People v Wele (Sada)

[*1] People v Wele (Sada) 2013 NY Slip Op 51804(U) Decided on October 30, 2013 Appellate Term, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 30, 2013
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Lowe, III, P.J., Schoenfeld, Hunter, Jr., JJ
570138/11.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Sada Wele, Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), rendered January 4, 2011, convicting him, upon a plea of guilty, of disorderly conduct, and imposing sentence.

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), rendered January 4, 2011, affirmed.

Defendant's present challenge to the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument is lacking in merit. The information — comprising the misdemeanor complaint and supporting depositions of the arresting police officer and a representative of the trademark owner — alleged, inter alia, that at a specified time at the southeast corner of Canal and Church streets in Manhattan, defendant, without the requisite license, was observed holding a black plastic bag containing hand bags bearing Coach trademarks; that defendant showed the merchandise to "numerous people" and "exchanged the merchandise with [three] customers in return for currency"; that the hand bags sold on the street by defendant were determined to be counterfeit based on several features distinguishing them from genuine Coach hand bags; and that the allegedly counterfeit trademarks appearing on the bags were registered and in use. These factual allegations, "given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), were sufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that defendant was guilty of unlicensed general vending (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 20-453) and third-degree trademark counterfeiting (see Penal Law § 165.71). For purposes of our threshold, pleading-stage inquiry, the accusatory instrument sufficiently described the trademark that was allegedly infringed (see People v Thiam, 189 Misc 2d 810, 812-813 [2001]) and supported a finding that defendant was acting in a "public space" (see Administrative Code § 20-452[d]; People v Abdurraheem, 94 AD3d 569, 570 [2012], lv denied 19
NY3d 970 [2012]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: October 30, 2013