Harris v Young

Harris v Young 2019 NY Slip Op 01572 Decided on March 6, 2019 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on March 6, 2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
LEONARD B. AUSTIN, J.P.
SHERI S. ROMAN
ROBERT J. MILLER
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
2016-09519
(Index No. 63956/13)

[*1]Naeco S. Harris, appellant,

v

Deanna Young, respondent.

Parker Waichman LLP, Port Washington, NY (Jay L. T. Breakstone of counsel), for appellant.

Russo & Tambasco, Melville, NY (Susan J. Mitola of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Denise F. Molia, J.), dated July 19, 2016. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 6, 2011. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the plaintiff's right shoulder and the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine did not constitute serious injuries under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614). In addition, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see John v Linden, 124 AD3d 598, 599; Marin v Ieni, 108 AD3d 656, 657; Richards v Tyson, 64 AD3d 760, 761). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Tinyanoff v Kuna, 98 AD3d 501, 501-502; Quintana v Arena Transp., Inc., 89 AD3d 1002, 1003-1004).

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

AUSTIN, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court