People v Parker

People v Parker 2013 NY Slip Op 00988 Decided on February 14, 2013 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on February 14, 2013
Sweeny, J.P., Saxe, DeGrasse, Abdus-Salaam, Feinman, JJ.
9225 1446/07

[*1]The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v

Jamel Parker, Defendant-Appellant.




Anthony L. Ricco, New York, for appellant.
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Justin J. Braun of
counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Judith Lieb, J.), rendered January 6, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 3½ years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are unreviewable on direct appeal because they involve matters not reflected in, or not fully explained by, the trial record (see People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]; People v Love, 57 NY2d 998 [1982]). On the existing record, to the extent it permits review, we find that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards (see People v Taylor, 1 NY3d 174, 175-176 [2003]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; see also Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]).

Defendant asserts that his trial counsel's impeachment of the victim by way of prior inconsistent statements was deficient. However, counsel questioned the victim at length about his grand jury testimony, and effectively argued that inconsistencies between that testimony and his trial testimony undermined his credibility. We conclude that counsel's conduct of the trial met an "objective standard of reasonableness" (Strickland, 466 US at 688). In any event, we also conclude that regardless of whether counsel should have taken the additional impeachment [*2]measures set forth by defendant in his present argument, counsel's failure to take those measures, viewed individually or collectively, did not have a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial (id. at 694).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: FEBRUARY 14, 2013

CLERK