People v Barnes (Thomas)

[*1] People v Barnes (Thomas) 2013 NY Slip Op 51249(U) Decided on July 31, 2013 Appellate Term, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on July 31, 2013
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Hunter, Jr., J.P., Torres, Shulman, JJ
570265/11.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Thomas Barnes, Defendant-Appellant,

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Robert M. Mandelbaum, J.), rendered February 16, 2011, convicting him, upon a plea of guilty, of criminal trespass in the second degree, and imposing sentence.

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (Robert M. Mandelbaum, J.), rendered February 16, 2011, affirmed.

The underlying misdemeanor information sufficiently set forth the factual basis for the charge of second-degree criminal trespass — defined as "knowingly enter[ing] or remain[ing] in a dwelling" (Penal Law § 140.15) — by alleging, inter alia, that defendant was observed inside the lobby of a public housing apartment building "beyond the vestibule," in an area located beyond a posted "No Trespassing" sign; that defendant provided a residence address different from that of the specified Housing Authority building; and that defendant was not "an invited guest in that [he] was unable to provide the identity of a resident" in the building. "[G]iven a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), these allegations were sufficient, for pleading purposes, to establish that the lobby area was part of the dwelling (see People v Quinones, 2002 NY Slip Op 50091[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 680 [2002]), and that defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully therein (see People v Babarcich, 166 AD2d 655 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 1019 [1990]). Inasmuch as the common areas of a restricted access Housing Authority building can be shown, upon proper proof, to be open only to building residents and their invitees, and not the general public (see People v Rodriguez, 159 AD2d 201, 202-203 [1990]), we reject defendant's sweeping contention that the proscriptions of the second-degree criminal trespass statute can never be applied to conduct occurring in such areas.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. [*2]
Decision Date: July 31, 2013