State v. Trujillo

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This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4 v. No. 33,257 5 FRANK TRUJILLO, 6 Defendant-Appellant. 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY 8 Sarah C. Backus, District Judge 9 10 11 12 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM 13 for Appellee 14 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 15 Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender 16 Santa Fe, NM 17 for Appellant 18 19 SUTIN, Judge. MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 {1} Defendant Frank Trujillo appeals his conviction for larceny (over $2,500 but 2 not more than $20,000), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-1(A), (E) (2006), a 3 third degree felony. He challenges (1) the admission of incriminating statements that 4 he made to the investigator/director of the district attorney’s preprosecution diversion 5 (PPD) program; (2) the admission of hearsay testimony regarding information 6 contained in documents that the district court had previously ruled were inadmissible 7 on hearsay grounds; and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm on all issues. 8 BACKGROUND 9 {2} Factual and procedural details will be discussed, as required, in the body of this 10 Opinion. 11 DISCUSSION 12 Admission of Defendant’s Statements 13 {3} Prior to trial, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 14 a program director and investigator for the PPD program, Tomas Trujillo (the 15 director), would be permitted to testify at trial regarding incriminating statements that 16 Defendant made to him by telephone and in person. Defendant argued that his 17 statements were inadmissible under Rule 11-410 NMRA, which provides, in relevant 18 part, that a statement is inadmissible if it was “made during plea discussions with an 19 attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea 2 1 or resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.” Rule 11-410(A)(5). The State did not 2 take issue with whether the discussion was with an attorney. The State argued only 3 that Defendant did not rely on Rule 11-410, Defendant made unsolicited admissions, 4 and his admissions were admissible as admissions by a party opponent. See Rule 115 801(D)(2)(a) NMRA. 6 {4} After the district court considered the director’s proffered testimony and the 7 arguments by counsel, the court determined that even if discussions for consideration 8 into the PPD program could be considered plea negotiations, the facts in this case 9 indicate that Defendant did not rely on Rule 11-410 when he divulged information 10 to the director. Therefore, Defendant’s statements were not made inadmissible by 11 Rule 11-410. The district court specifically ruled that “those statements [would] be 12 admissible, if otherwise admissible.” 13 {5} On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court’s evidentiary ruling was 14 erroneous and raises the same arguments he raised at the evidentiary hearing. “With 15 respect to the admission or exclusion of evidence, we generally apply an abuse of 16 discretion standard where the application of an evidentiary rule involves an exercise 17 of discretion or judgment, but we apply a de novo standard to review any 18 interpretations of law underlying the evidentiary ruling.” DeWitt v. Rent-A-Center, 19 Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341; State v. Rojo, 3 1 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 41, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (“We review the trial court’s 2 evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”); see also State v. Martinez, 3 2008-NMSC-060, ¶ 10, 145 N.M. 220, 195 P.3d 1232 (“A misapprehension of the 4 law upon which a court bases an otherwise discretionary evidentiary ruling is subject 5 to de novo review.”). 6 {6} The district court relied on State v. Anderson, 1993-NMSC-077, 116 N.M. 599, 7 866 P.2d 327, in support of its determination that Rule 11-410 did not bar admission 8 of Defendant’s statements. In Anderson, our Supreme Court explained the purpose 9 and application of Rule 11-410. “[T]he purpose of Rule [11-]410 is to encourage 10 negotiations between the defendant and the [prosecution].” Anderson, 1993-NMSC11 077, ¶ 12. “[T]he determinative factor in excluding statements pursuant to the rule is 12 whether it may be naturally inferred that the defendant relied on the rule in deciding 13 to break silence[.]” Id. “[W]hether the defendant relies on the rule depends on the 14 facts of any given case.” Id. 15 {7} “Reliance on the rule” means that the defendant had a subjective belief that his 16 offer to plead and related statements would not be used against him. Id. ¶ 13. If the 17 prosecution induces the defendant to break his silence, there is an irrebuttable 18 presumption that he relied on the rule in breaking his silence. 