People v Pileggi

People v Pileggi 2014 NY Slip Op 02803 Decided on April 23, 2014 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on April 23, 2014
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKAPPELLATE DIVISION : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL
SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX
JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
2012-01725
(Ind. No. 09-01616)

[*1]The People of the State of New York, respondent,

v

James Pileggi, appellant.




Green & Willstatter, White Plains, N.Y. (Theodore S. Green of
counsel), for appellant.
Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Jennifer
Spencer, Steven A. Bender, and
Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for
respondent.


DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Zambelli, J.), rendered January 17, 2012, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in making its Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371), which permitted inquiry into the defendant's prior use of illegal steroids, and his injection of a fellow police officer with illegal steroids in 2008. This prior conduct was relevant to the defendant's credibility because it demonstrated his willingness to further his self-interest at the expense of society (see id. at 377; People v Celleri, 29 AD3d 707, 709; People v Blackman, 13 AD3d 640, 641-642; People v Floyd, 143 AD2d 143).

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he acted recklessly in causing the death of the victim is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10; People v Huddleston, 101 AD3d 901). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of manslaughter in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law § 15.05[3]; People v Licitra, 47 NY2d 554; People v Johnson, 205 AD2d 707, 708). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]).

The defendant's contention that the prosecution elicited improper opinion testimony on the issue of recklessness which invaded the province of the jury is also unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Minter, 106 AD3d 934) and, in any event, without merit (see People v Kozlowski, 11 NY3d 223, 240; People v Minter, 106 AD3d at 934-935).

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its [*2]discretion in denying the defendant's request to strike the testimony of a police detective who admitted that he spoke to the prosecutor during a break in his testimony (see People v Branch, 83 NY2d 663, 667; People v Neil, 289 AD2d 611, 614-615; People v Thanh Giap, 273 AD2d 54, 55; cf. People v Robinson, 190 AD2d 697).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the supplemental charge that the Supreme Court gave in response to the jury's request for a definition of the "conscious disregard" component of recklessness was proper (see People v Lewie, 17 NY3d 348, 362-363).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
RIVERA, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and MALTESE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court