New Jersey v. Hummel

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                                   State v. Lori A. Hummel (A-36-16) (078476)

Argued October 24, 2017 -- Decided March 13, 2018

TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court.

      The Court considers the legality of the police’s search and seizure of the contents of defendant Lori
Hummel’s handbag while she was detained at the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office.

         On December 5, 2010, Thomas Carbin was stabbed to death. On December 7, 2010, Investigator Gary
Krohn advised defendant that he was going to bring her to the police station for two outstanding traffic bench
warrants; he drove her to the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office. There, he introduced defendant to Detective
Bryn Wilden and Sergeant James Ballenger. Detective Wilden then escorted defendant into an interrogation room.

         Defendant placed her purse on the table in front of her. Around 1:56 p m., Detective Wilden and Sergeant
Ballenger entered defendant’s interrogation room to begin questioning her. The detectives took seats at the table
without removing defendant’s purse or frisking her. About a minute into questioning, defendant reached into and
rummaged through her purse to retrieve her cell phone. She checked the time and advised the detectives that she
had to pick up her daughter by 3:20 p m. The detectives did not comment on her time constraint. Detective Wilden
then asked defendant to raise her right hand and swore her in. The detectives began asking defendant substantive
questions without advising her of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966). In response to
questions from the detectives about her cell phone, defendant began to look through her purse for a receipt showing
her recent cell phone purchase. The detectives kept questioning defendant about her relationship with the victim.

         The detectives left defendant alone in the room. She put her belongings back into her purse and stepped
outside, asking if she could leave to pick up her daughter. The detectives did not permit her to leave. She then
asked, “Am I arrested?” Detective Wilden responded that “technically” she had traffic warrants and that they still
had questions for her. Defendant stated that she thought she wanted to get a lawyer. After briefly asking questions
about defendant’s decision to retain a lawyer, the detectives ceased talking to defendant and left the room.

          Soon after, Detective Wilden cuffed defendant’s right ankle to a bar on the floor and told defendant that she
was being detained and that she had an outstanding warrant. Defendant asked several times whether she could make
a phone call to her lawyer. Detective Wilden took defendant’s purse from the table, and defendant stated that she
did not like that he had her pocketbook. Sergeant Ballenger responded that defendant was “in custody.” As
Detective Wilden began walking out, defendant said, “Hopefully that $500 ain’t missing out of there.”

          In response to defendant’s comment, the detectives began taking everything out of her purse. They asked if
she would rather search the purse herself, but defendant declined. Detective Wilden found two electronic benefits
transfer (EBT) cards issued through New Jersey’s “Families First” supplemental income program. He asked
defendant if the cards were hers. She responded that everything in the pocketbook was hers. Detective Wilden read
her the name of another individual on one of the cards. Defendant disavowed that she knew that individual or how
the card wound up in her purse. Detective Wilden then put all the items back into the purse and left the room with
it. The detectives left defendant shackled for over two hours. At one point she asked why she could not get a
lawyer, and the detectives failed to allow her to call one. Around 5:48 p.m., the detectives unsecured defendant’s
ankle and escorted her out of the room to be released. Police arrested defendant three days later.

         Defendant moved to suppress her statements to police and the physical evidence obtained during her
interrogation. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress her statements to police but denied her motion
to suppress physical evidence. Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress physical
evidence. The Appellate Division panel found that the Families First EBT card should have been suppressed
                                                          1
because the detectives’ inventory search developed into a warrantless investigatory search. The panel ruled that
defendant could apply within thirty days to withdraw her guilty plea and to have her conviction vacated and her case
listed for trial. The Court denied defendant’s petition for certification, 
229 N.J. 3 (2017), but granted the State’s
cross-petition for certification, 
229 N.J. 17 (2017).

HELD: The Court finds no valid inventory search and therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s determination that the
evidence seized during the search should be suppressed.

