Mateo v Vazquez

Mateo v Vazquez 2017 NY Slip Op 06359 Decided on August 30, 2017 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on August 30, 2017 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P.
MARK C. DILLON
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
2016-03770
(Index No. 9591/14)

[*1]Felix Mateo, appellant,

v

Christina M. Vazquez, et al., respondents.

William Schwitzer & Associates, P.C., New York, NY (Howard R. Cohen of counsel), for appellant.

Lynch Daskal Emery LLP, New York, NY (Andrew J. Mundo and James R. Lynch of counsel), for respondents.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Brathwaite Nelson, J.), entered March 18, 2016, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

RIVERA, J.P., DILLON, CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court