19 20 [W]hen a suspect is induced by the [prosecution] to engage in plea negotiations, as in formal plea negotiations with a state attorney (or an 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 agent of the attorney), there will be an irrebuttable presumption that such person has relied on the rule in breaking his silence, and all statements made during the course of “making a deal” are inadmissible in future proceedings, whether the statements are offers to confess or offers to plead guilty, and regardless of whether the declarant has been formally charged with a crime. The court may be guided by the established standards of voluntariness in finding inducement by the [prosecution]. 9 Id. ¶ 14. 10 {8} The defendant in Anderson was arrested in Texas and charged with commercial 11 and residential burglary. Id. ¶ 3. While in custody for those charges, the defendant 12 spoke to detectives from New Mexico about a murder that was committed in Santa 13 Fe. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant received his Miranda warnings, waived his Miranda rights, 14 and made implicatory statements to the New Mexico detectives. Id. Later, he told a 15 Texas officer that he would confess to committing the Santa Fe murder if the Texas 16 charges were dropped and the agreement was in writing. Id. The district court found 17 that the defendant’s offer to make a deal was voluntary, and the district court admitted 18 the Texas officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s statements. Id. ¶¶ 4, 20. Our 19 Supreme Court affirmed. Id. ¶¶ 1, 20, 27. 20 {9} In the present case, Defendant made incriminating statements to the director 21 on two separate occasions—by telephone and in person. As an initial matter, we note 22 that the director gave conflicting testimony as to whether he informed Defendant that 23 any statements he made would not be used against him. However, it was up to the 5 1 district court, as the factfinder during the evidentiary hearing, to resolve any conflicts 2 in the director’s testimony. State v. Bloom, 1977-NMSC-016, ¶ 5, 90 N.M. 192, 561 3 P.2d 465 (stating that conflicts in evidence are to be resolved by the finder of fact, 4 including conflicts in the testimony of a witness). As an appellate court, we will not 5 reweigh the evidence on appeal. See id. 6 {10} There was evidence that the director sent a preindictment letter to Defendant 7 advising him to obtain an attorney and then to schedule a meeting to determine if he 8 would be appropriate for the PPD program based on allegations that Defendant had 9 used his previous employer’s gasoline card for more than $2,500 in unauthorized 10 purchases. See NMSA 1978, § 31-16A-6(A) (1981) (stating that “[a] defendant must 11 secure or be appointed defense counsel to be present at a [PPD] screening interview 12 prior to applying for acceptance into a [PPD] program”). Before obtaining counsel, 13 Defendant called the director and made incriminating statements. During the 14 telephone conversation, the director advised Defendant to obtain counsel multiple 15 times but Defendant continued to talk; the conversation got “heated,” and Defendant 16 hung up the telephone on the director. While we acknowledge that Defendant called 17 the director in response to the director’s letter, there is no evidence that the director 18 induced Defendant to break his silence and make incriminating statements. Cf. State 6 1 v. Hastings, 1993-NMCA-111, ¶ 11, 116 N.M. 344, 862 P.2d 452 (recognizing that 2 “[n]o defendant is compelled to participate in or even apply for a PPD program”). 3 {11} After Defendant was indicted for larceny, defense counsel contacted the 4 director and asked him to reconsider Defendant for the PPD program. Following this 5 conversation, Defendant went to the director’s office, without counsel but upon his 6 counsel’s direction, and made additional incriminating statements. But see § 31-16A7 6(A) (requiring defense counsel to be present at a PPD screening interview). 8 According to the director, they went to an interview room, and Defendant “started 9 blurting out stuff.” 