the "physical injury" element of assault in the third degree. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority notes, "physical injury" is defined as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]). While the question of whether "substantial pain" exists necessarily contemplates a complainant's subjective reaction, "there is an objective level . . . below which the question is one of law . . . " (Matter of Philip A., 49 NY2d 198, 200 [1980]).
Here, the only allegations supporting physical injury are that the complainant was punched repeatedly in the back of the head, causing swelling, soreness and pain. Nothing in the accusatory instrument alleges the degree of pain suffered or that the complainant was in substantial pain. Under these circumstances, I conclude that the accusatory instrument is insufficient to show, prima facie, that complainant suffered physical injury (see People v Briggs, 285 AD2d 651, 652 [2d Dept 2001] [evidence that defendant punched complainant in face, that complainant suffered pain to shoulder and throat during struggle, and that complainant treated injuries with ice and Tylenol insufficient to support physical injury]; People v DiStefano, 252 AD2d 530 [2d Dept
1998] [evidence that complainant was punched twice, causing soreness and scratches and requiring the application of ice was insufficient to establish physical injury]).
Decision Date: November 03, 2005
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
