State v. Montoya

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This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4 v. NO. 34,505 5 CHRISTINA MONTOYA, 6 Defendant-Appellant. 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY 8 James L. Sanchez, District Judge 9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Joseph Sullivan 13 Albuquerque, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 GARCIA, Judge. 17 {1} Defendant appeals from her convictions for driving under the influence and 1 careless driving following a de novo bench trial in the Valencia County District Court. 2 On appeal, Defendant contends that the district court erred in denying her motion for 3 directed verdict for lack of jurisdiction. This Court issued a calendar notice proposing 4 to affirm. Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition, which this Court has duly 5 considered. Because we remain unpersuaded by Defendant’s arguments, we affirm. 6 {2} Defendant contends that the Valencia County Magistrate Court did not have 7 jurisdiction to hear the criminal complaint against her, because Defendant’s single-car 8 accident occurred in Bernalillo County. While Defendant acknowledges that NMSA 9 1978, Section 35-3-6(A) (2007) provides jurisdiction to magistrate courts for 10 violations of laws involving motor vehicles that occur in adjacent counties, Defendant 11 argues that the Valencia County Magistrate Court did not have jurisdiction because 12 Defendant was not provided an opportunity to move for a change of venue to 13 Bernalillo County. 14 {3} In this Court’s calendar notice, we acknowledged that an adjacent county’s 15 jurisdiction is dependent on a defendant being “entitled to a change of venue to the 16 district court where the cause of action arose if the defendant so moves[.]” [CN 3 17 (citing Section 35-3-6(A))] To the extent Defendant argued that jurisdiction could not 18 lie in Valencia County Magistrate Court because the complaint incorrectly stated the 19 accident occurred in Valencia County, we proposed to conclude that the statute did not 2 1 make jurisdiction merely dependent on notice of the place where the criminal action 2 occurred. [CN 3] Instead, based on the plain language of the statute, we proposed to 3 conclude that jurisdiction is dependent on a defendant being permitted to exercise a 4 change of venue if he or she so moves. [CN 3] Moreover, we proposed to conclude 5 that, even if notice was required, the inclusion of a description of the physical location 6 where the accident occurred—placing the accident in Bernalillo County—was 7 sufficient to provide Defendant with notice. 8 {4} Defendant challenges this Court’s interpretation of the statute, and continues 9 to assert that notice is required for there to be jurisdiction. We assume, solely for the 10 purpose of this opinion, that Defendant’s interpretation is correct and notice is 11 required, and we limit our analysis accordingly. 12 {5} In response to this Court’s proposal that sufficient notice was provided because 13 the physical location of the accident was included in the complaint, Defendant asserts 14 that, where the officer’s sworn statement places the violation in a specific county, it 15 is reasonable for defense counsel to “presume” that this information is correct. [MIO 16 3] Defendant provides no authority in support of such a presumption. See Curry v. 17 Great Nw. Ins. Co., 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no 18 authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”). 19 Moreover, we disagree with Defendant’s assertion that such a presumption is 3 1 reasonable. It is not reasonable for defense counsel to assume that facts alleged in a 2 criminal complaint are true without undertaking any investigation. Much to the 3 contrary, we point out that defense counsel has a general duty or obligation to 4 challenge the facts asserted in a criminal complaint and conduct an independent 5 evaluation. We are therefore unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that insufficient 6 notice was provided. 7 {6} To the extent Defendant contends that she was denied due process of law due 8 to a lack of notice, this argument is also unavailing. Again, we point out that the 9 information contained in the criminal complaint was sufficient to apprise Defendant 10 of the pendency of the action and afford her an opportunity to present her objections. 11 See Maso v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, Motor Vehicle Div., 2004-NMSC-028, 12 ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 161, 96 P.3d 286 (“Actual notice is not required, so long as the notice 13 given is ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 14 parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 15 objections.’” (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 16 (1950))). Moreover, to the extent Defendant asserts a violation of her right to due 17 process, Defendant has failed to establish prejudice. See State v. Dinapoli, ___18 NMCA-___, ¶ 32, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 33,004 April 27, 2015) (“To the extent that 19 Defendant contends that the district court violated his due process rights, he must 4 1 show prejudice.” (citing State v. Neal, 2007-NMCA-086, ¶ 42, 142 N.M. 487, 167 2 P.3d 935)). 3 {7} In the present case, Defendant asserts that she was deprived of an on-record 4 appeal in Bernalillo County District Court, as opposed to the de novo trial that she 5 received in Valencia County District Court. This does not demonstrate prejudice. In 6 an on-record appeal from the metropolitan court the district court is the equivalent of 7 an appellate court. See State v. Trujillo, 1999-NMCA-003, ¶ 4, 126 N.M. 603, 973 8 P.2d 855 (“For on-record appeals the district court acts as a typical appellate court, 9 with the district judge simply reviewing the record of the metropolitan court trial for 10 legal error.”). When a court acts as an appellate court, it is not permitted to reweigh 11 evidence or assess credibility. See State v. Salas, 1999-NMCA-099, ¶ 13, 127 N.M. 12 686, 986 P.2d 482 (recognizing that it is for the fact finder to resolve any conflict in 13 the testimony of the witnesses and to determine where the weight and credibility lie); 14 see also State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031, ¶ 23, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314 15 (stating that an appellate court “may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its 16 judgment for that of the [fact finder]”). Whereas, a de novo appeal is one “in which 17 the whole case is gone into as if no trial whatever had been had in the court below.” 18 State v. Cannon, 2014-NMCA-058, ¶ 19, 326 P.3d 485 (internal quotation marks and 19 citation omitted). Thus, as a result, Defendant received an appeal that was less 5 1 deferential to the ruling of the lower court; a procedure more favorable to Defendant. 2 As a result, we conclude that Defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice, and has 3 therefore failed to establish a due process violation. 4 {8} For the reasons stated above and in this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, 5 we affirm Defendant’s convictions. 6 {9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 ________________________________ TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 9 WE CONCUR: 10 _______________________________ 11 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge 12 _______________________________ 13 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 6

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