Lai-Hor Ng Yiu v Crevatas

Lai-Hor Ng Yiu v Crevatas 2013 NY Slip Op 00895 Decided on February 13, 2013 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on February 13, 2013
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKAPPELLATE DIVISION : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P.
L. PRISCILLA HALL
LEONARD B. AUSTIN
JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
2011-08929
(Index No. 4366/09)

[*1]Lai-Hor Ng Yiu, appellant,

v

George J. Crevatas, etc., respondent.




Leslie Elliot Krause, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Joseph Medic of
counsel), for appellant.
Devitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, Smithtown, N.Y. (Diane K.
Farrell and John Denby of counsel), for
respondent.


DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), entered August 23, 2011, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained when she tripped and fell on a sidewalk abutting the defendant's property. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the property was exempt from the liability imposed upon certain landowners pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210(b) for failure to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. The Supreme Court granted the motion.

The defendant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the property abutting the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell was improved by a two-family house, and that the property was owner-occupied and used exclusively for residential purposes (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210[b]; Schwartz v City of New York, 74 AD3d 945, 946). Thus, the defendant established, prima facie, that the property was exempt from the liability imposed pursuant to Administrative Code of City of New York § 7-210(b). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324; Schwartz v City of New York, 74 AD3d 945, 946).

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
BALKIN, J.P., HALL, AUSTIN and COHEN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court