Matter of James v Cattaraugus County

Matter of James v Cattaraugus County 2012 NY Slip Op 08950 Released on December 21, 2012 Appellate Division, Fourth Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Released on December 21, 2012
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
1338 CA 11-02004

[*1]IN THE MATTER OF ELLIOTT JAMES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

v

CATTARAUGUS COUNTY, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.


Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Cattaraugus County (Michael L. Nenno, A.J.), entered September 19, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. The judgment dismissed the petition.


ELLIOTT JAMES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT PRO SE.
THOMAS C. BRADY, COUNTY ATTORNEY, LITTLE VALLEY, FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.


It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, petitioner appeals from a judgment that dismissed his petition to compel respondent to return money and property seized in the course of a prior criminal investigation. Petitioner was convicted of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree in 1994, and the judgment of conviction was reversed by this Court in 1995 (People v James, 217 AD2d 969). We note at the outset that, although a CPLR article 78 proceeding is an "appropriate vehicle for petitioner to seek the return of his property" (Matter of Marshall v Soares, 94 AD3d 1258, 1259; see Boyle v Kelly, 42 NY2d 88, 91), "the requirement that a notice of claim be timely filed where the gravamen [of the proceeding] is the wrongful retention by a municipality of money or property after the dismissal of a criminal action in the course of which the money or property had been seized . . . may not be evaded by resort to a CPLR article 78 proceeding instead of an action in tort for conversion, or by an action upon the equitable principle of unjust enrichment" (Matter of Abramowitz v Guido, 61 AD2d 1045, 1045; see Smith v Scott, 294 AD2d 11, 17; Matter of Ganci v Tuthill, 216 AD2d 390, 390-391). Inasmuch as petitioner failed to file a notice of claim, the petition was properly dismissed.

We further conclude in any event that petitioner's claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. A petitioner "may not delay in making a demand [for the return of money or property] in order to indefinitely postpone the time within which to institute the proceeding. The petitioner must make his or her demand within a reasonable time after the right to make it occurs" (Matter of Barresi v County of Suffolk, 72 AD3d 1076, 1076, lv denied 15 NY3d 705; see Matter of Sheerin v New York Fire Dept. Arts. 1 & 1B Pension Funds, 46 NY2d 488, 495-497, rearg denied 46 NY2d 1076). Inasmuch as petitioner "proffered absolutely no excuse for his [more than 14-year] delay in making the demand" for the return of his money and property, the [*2]proceeding is barred by the doctrine of laches (Matter of Schwartz v Morgenthau, 23 AD3d 231, 233, affd 7 NY3d 427; see Matter of Thomas v City of Buffalo Inspections Dept., 275 AD2d 1004, 1004; Matter of Densmore v Altmar-Parish-Williamstown Cent. School Dist., 265 AD2d 838, 839, lv denied 94 NY2d 758). We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.
Entered: December 21, 2012
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court