1. One narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is the inventory search. An inventory search
is not an independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding
incarceration. Police may search an arrestee without a warrant and inventory the property in the arrestee’s possession
before he or she is jailed. Such searches “serve[] a three-fold purpose: protection of the inventoried property while in
police custody, shielding the police and storage bailees from false property claims, and safeguarding the police from
potential danger.” State v. Mangold, 
82 N.J. 575, 581-82 (1980). (pp. 12-13)

2. An inventory search must be reasonable under the circumstances to pass constitutional muster. In Mangold, the
Court explained that the propriety of an inventory search involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the impoundment of
the property is justified; and (2) whether the inventory procedure was legal. Id. at 583. For there to be a lawful
inventory search, there must be a lawful impoundment. Courts need only analyze the reasonableness of the inventory
search if the impoundment is justified. Several factors are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry. They include “the
scope of the search, the procedure used, and the availability of less intrusive alternatives.” Id. at 584. (pp. 13-14)

3. Under the first Mangold inquiry, the detectives’ impoundment of defendant’s purse was not justified. The
detectives had not arrested defendant before seeking to impound her purse. Defendant kept her purse open and
within her reach for the entire interrogation. She rummaged through her bag several times in front of the detectives.
The detectives did not frisk defendant at any point during her detention. They sought to remove her bag from the
interrogation room only after she asked for an attorney. Crucially, they asked defendant if she would rather examine
the contents of her purse herself. It is clear that had valid safety concerns existed at the time they sought to impound
her bag, the officers would not have given defendant the option to search her own purse. (pp. 14-15)

4. Even if the initial impoundment was justified under the first Mangold inquiry, the search would fail under the
balancing test required by the second. The detectives initiated the search to find the $500 defendant claimed her
purse contained. The scope of the search should have been limited to that $500. The State concedes that the
departmental policy for inventory searches is unknown. There is no way then to determine whether the detectives’
search was executed according to any purported policy or practice. Finally, the detectives had reasonable, less
intrusive alternatives available to protect them against false theft claims that would have simultaneously respected
defendant’s constitutionally protected privacy rights. The inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement does not apply, and the detectives’ search was unconstitutional. (pp. 15-18)

5. The State concedes that the detectives did not conduct a “traditional” inventory search. The record reveals that
nearly every aspect of the purported inventory search was not “traditional.” They did not formally arrest her that
day, but rather let her leave and arrested her three days later. The Court remands to permit defendant to raise issues
she has preserved before a PCR court, or withdraw her guilty plea and continue before the trial court. (pp. 18-19)

        The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED and the matter is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

          JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART, concurs in the
judgment but expresses the view that the Court should have re-considered the denial of defendant’s petition for
certification. By not hearing now defendant’s multi-faceted argument that improper police procedures rendered all
of her statements and all evidence obtained during her custodial interrogation fruits of the poisonous tree, the Court
missed addressing the prerequisite question to an inventory-search analysis, according to Justice LaVecchia.

         CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON
join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate, partially concurring and
partially dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE ALBIN joins.
                                                           2
                                      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                        A-
36 September Term 2016
                                                 078476

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

    Plaintiff-Appellant,

         v.

LORI A. HUMMEL,

    Defendant-Respondent.


         Argued October 24, 2017 – Decided March 13, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division.

         Sara M. Quigley, Deputy Attorney General,
         argued the cause for appellant (Christopher
         S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Sara
         M. Quigley, of counsel and on the briefs).

         Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant Deputy Public
         Defender, argued the cause for respondent
         (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
         attorney; Elizabeth C. Jarit, of counsel and
         on the briefs).

         Alexi Machek Velez argued the cause for
         amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union
         of New Jersey Foundation (Edward L. Barocas,
         Legal Director, attorney; Alexi Machek
         Velez, Alexander R. Shalom, Edward L.
         Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero on the
         brief).

JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

    This case is before us on the narrow issue of the legality

of the police’s search and seizure of the contents of defendant

Lori Hummel’s handbag while she was detained at the Gloucester

                                1
County Prosecutor’s Office.    We find no valid inventory search.

We therefore affirm the Appellate Division’s determination that

the evidence seized during the search should be suppressed.       We

remand to permit the defendant to withdraw her guilty plea and

continue at the trial court level or, in the alternative, to

proceed before a PCR court on other issues she has preserved.

                                  I.

    We cull the following facts from the record.

                                  A.

    On December 5, 2010, Thomas Carbin was stabbed to death in

his apartment in Westville, New Jersey.   His lifeless body was

found the following morning.   The Gloucester County Prosecutor’s

Office began interviewing individuals to obtain information

about Carbin and learned that defendant was in Carbin’s “circle

of acquaintances.”

    On December 7, 2010, Woodbury Heights Investigator Gary

Krohn observed defendant at a Wawa convenience store located in

Woodbury Heights.    Defendant knew Investigator Krohn from her

prior employment and approached his vehicle to talk.    During

their conversation, Investigator Krohn discovered that defendant

had two outstanding traffic bench warrants.    He contacted the

Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office to confirm that detectives

wanted to speak with defendant.    Investigator Krohn thereafter

advised defendant that he was going to bring her to the police

                                  2
station for the traffic warrants but assured her that she would

be released on her own recognizance.

    Investigator Krohn drove defendant and her friend, who had

been driving defendant’s car without a valid driver’s license,

to the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office instead of the

court that had issued the warrant.     There, Investigator Krohn

introduced defendant to Detective Bryn Wilden and Sergeant James

Ballenger.    Detective Wilden then escorted defendant and her

friend into separate interrogation rooms.

    Defendant placed her purse on the table in front of her.

Around 1:56 p.m., Detective Wilden and Sergeant Ballenger

entered defendant’s interrogation room to begin questioning her.

The detectives took seats at the table without removing

defendant’s purse or frisking her.     Defendant immediately asked

the detectives, “What is it about?”     Detective Wilden replied

that they would “explain that to [her] in just a minute” and

began asking defendant about her background.     About a minute

into questioning, defendant reached into and rummaged through

her purse to retrieve her cell phone.    She checked the time and

advised the detectives that she had to pick up her daughter by

3:20 p.m.    The detectives did not comment on her time

constraint.   Detective Wilden then asked defendant to raise her

right hand and swore her in.    The detectives began asking



                                  3
defendant substantive questions without advising her of her

rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966).

    Detective Wilden asked defendant if she had any idea why

they were interested in talking to her, to which she responded,

“I have no idea.   I thought it was over a taillight, but

apparently not, and now I’m scared.”     Detective Wilden assured

defendant that there was no reason to be scared and told her

that her name had come up during an investigation.     Defendant

indicated her apprehension to give the detectives her home

address, and Detective Wilden assured her that anything she told

them would be kept confidential.

    Detective Wilden then asked defendant questions about her

whereabouts the day before.   In response to questions from the

detectives about her cell phone, defendant began to look through

her purse for a receipt showing her recent cell phone purchase.

After handing Sergeant Ballenger the receipts from her purse,

defendant asked, “Can you tell me what’s going on here?”

Detective Wilden explained that they were investigating someone

named “Tom.”   He assured defendant that she would be able to

leave in time to pick up her daughter.

    Defendant again expressed concern about giving the

detectives certain information.    The detectives nonetheless kept

questioning her, asking more specifically about her relationship

with the victim.   Defendant consistently denied being at the

                                   4
victim’s apartment on the date of the murder.     A little over an

hour into the interrogation, Sergeant Ballenger began

questioning defendant about the victim’s roof, claiming that

they had collected footprints.    Defendant offered her boots to

Sergeant Ballenger for inspection by lifting her feet toward

him, allowing him to see the bottom of each boot.     The

detectives noted that they saw “discoloration” on one boot.

Sergeant Ballenger left the room, and defendant took that boot

off her foot and handed it to Detective Wilden.    With

defendant’s boot in his possession, Detective Wilden also left

the room.

    The detectives returned with a consent-to-search form.

