Rawlins v Santana

[*1] Rawlins v Santana 2019 NY Slip Op 50451(U) Decided on April 2, 2019 Appellate Term, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on April 2, 2019
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Ling-Cohan, J.P., Cooper, Edmead, JJ.
570392/18

Maria Rawlins,

against

Charles Santana, Respondent, and MVAIC, Respondent-Appellant.

Respondent MVAIC, as limited by its briefs, appeals from that portion of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Denise M. Dominguez, J.), entered May 1, 2018, which granted petitioner leave to commence an action against MVAIC.

Per Curiam.

Order (Denise M. Dominguez, J.), entered May 1, 2018, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with $10 costs.

Civil Court properly granted petitioner's renewed application for leave to commence an action against MVAIC. Petitioner sufficiently pleaded all of the requirements of Insurance Law § 5218 for commencing an action against MVAIC (see Matter of Osorio v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 112 AD3d 831, 833 [2013]). In support of the application, petitioner provided, inter alia, a copy of the police accident report, which indicated that she was struck by a vehicle while crossing the street, and that the vehicle left the scene, but was identified in the report as a green Ford van with a specified license number. Petitioner also demonstrated that she commenced an action against the owner of said van, one Charles Santana, and that action was dismissed for lack of proof.

Having now exhausted her remedies against Santana, petitioner's renewed application for leave to sue MVAIC was properly considered (see Matter of Acosta-Collado v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 103 AD3d 714, 716 [2013]; Hauswirth v American Home Assur. Co., 244 AD2d 528, 529 [1997]). Moreover, since the proof established that "the hit-and-run accident was one in which the identity of the owner and operator of the offending vehicle was unknown or not readily ascertainable through reasonable efforts" (Matter of Troches v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 171 AD2d 873 [1991]), the application was properly granted.

We have considered respondent's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concur I concur I concur

Decision Date: April 02, 2019