Matter of Hand

Matter of Hand 2018 NY Slip Op 05658 Decided on August 2, 2018 Appellate Division, Third Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided and Entered: August 2, 2018

[*1]In the Matter of STEPHANIE ASHLY HAND, an Attorney. (Attorney Registration No. 2599827)

Calendar Date: July 2, 2018
Before: Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Devine, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ.

Monica A. Duffy, Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department, Albany (Alison M. Coan of counsel), for Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Per Curiam.

Respondent was admitted to practice by this Court in 1994

and currently lists a business address in Livingston, New Jersey

with the Office of Court Administration. She was also admitted to the practice of law in New Jersey in 2000. In September 2015, respondent pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to two misdemeanor counts of willful failure to file tax returns in 2008 and 2009 (see 26 USC § 7203), and was sentenced in May 2016 on both counts to, among other things, three years of probation and restitution in the amount of $50,588. Following a jury trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, respondent was convicted in March 2017 of conspiracy in the second degree (see NJSA 2" target="_blank">see Matter of Dickstein, 105 AD3d 77, 79 [2013]).

AGC first contends that respondent's conviction for theft

by deception (see NJSA 2" target="_blank">see People v Waugh, 52 AD3d 853, 854 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 796 [2008]). Accordingly, we find that respondent's conviction for theft by deception is a proper predicate for automatic disbarment pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (a) as an analogue felony (see Matter of DuBose, 132 AD3d 180, 183 [2015]; Matter of Salzer, 230 AD2d at 102; Matter of Mina, 218 AD2d 164, 166 [1996]).

We also find that respondent's New Jersey conviction for conspiracy in the second [*3]degree (see NJSA 2" target="_blank">see Matter of Goncalves, 161 AD3d 1377, 1379 [2018]; Matter of Craft, 158 AD3d 887, 889 [2018]).[FN2]

Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Devine, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the motion of the Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department is granted in part and denied in part in accordance with the findings set forth in this decision; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent's name is hereby stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law of the State of New York, effective nunc pro tunc to March 30, 2017; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent is commanded to desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form in the State of New York, either as principal or as agent, clerk or employee of another; and respondent is hereby forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission or other public authority, or to give to another an opinion as to the law or its application, or any advice in relation thereto, or to hold herself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law in this State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall comply with the provisions of the Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters regulating the conduct of disbarred attorneys (see Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.15).

Footnotes

Footnote 1: We note respondent's failure to advise this Court of her conviction in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (see Judiciary Law § 90 [4] [c]). Moreover, respondent later failed to provide timely notice of her conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey to this Court or the Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department in contravention of Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.12 (a).

Footnote 2: Because respondent's disbarment is automatic and we have confirmed her disbarred status, we need not address AGC's alternative request to discipline respondent based upon her conviction of a serious crime pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (g).