Defendant stated that they could “absolutely” search her boot

and initialed next to each item on the consent form as Detective

Wilden read the form to her.     The detectives again left

defendant alone in the room.     She put her belongings back into

her purse and stepped outside the door, asking if she could

leave because she needed to pick up her daughter.     The

detectives did not permit her to leave.

    She then asked, “Am I arrested?”      Detective Wilden

responded that “technically” she had traffic warrants.

Defendant claimed that the two officers had “jerked [her]

around.”    Detective Wilden told defendant that they still had

questions for her.    Defendant indicated that she did not want to

                                  5
give any more answers at that time.       She stated that she thought

she wanted to get a lawyer.    After briefly asking questions

about defendant’s decision to retain a lawyer, the detectives

ceased talking to defendant and left the room.

    Soon after, Detective Wilden and Sergeant Ballenger asked

defendant to sit down in a chair in the corner of the

interrogation room.   Detective Wilden cuffed defendant’s right

ankle to a bar on the floor next to the chair and told defendant

that she was being detained and that she had an outstanding

warrant.   Defendant asked several times whether she could make a

phone call to her lawyer.     Detective Wilden took defendant’s

purse from the table, and defendant stated that she did not like

that he had her pocketbook.    Sergeant Ballenger responded that

defendant was “in custody.”    As Detective Wilden began walking

out, defendant said, “Hopefully that $500 ain’t missing out of

there.”

    In response to defendant’s comment, the detectives began

taking everything out of her purse and placing each item on the

table in the interrogation room.       Sergeant Ballenger asked where

the $500 was located; defendant responded that it was in her

wallet.    They asked if she would rather search the purse

herself, but defendant declined.       While conducting the search,

Detective Wilden found two electronic benefits transfer (EBT)

cards issued through New Jersey’s “Families First” supplemental

                                   6
income program.   He asked defendant if the cards were hers.      She

responded that everything in the pocketbook was hers.      Detective

Wilden read her the name of another individual on one of the

cards.    Defendant disavowed that she knew that individual or how

the card wound up in her purse.       Detective Wilden then put all

the items back into the purse and left the room with it.

       The detectives left defendant shackled in the interrogation

room for over two hours.    At one point she asked why she could

not get a lawyer, and the detectives failed to allow her to call

one.    Around 5:48 p.m., the detectives unsecured defendant’s

ankle and escorted her out of the room to be released.

                                  B.

       Police arrested defendant three days later, on December 10,

2010.    On April 27, 2011, a Gloucester County Grand Jury

returned an indictment, charging defendant with first-degree

murder, contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); first-degree

felony murder, contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degree

robbery, contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; third-degree possession

of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4(d); and fourth-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful

purpose, contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d).       On February 15, 2013,

an accusation additionally charged defendant with third-degree

conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS),

contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3).      Defendant waived

                                  7
her right to an indictment in exchange for the State amending

her first-degree murder charge to first-degree aggravated

manslaughter, contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1).     The

indictment and accusation were then consolidated for

disposition.

    Defendant moved to suppress her statements to police and

the physical evidence obtained during her December 7, 2010

interrogation.    After hearing testimony and the parties’

arguments and reviewing the video-recorded interrogation, the

trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress her

statements to police, but denied her motion to suppress physical

evidence.    Regarding the first motion, the court ruled that the

officers conducted a custodial interrogation of defendant

without giving defendant her Miranda warnings.     The trial court

reached this conclusion after considering the totality of the

circumstances, which it found demonstrated defendant’s

reasonable basis to believe that she was not free to leave the

prosecutor’s office.

    Despite its ruling that defendant’s statements should be

suppressed, the trial court determined that Miranda did not

apply to the physical evidence the officers retrieved from

defendant.     Finding that defendant’s action of placing her boots

on the table in front of the officers constituted voluntary,

non-custodial conduct, the court ruled that the boots did not

                                   8
warrant suppression under the “fruit of the poisonous tree”

doctrine.   The court likewise denied suppression of the Families

First EBT card that did not bear defendant’s name because the

officers had discovered the card in plain view while conducting

a valid inventory search of defendant’s purse.

    Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to

first-degree aggravated manslaughter and third-degree conspiracy

to distribute CDS.   On March 28, 2013, the trial court sentenced

defendant to a twenty-four-year prison term with an eighty-five

percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early

Release Act (NERA), 
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a), on the aggravated

manslaughter conviction to run concurrently with a four-year

prison sentence on defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to

distribute a CDS.

    Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of her

motion to suppress physical evidence.   The Appellate Division

panel affirmed in part and reversed in part in an unpublished

opinion filed on September 14, 2016.    The panel affirmed as to

the boots but found that the Families First EBT card should have

been suppressed because the detectives’ inventory search

developed into a warrantless investigatory search.   The panel

ruled that defendant could apply within thirty days to withdraw

her guilty plea and to have her conviction vacated and her case

listed for trial.

                                9
    Defendant petitioned for certification, which we denied.


229 N.J. 3 (2017).   We granted the State’s cross-petition for

certification.   
229 N.J. 17 (2017).    We also granted the

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey’s (ACLU) motion to

participate as amicus curiae.

                                II.

                                A.

    The State asserts that the detectives sought to remove

defendant’s purse from the interrogation room to protect their

safety, not to search it.   The State argues that the detectives

conducted a lawful inventory search of the purse after defendant

stated that she hoped the $500 in her purse was not missing when

they returned to the room with it.     Characterizing that

statement as a threat, the State urges this Court to balance the

officers’ intrusion on defendant’s Fourth Amendment privacy

interests in the purse against the legitimate governmental

interest to protect the detectives from defendant’s potential

false theft claim.   The State argues that balancing those

competing interests reveals that an immediate inventory search

of her purse was “absolutely necessary” in light of defendant’s

explicit threat to accuse the detectives of theft.

                                B.

    Defendant argues that the inventory-search exception to the

Fourth Amendment is “a limited rule of necessity” that is only

                                10
applicable upon satisfaction of certain conditions.   Defendant

asserts that the detectives here conducted an unlawful inventory

search of her belongings for four reasons:   (1) the detectives

did not become bailees of her belongings because they never

arrested and jailed defendant; (2) there is no evidence

suggesting that the detectives followed a standard inventory

procedure or created an inventory search list; (3) the

detectives did not provide defendant an opportunity to make

other arrangements for her property before they began their

intrusive search; and (4) the search went beyond that necessary

to prevent any false theft claims.   Finally, defendant argues

that the State’s interests in protecting the detectives from

false theft claims and safety threats are undermined by the

detectives’ failures to create an inventory list of defendant’s

items and frisk her at any point during her detainment.

                                C.

    Amicus curiae the ACLU insists that the detectives

conducted an unlawful investigatory search contrary to the

Fourth Amendment and urges this Court to uphold our well-

established precedent for inventory searches.   The ACLU echoes

defendant’s argument that the narrow inventory-search exception

applies only where officers satisfy certain conditions.    The

ACLU contends that:   (1) the detectives did not search

defendant’s purse as part of a routine pre-incarceration

                                11
administrative procedure; (2) the State cannot justify an

illegal search based upon defendant’s conduct after the

detectives had already begun that search; and (3) the detectives

could have accomplished the goal of avoiding false theft

accusations and ensuring safety through less intrusive means.

                               III.

                                A.

    The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect

individuals against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”      U.S.

Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.     This fundamental

protection encompasses the privacy rights of our citizenry.

Through it, our Court has carefully delineated standards of

police conduct that strike a balance between individual privacy

expectations and government interests.

    While recognizing this balance, our Fourth Amendment

opinions have “expresse[d] a clear preference for government

officials to obtain a warrant issued by a neutral and detached

judicial officer before executing a search.”    State v. Edmonds,


211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012).   For that reason, “a warrantless

search is presumptively invalid.”     Id. at 130.   The State bears

the burden to demonstrate that a warrantless search is

reasonable because it fits within a recognized exception to the



                                12
warrant requirement.    State v. Davila, 
203 N.J. 97, 111-12

(2010) (citing State v. Hill, 
115 N.J. 169, 173-74 (1989)).