10 {12} We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 11 Defendant did not rely on Rule 11-410 when he made incriminating statements to the 12 director by telephone or in person. See State v. Martinez, 1983-NMSC-018, ¶ 9, 99 13 N.M. 353, 658 P.2d 428 (holding that the defendant’s offer to plead guilty to murder 14 was voluntary and admissible and noting that the defendant was “urged to talk to her 15 attorney before she made the statement” and she “repeatedly insisted on making the 16 statement, contrary to the advice of her attorney”); State v. Fernandez, 17 1994-NMCA-056, ¶ 30, 117 N.M. 673, 875 P.2d 1104 (holding that even if the letter 18 at issue was construed as an offer to plea bargain, “statements volunteered by the 19 [d]efendant in contacts he initiated with authorities are beyond the protection of 7 1 [Rule] 11-410” and there was no evidence that the defendant relied on Rule 11-410 2 in initiating this contact). The statements made by Defendant were not made in 3 reliance of Rule 11-410, as a result of inducement by the State, nor during formal plea 4 negotiations. See Anderson, 1993-NMSC-077, ¶ 1. We affirm. 5 Admission of Hearsay 6 {13} Defendant asserts that the district court abused its discretion by allowing 7 testimony as to the value of fuel charges made by a non-employee of AC Towing. 8 Defendant argues that Ms. Cohn’s testimony as to the value of fuel charges made by 9 a non-employee of AC Towing was hearsay because it was based purely on credit 10 card activity reports she received from Conoco Phillips, which Defendant contends 11 were inadmissible hearsay documents. He insists that he has preserved this error 12 because his counsel objected “as clearly as possible” to both the introduction of the 13 “fuel company records” and to Ms. Cohn’s testimony as to value. The State counters 14 that this error was not preserved for review because Defendant did not object to either 15 the question regarding value or to any references to the “activity reports” received 16 from Conoco Phillips. For the following reasons, we agree with the State that this 17 alleged error was not preserved for our review. 18 {14} We reviewed the trial transcript in depth in order to fully understand Ms. 19 Cohn’s testimony and Defendant’s objections. Ms. Cohn testified that she and her 8 1 husband owned the business, AC Towing, where Defendant had been a tow truck 2 driver, and that she was the bookkeeper for AC Towing. Ms. Cohn stated that, as AC 3 Towing’s bookkeeper, she was responsible for billing customers, overseeing the 4 company’s payroll, and paying AC Towing’s fuel bills so their drivers could purchase 5 fuel. Ms. Cohn testified that each driver is issued a “fuel card” with a unique PIN 6 number in order to pay for fuel and that each driver was supposed to enter their 7 unique PIN and odometer reading when purchasing fuel. Only the driver and Ms. 8 Cohn knew the individual driver’s PIN number. 9 {15} After Defendant stopped working for AC Towing for the second time, AC 10 Towing did not receive the company’s fuel card from him. After some time, Ms. Cohn 11 noticed irregularities pertaining to the fuel card that had been issued to Defendant. 12 She stated it was her customary practice to pay AC Towing’s fuel bill regularly 13 without checking each transaction, but she decided to check every transaction after 14 she noticed the fuel bills were irregularly high. When Ms. Cohn testified that she 15 noticed Defendant specifically was using his fuel card after he was no longer an 16 employee, defense counsel objected for lack of foundation, which was sustained. 17 {16} Presumably to lay a foundation, Ms. Cohn next described how she checked 18 particular fuel charges after she noticed the irregularities. She called the fuel 19 company, Conoco Phillips, for documentation they had on Defendant’s fuel card 9 1 being swiped and she also called the gas station for any video footage of the card 2 being swiped. Ms. Cohn testified that the documentation she received from Conoco 3 Phillips was a list of all transactions, including times and dates of the transactions. 4 The State then asked if the transactions were specific to each individual employee; 5 defense counsel objected based on hearsay, and the objection was sustained. The 6 State then asked “when you got the activity report, was that how you started verifying 7 the fuel charges?” Ms. Cohn responded, “yes.” The term “activity report” seems to 8 have been used in reference to the extra transaction-related documentation Ms. Cohn 9 had requested and received from Conoco Phillips. 