Matter of Denzil B.

Matter of Denzil B. 2014 NY Slip Op 00349 Decided on January 22, 2014 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on January 22, 2014
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKAPPELLATE DIVISION : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
THOMAS A. DICKERSON
LEONARD B. AUSTIN
SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
2013-01762
(Docket No. D-31881-12)

[*1]In the Matter of Denzil B. (Anonymous), appellant.




Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Judith
Stern of counsel), for appellant.
Jeffrey D. Friedlander, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York,
N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Karen M.
Griffin of counsel), for respondent.


DECISION & ORDER

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (McElrath, J.), dated December 19, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated November 28, 2012, finding that the appellant had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted a violation of section 10-131(g)(1) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York which prohibits the possession of an imitation firearm, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation until February 4, 2014. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the appellant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and statements made to law enforcement personnel.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The Family Court properly denied that branch of the appellant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that there was a lawful basis to stop and detain the appellant as a suspected truant (see Education Law § 3213[2]; Matter of Shannon B., 70 NY2d 458; Matter of Kennedy T., 39 AD3d 408; Matter of D'Angelo H., 184 AD2d 1039, 1040; Matter of Devon B., 158 AD2d 519, 520), and the officer's pat down of the book bag which the appellant was wearing was reasonable under the circumstances (see Matter of Deshaun G., 88 AD3d 707, 708; Matter of Bernard G., 247 AD2d 91, 93; Matter of D'Angelo H., 184 AD2d at 1040; Matter of Mark Anthony G., 169 AD2d 89, 92-93). The evidence further established that, as a result of the pat down, the officer was justified in searching the contents of the book bag (see Matter of Marrhonda G., 81 NY2d 942; Matter of Jakwon, R., 110 AD3d 723, 725; see also Matter of Mark Anthony G., 169 AD2d at 93).

The Family Court also properly denied that branch of the appellant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements which he made to law enforcement personnel. The record is clear that the subject statements were spontaneous and not the product of custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent (see People v Rivers, 56 NY2d 476; People v Roper, 208 AD2d 571). [*2]
DILLON, J.P., DICKERSON, AUSTIN and SGROI, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court