Arias v County of Suffolk

Arias v County of Suffolk 2013 NY Slip Op 03957 Decided on June 5, 2013 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on June 5, 2013
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKAPPELLATE DIVISION : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS
SANDRA L. SGROI
SYLVIA HINDS-RADIX, JJ.
2012-04607
(Index No. 8847/09)

[*1]Lissette Arias, appellant,

v

County of Suffolk, et al., respondents.




Cannon & Acosta, LLP, Huntington, N.Y. (June Redeker of
counsel), for appellant.
Stuart P. Besen, Garden City, N.Y., for respondents.


DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Baisley, Jr., J.), dated March 30, 2012, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants submitted, inter alia, competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff submitted evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219). Thus, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
SKELOS, J.P., CHAMBERS, SGROI and HINDS-RADIX, JJ., concur.

ENTER: [*2]

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court