10 {17} The State next asked how Ms. Cohn “monitor[ed] the fuel reports in general.” 11 Ms. Cohn explained that the driver had his fuel card and PIN and that’s how AC 12 Towing monitored who purchased fuel. The State then referred to “credit card 13 statement[s]” and “bills” and asked how Ms. Cohn, as part of her course of business, 14 went about paying AC Towing’s fuel bills. Ms. Cohn stated that she would get the 15 credit card statement at the end of the month and would review the transactions in the 16 monthly statements and that the drivers are supposed to turn in receipts after they 17 purchase fuel. The State asked Ms. Cohn from where she was getting the 18 “statements,” to which Ms. Cohn replied “Conoco Phillips.” When asked if she would 19 recognize the statements, Ms. Cohn confirmed she would recognize the statements 10 1 from Conoco Phillips. Defense counsel objected, and the district court asked counsel 2 to approach the bench. 3 {18} At the bench conference, defense counsel stated he may have objected too 4 early, but that he was objecting to the use of the monthly credit card billing 5 statements for both hearsay and foundation reasons because he did not believe the 6 State had a custodian of records from Conoco Phillips; as such, he objected to “these 7 being used in any manner whatsoever.” The State argued that the statements were 8 kept in AC Towing’s regular course of business to monitor their fuel cards, that the 9 statements showed the irregularities Ms. Cohn noticed regarding the use of 10 Defendant’s card and PIN, and that Ms. Cohn should be able to testify as to the 11 billings AC Towing received on the fuel cards. The district court told the State that 12 Ms. Cohn may testify that she received the bills, but “what those bills actually said 13 though, I think you need somebody else to authenticate those specific records.” 14 During the conference, no one used the phrase “activity report.” Rather, only “bills,” 15 “statements,” and “records” were mentioned. 16 {19} As direct examination continued, the State asked to approach Ms. Cohn and 17 then asked Ms. Cohn, “you indicated that you received from Phillips 66 a number of 18 activity logs, and I do not want to get into any of the details of those logs, . . . Do you 19 recognize these documents that have been previously marked State’s Exhibits 1, 2, 11 1 3, 4, and 5?” Ms. Cohn responded, “yes, I do.” The documents the State showed Ms. 2 Cohn appear to be the activity reports, not the monthly statements that were objected 3 to before and during the bench conference, since the “activity logs” were what the 4 State referenced in its question. However, with no specification as to activity reports 5 or monthly statements as the source of information, the State asked Ms. Cohn 6 generally if there were fuel charges that AC Towing had to pay that were not charged 7 by any of AC Towing’s current employees, to which Ms. Cohn answered, “yes” 8 before being cut off by an objection by defense counsel. The defense did not state a 9 reason for his objection, and the court overruled the objection. It is reasonable to 10 assume that the State’s question as to fuel charges sought information that Ms. Cohn 11 could know only from an analysis of either the activity reports, the monthly 12 statements, or both. Defendant’s counsel did not follow up with any request for a 13 further bench conference or with a request to be heard on the specific basis for his 14 objection. 15 {20} The State continued, asking Ms. Cohn approximately how much a non- 16 employee had charged for fuel. “In total?” Ms. Cohn asked; “in total,” the State 17 repeated. Ms. Cohn replied, “approximately $4,500.” The State paused for 18 approximately ten seconds before ending its direct examination. Defendant did not 19 object during or after this exchange. 12 1 {21} On cross-examination, Defendant’s counsel asked five questions on four 2 topics: whether more than one person ever used the same card, whether Ms. Cohn 3 reviewed the fuel bills monthly, how long it took Ms. Cohn to realize the 4 irregularities in the fuel bills, and whether Ms. Cohn remembered when Defendant 5 was fired from AC Towing. 