Matter of Gonzalez v New York City Hous. Auth.

Matter of Gonzalez v New York City Hous. Auth. 2013 NY Slip Op 08532 Decided on December 24, 2013 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 24, 2013
Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, Moskowitz, Freedman, Clark, JJ.
11393 104132/12

[*1]In re Salvador Gonzalez, Petitioner,

v

New York City Housing Authority, Respondent.




John Ciurcina, Attorney At Law, LLC, Garden City (John
Ciurcina of counsel), for petitioner.
Kelly D. MacNeal, New York (Maria Termini of counsel), for
respondent.

Determination of respondent New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), dated July 3, 2012, which approved a Hearing Officer's decision to deny petitioner's grievance seeking succession rights as a remaining family member to the tenancy of his late mother, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of Supreme Court, New York County [Cynthia Kern, J.], entered February 1, 2013), dismissed, without costs.

Substantial evidence supports the determination that petitioner is not entitled to succession rights as a remaining family member (RFM) (see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180-181 [1978]). The record establishes that petitioner's occupancy of the subject apartment was not pursuant to NYCHA's written permission (see Matter of Rahjou v Rhea, 101 AD3d 422 [1st Dept 2012]; Matter of Adler v New York City Hous. Auth., 95 AD3d 694 [1st Dept 2012], lv dismissed 20 NY3d 1053 [2013]), and there exists no basis to disturb the Hearing Officer's finding that petitioner's mother never sought or obtained the agency's written permission to add petitioner to her household (see Matter of Café La China Corp. v New York State Liq. Auth., 43 AD3d 280, 281 [1st Dept 2007]). Contrary to petitioner's contention, he is not entitled to RFM status on the ground that the agency had [*2]implicit knowledge of his alleged long-term occupancy of the apartment (see Adler at 695).

We have considered petitioner's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: DECEMBER 24, 2013

DEPUTY CLERK