       One narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant

requirement is the inventory search.     See Colorado v. Bertine,


479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 
462 U.S. 640,

643-48 (1983); State v. Mangold, 
82 N.J. 575 (1980).     An

“inventory search is not an independent legal concept but rather

an incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding

incarceration.”   Lafayette, 
462 U.S.  at 644 (emphasis added).

Police may search an arrestee without a warrant and inventory

the property in the arrestee’s possession before he or she is

jailed.    Id. at 646; accord State v. Paturzzio, 
292 N.J. Super.
 542, 550 (App. Div. 1996).    Such searches “serve[] a three-fold

purpose:   protection of the inventoried property while in police

custody, shielding the police and storage bailees from false

property claims, and safeguarding the police from potential

danger.”   Mangold, 
82 N.J. at 581-82 (citing South Dakota v.

Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)).

       That an inventory search is administrative in nature does

not relieve it from Fourth Amendment strictures.     See id. at

583.    An inventory search is still a search and must be

reasonable under the circumstances to pass constitutional

muster.    See id. at 584.   In Mangold, we explained that the

propriety of an inventory search involves a two-step inquiry:

                                  13
(1) whether the impoundment of the property is justified; and

(2) whether the inventory procedure was legal.   Id. at 583.    For

there to be a lawful inventory search, there must be a lawful

impoundment.   Ibid. (“The threshold consideration is of

fundamental importance as it is the act of impoundment which

generates the necessity for the inventory.”).    Courts need only

analyze the reasonableness of the inventory search if the

impoundment is justified.

    Several factors are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.

They include “the scope of the search, the procedure used, and

the availability of less intrusive alternatives.”   Id. at 584.

While no factor alone is dispositive, a balancing of each

against the others ensures that “[t]he inventory search

procedure [is] no more intrusive than reasonably necessary to

respond to the protective functions which fostered its

creation.”   Id. at 587.

                                B.

    Applying those principles to the present case, we hold that

the detectives conducted an invalid inventory search contrary to

the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New

Jersey Constitution.

    Under the first Mangold inquiry, we conclude that the

detectives’ impoundment of defendant’s purse was not justified.


82 N.J. at 583.   The State argues that the detectives sought to

                                14
remove defendant’s purse from the interrogation room due to

safety concerns.     Although we recognize that safety concerns may

warrant the impoundment of property in some cases, those

concerns did not justify the impoundment here.

    The detectives had not arrested defendant before seeking to

impound her purse.     Defendant kept her purse open and within her

reach for the entire interrogation.        During questioning, she

rummaged through her bag several times in front of the

detectives.   The detectives did not frisk defendant at any point

during her detention.     They sought to remove her bag from the

interrogation room only after she asked for an attorney.

Crucially, at the beginning of their search, they asked

defendant if she would rather examine the contents of her purse

herself.   It is clear that had valid safety concerns existed at

the time they sought to impound her bag, the officers would not

have given defendant the option to search her own purse.       We

therefore reject any contention that safety concerns justified

the detectives’ removal of her bag from the interrogation room.

    Because we find that the impoundment of defendant’s purse

was not justified, the inventory search exception does not apply

to the detectives’ search.     See ibid.    However, even if the

initial impoundment was justified under the first Mangold

inquiry, the search would fail under the balancing test required

by the second.

                                  15
    The State asserts that the detectives inventoried the items

in defendant’s purse to protect themselves against defendant’s

immediate and explicit theft threat.     Their search, however,

cannot withstand the balancing test we articulated in Mangold.

Under that test, we consider factors like “the scope of the

search, the procedure used, and the availability of less

intrusive alternatives.”   Id. at 584.