6 {22} In the context of this part of the trial, the record shows that Defendant’s 7 counsel made four objections in total with the following court rulings: first, a 8 sustained foundation objection when Ms. Cohn testified that Defendant used his fuel 9 card after he was no longer an employee; second, a sustained hearsay objection when 10 the State asked if the activity logs were specific to individual employees; third, what 11 appears to have been a sustained hearsay and lack of foundation objection when Ms. 12 Cohn confirmed that she would recognize the monthly fuel bills; and finally, an 13 overruled bare objection when the State asked whether Mrs. Cohn paid fuel charges 14 that were unattributable to AC Towing’s current employees. None of Defendant’s 15 objections related to the actual value of charges made by a non-employee, which is 16 the specific testimony Defendant argues on appeal was erroneously admitted. Further, 17 Defendant had ample opportunity to object to the activity reports’ use in general for 18 any substantive purpose and failed to do so. When the State asked to approach Ms. 19 Cohn and showed her the documents marked as Exhibits 1-5, which we presume to 13 1 be the activity logs given the prosecutor’s reference, Defendant did not object. As the 2 State referenced the activity logs, Defendant did not object. While it is unclear 3 whether Ms. Cohn was relying on the monthly statements or the activity logs, at the 4 critical moment when the State explicitly asked Ms. Cohn how much was charged by 5 a non-employee, Defendant did not object. 6 {23} We are not persuaded that any of Defendant’s objections was sufficiently 7 timely, specific, or ongoing to serve as a basis for claiming that the district court 8 abused any discretion in connection with Ms. Cohn’s testimony as to the value of fuel 9 charges made by a non-employee of AC Towing. We are similarly not persuaded that 10 Defendant preserved the objection on which he now relies. And, finally, it is unclear 11 whether the testimony that Defendant complains of was ever the subject of an 12 objection. We conclude that Defendant did not adequately or properly object or 13 otherwise preserve an objection to Ms. Cohn’s testimony as to value or to the use of 14 the activity logs. See Rule 11-103(A)(1)(a) NMRA (requiring that in order to preserve 15 a claim of error, a party must make a timely objection); State v. Neswood, 200216 NMCA-081, ¶ 18, 132 N.M. 505, 51 P.3d 1159 (“Generally, evidentiary objections 17 must be made at the time the evidence is offered.”); State v. Smith, 1999-NMCA-154, 18 ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 467, 994 P.2d 47 (stating that this Court will not review an argument 19 that was not preserved). 14 15 1 Sufficiency of the Evidence 2 {24} Defendant contends that the State failed to prove that he used the fuel card and 3 that the value of unauthorized charges was more than $2,500 because his conviction 4 was based on inadmissible evidence and no video evidence was produced showing 5 Defendant using the card. See UJI 14-1601 NMRA; § 30-16-1(A), (E). 6 {25} “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, [the appellate courts] must view 7 the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable 8 inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” State 9 v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176. “The relevant 10 question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 11 prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 12 crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (alteration, emphasis, internal quotation marks, 13 and citation omitted). 14 {26} The director testified at trial that, during their first conversation, Defendant told 15 him that “he had taken the truck and he was using the truck and he used the card[.]” 16 During their second conversation, Defendant told the director “he knew what he had 17 done” and “he’d rather go to jail than pay [restitution].” Ms. Cohn testified that 18 Defendant had been an employee of the towing company; as an employee, he had a 19 fuel card; upon his termination, he did not return that card; after his termination, the 16 1 fuel charges increased; and the amount of unauthorized charges was approximately 2 $4,500. Indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, we conclude that 3 the State presented sufficient evidence that Defendant used the fuel card and that the 4 value of unauthorized charges was more than $2,500. 5 CONCLUSION 6 {27} We affirm. 7 {28} IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 __________________________________ JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 10 WE CONCUR: 11 _______________________________ 12 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 13 _______________________________ 14 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 17

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