People v Davis

People v Davis 2019 NY Slip Op 08857 Decided on December 11, 2019 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 11, 2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J.
REINALDO E. RIVERA
RUTH C. BALKIN
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, JJ.
2016-09444
(Ind. No. 15-00563)

[*1]The People of the State of New York, respondent,

v

Samuel Davis, appellant.

Del Atwell, East Hampton, NY, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Anthony A. Scarpino, Jr., District Attorney, White Plains, NY (William C. Milaccio and Christine DiSalvo of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Susan Cacace, J.), rendered August 16, 2016, convicting him of sexual abuse in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, rape in the second degree (seven counts), criminal sexual act in the second degree (two counts), and rape in the third degree (three counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that one of his statements to police should have been suppressed as the product of custodial interrogation conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436) is academic, as that statement was suppressed after a pretrial hearing and was not used at trial (see People v Pierre, 159 AD3d 723, 724).

The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633).

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the sentence imposed was neither illegal (see Penal Law §§ 70.02, 70.80, 70.25, 70.45) nor excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).

The defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel is based, in part, on matter appearing on the record and, in part, on matter outside the record and, thus, constitutes a "mixed claim" of ineffective assistance of counsel (People v Maxwell, 89 AD3d 1108, 1109 [internal quotation marks omitted]; [*2]see People v Evans, 16 NY3d 571, 575 n 2). Since the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be resolved without reference to matter outside the record, a CPL 440.10 proceeding is the appropriate forum for reviewing the claim in its entirety, and we decline to review the claim on this direct appeal (see People v Freeman, 93 AD3d 805, 806; People v Maxwell, 89 AD3d at 1109).

The defendant's remaining contentions, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are without merit.

SCHEINKMAN, P.J., RIVERA, BALKIN and LEVENTHAL, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court