People v Guzman

People v Guzman 2014 NY Slip Op 02453 Decided on April 9, 2014 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on April 9, 2014
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKAPPELLATE DIVISION : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS
LEONARD B. AUSTIN
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
2010-09096
(Ind. No. 09-00927)

[*1]The People of the State of New York, respondent,

v

Harry Guzman, appellant.




Harry Guzman, Napanoch, N.Y., appellant pro se.
Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y.
(Raffaelina Gianfrancesco, Steven A.
Bender, and Richard Longworth
Hecht of counsel), for respondent.


DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Holdman, J.), rendered July 9, 2010, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Betancourt, 68 NY2d 707; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish his guilt of burglary in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law § 140.25[2]; People v Hammon, 47 AD3d 644; People v Balaz, 43 AD3d 949; People v Moon, 11 AD3d 486; People v Brown, 288 AD2d 233; People v Hirsch, 280 AD2d 612; People v Murray, 168 AD2d 573). Contrary to the defendant's contention, his intent to commit a crime within the subject residence was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence (see People v Barnes, 50 NY2d 375, 380; People v Bergman, 70 AD3d 1494; People v Gilmore, 199 AD2d 410, 411; People v Lide, 192 AD2d 557, 558; People v Murray, 168 AD2d 573; People v Caraballo, 138 AD2d 725), including DNA evidence linking the defendant to the crime (see People v Jones, 105 AD3d 1059, 1060; People v Dolan, 2 AD3d 745, 746; People v Rush, 242 AD2d 108).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410, cert denied 542 US 946; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to all of the convictions was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court conducted an extensive colloquy, following which the defendant executed a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel (see People v Providence, 2 NY3d 579, 583; People v Vivenzio, 62 NY2d 775; People v Anderson, 94 AD3d 1010, 1012). [*2]

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
DILLON, J.P., CHAMBERS, AUSTIN and DUFFY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court