    Here, the detectives initiated the search to find the $500

defendant claimed her purse contained.     The scope of the search

should have been limited to that $500.     Detective Wilden instead

broadened his search to include an inspection of the details on

cards found inside.   As this clearly exceeded the search’s

scope, that first factor weighs in defendant’s favor.

    With respect to the second factor, whether law enforcement

conducted the search pursuant to routine police procedures is

essential.   Law enforcement may not use inventory searches as “a

ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating

evidence.”   Florida v. Wells, 
495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).

Standardized procedures prevent the searching officer from

having “so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into

'a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of

crime.’”   Ibid. (quoting Bertine, 
479 U.S.  at 376 (Blackmun, J.,

concurring)).   Searches conducted at variance with or in the



                                16
absence of standardized practices are unlikely to satisfy the

inventory-search warrant exception.

    The State concedes that the departmental policy for

inventory searches pertaining to Detective Wilden and Sergeant

Ballenger is unknown.   There is no way then for this Court to

determine whether the detectives’ search was executed according

to any purported administrative policy or practice.   Indeed, the

State acknowledges that the detectives had to “improvise” in

light of defendant’s perceived theft threat.   If anything, that

concession suggests to the Court that the detectives did not act

in accordance with a standard inventory search procedure.

    Finally, we find that the detectives had reasonable, less

intrusive alternatives available to protect them against false

theft claims that would have simultaneously respected

defendant’s constitutionally protected privacy rights.    They

could have, for example, placed defendant’s purse directly into

a sealed evidence bag or asked defendant to make arrangements

for someone to retrieve the bag from the prosecutor’s office.

    Because the balance tips very heavily in favor of

defendant’s constitutionally protected privacy interests, we

cannot find that the handbag search here was conducted “with the

intent to foster the protective functions it was designed to

promote.”   Mangold, 
82 N.J. at 584.   Our conclusion is further

supported by the detectives’ decision to continue interrogating

                                17
defendant about items they found inside her purse other than the

$500 she claimed was in the bag.       We find that the inventory

search exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement

does not apply and that the detectives’ search was

unconstitutional.   See State v. Badessa, 
185 N.J. 303, 311

(2005) (explaining that “the State is barred from introduction

into evidence the 'fruits of an unlawful search or seizure by

the police’”).   We therefore affirm the appellate panel’s

determination that the evidence seized through the search should

have been suppressed.
1 See id. at 577-80.

     The State concedes that the detectives did not conduct a

“traditional” inventory search.    Our review of the record

reveals that nearly every aspect of the purported inventory

search was not “traditional.”     They did not formally arrest her

that day, but rather let her leave and arrested her three days

later.




1  Defendant argues that her trial counsel did not challenge the
constitutionality of her detention before the trial court. She
asserts, therefore, that the nature of defendant’s traffic
warrant is not clear from the record, and the trial court did
not address whether the detectives lawfully detained defendant
at the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office. We acknowledge
that the legality of defendant’s detention has not yet been
briefed or argued before this or any other court. At this time,
we defer any comment other than to recognize that defendant has
preserved this issue for a possible later challenge -- either
before a PCR court or, should defendant withdraw her guilty
plea, before the trial court during further proceedings in this
case.
                                  18
                               IV.

    We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand

to permit defendant to raise issues she has preserved before a

PCR court, or withdraw her guilty plea and continue before the

trial court.


     CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. JUSTICE
LaVECCHIA filed a separate, partially concurring and partially
dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE ALBIN joins.




                               19
                                         SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                           A-
36 September Term 2016
                                                    078476

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

           v.

LORI A. HUMMEL,

      Defendant-Respondent.

      JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, concurring in part, dissenting in part.

      I concur in the judgment affirming the suppression of the

evidence seized during the search of defendant’s handbag.      We

granted the State’s cross-petition for certification to

determine the legality of the inventory search.    We erred,

however, in denying defendant’s petition.

      In her petition, defendant argued that the failure to honor

her Miranda1 rights tainted all the police conduct that followed

the police taking her into custody.   Underlying the petition,

moreover, was whether the police unlawfully detained defendant.

