Matter of Rasole v Department of Citywide Admin. Servs.

Matter of Rasole v Department of Citywide Admin. Servs. 2011 NY Slip Op 02952 Decided on April 14, 2011 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on April 14, 2011
Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Acosta, DeGrasse, JJ.
4789 109981/09

[*1]In re Paul Rasole, Petitioner-Appellant,

v

The Department of Citywide Administrative Services, et al., Respondents-Respondents.



 
Tarter Krinsky & Drogin, LLP, New York (David J. Pfeffer of
counsel), for appellant.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York
(Elizabeth I. Freedman of counsel), for respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael D. Stallman, J.), entered February 19, 2010, which denied the petition seeking, inter alia, to annul the determination of respondent New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) denying petitioner's application for a Master Fire Suppression Piping Contractor's license and dismissed the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

DOB's determination denying petitioner's license application had a rational basis (see Arbuiso v New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 64 AD3d 520, 522 [2009]). Petitioner's supervisors at two of the three companies he listed in his application submitted affidavits indicating that petitioner did not perform the type of work necessary to satisfy the prior experience requirement for obtaining such a license (see Administrative Code of the City of New York § 26-146[b]; see also Matter of Reingold v Koch, 111 AD2d 688 [1985], affd 66 NY2d 994 [1985]). Although petitioner did present evidence that he performed the appropriate type of work pursuant to permits obtained by the supervisors at a third company, the time periods authorized for those projects falls well short of the required three years. Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's contention, he did not have a due process right to a hearing regarding his initial application for a license (see Matter of Daxor Corp. v State of N.Y. Dept. Of Health, 90 NY2d 89, 97-98 [1997], cert denied 523 US 1074 [1998]), and the record establishes that he was afforded "a full and fair opportunity to be heard" (Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of the City of N.Y., Inc. v New York City Bd. of Collective Bargaining, 38 AD3d 482, 483 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 807 [2007]).

We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: APRIL 14, 2011

CLERK