People v Tanner (Marquis)

[*1] People v Tanner (Marquis) 2021 NY Slip Op 50019(U) Decided on January 15, 2021 Appellate Term, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on January 15, 2021
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Edmead, P.J., Higgitt, McShan, JJ.
19-224

The People of the State of New York, Respondent, - -

against

Marquis Tanner, Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Judy H. Kim, J.), rendered November 19, 2018, convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of assault in the third degree, and imposing sentence.

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (Judy H. Kim, J.), rendered November 19, 2018, affirmed.

Since defendant waived prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement of a misdemeanor complaint (see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally valid, since it contained factual allegations providing reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of third-degree assault (see Penal Law § 120.00[1]). The instrument recited that defendant struck the complainant "about the face with a closed fist causing bruising and swelling to [complainant's] eye and substantial pain." Accepting these allegations as true, a reasonable person could infer that the victim felt "substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00[9]; see People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999]; People v Lang, 81 AD3d 538 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 896 [2011]), a term which simply means "more than slight or trivial pain" (People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 [2007]). Defendant's intent to cause physical injury was readily inferable from his actions (see Matter of Edward H., 61 AD3d 473, 473 [2009]; Matter of Marcel F., 233 AD2d 442, 442-443 [1996]). That other, innocent inferences could be drawn from defendant's quoted statement that the punch was thrown after the victim "took a swing" at him, "is irrelevant on this pleading stage inquiry" (People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976, 979 [1987]; People v Hernandez, 54 Misc 3d 133[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50064[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1080 [2017]).

Our review of the record indicates that defendant's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary (see People v Conceicao, 26 NY3d 375 [2015]). Under the facts presented, the court was not required to conduct a sua sponte inquiry based on defendant's post-arrest contention that the complainant "swung" at him, since defendant did not "reiterate those statements at [the] plea allocution" (People v Martorell, 88 AD3d 485, 486 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 926 [2012][internal citation omitted]; see also People v Sosa, 172 AD3d 432, 433 [2019]).All concur

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Clerk of the Court
Decision Date: January 15, 2021