If she is right, plain error permeates her interrogation and the

fruits of that poisoned investigation.    Yet, by taking only the

State’s petition and addressing only the State’s claimed error

in the suppression of its alleged inventory search, we have

fomented piecemeal review of defendant’s claims.    The Court’s


1   Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                 1
failure to reach those issues at this time disserves the

interest of justice.

    Arguments and issues are being reviewed in isolation when

instead they should be considered in tandem because they affect

one another.   Issues concerning search and seizure are generally

assessed using a totality of the circumstances approach, looking

at the entire picture of the case, and not engaging in a

piecemeal analysis.    See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 
228 N.J. 566,

587 (2017); State v. Rosario, 
229 N.J. 263, 275 (2017); State v.

Johnson, 
171 N.J. 192, 214-17 (2002).

    In the petition that we did not take, defendant claimed

that her entire questioning was coercive and fundamentally

unfair in numerous respects, all exacerbated by the lack of

warnings.   No one contests that defendant should have been

warned of her Miranda rights because she was in a custodial

interrogation.   The trial court held as much, and the Appellate

Division affirmed.    Both courts relied on the lack of warnings

to suppress defendant’s verbal responses to questioning.

However, because we did not take defendant’s petition, defendant

has been deprived of our review of the claimed coercive impact

of the lack of warnings and custodial interrogation on all other

evidence the State secured from her during the unusual

circumstances surrounding her detention.    The remand will not

correct the mistake.

                                  2
     The majority’s analysis ignores the elephant in the room:

There is absolutely no reason to analyze whether this was a

lawfully conducted inventory search if defendant was unfairly

questioned in a custodial interrogation and unlawfully detained.

A lawful detention is a condition precedent for a lawful

inventory search.   Illinois v. Lafayette, 
462 U.S. 640, 643

(1983) (“It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes

the authority to search.”); see also State v. Padilla, 
321 N.J.

Super. 96, 111 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b., 
163 N.J. 3 (2000).

     I understand that trial counsel did not use the proper

incantation -- did not use words declaring a “challenge” to

defendant’s detention.     See ante at 18 n.1.   But, the challenge

was present nonetheless.    The thrust of defendant’s appeal was

an attack on the voluntariness of her presence at the

prosecutor’s office.2    Defendant contends there were multiple


2  The trial court’s clear and compelling findings indicate that
defendant was detained and suggest that the detention was
unlawful:

          Here, in considering the totality of the
          circumstances, it appears to this Court that
          defendant did not believe she was free to
          leave. Defendant was confronted with active
          warrants at the Wawa convenience store and
          transported by law enforcement officers to the
          Prosecutor’s Office.    Even if she was not
          arrested, she knew that the police had a basis
          to have her arrested based on those warrants.
          Defendant agreed to accompany the police upon
          being notified that they would release her on
          her own recognizance if she agreed to come in
                                  3
misleading and coercive steps taken against her, including that

she was told she was being brought to police headquarters to be

released on her own recognizance on traffic warrants when

instead she was transported to the prosecutor’s office as a

person of interest in a homicide investigation.   She alleges she

was subjected to misinformation and duplicity during an

interrogation while uncounseled in her rights.    (It bears

repeating that no one disputes that her Miranda rights were

violated, as found by the trial court and the Appellate

Division.)   The officers also promised her confidentiality,

which our appellate courts and sister states have held to be

antithetical to the privilege against self-incrimination.      See,

e.g., Hopkins v. Cockrell, 
325 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2003);

Leger v. Commonwealth, 
400 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2013); State v.

Fletcher, 
380 N.J. Super. 80, 82 (App. Div. 2005).   Thus, she

challenged directly the “consensual” nature of her interrogation

by investigators, who refused to let her leave or receive phone

calls, and who eventually chained her to a bar on the floor.




          and speak to the Prosecutor’s Office.     That
          inherent compulsion leads this Court to find
          that she was not 'invited’ and did not consent
          to going to police headquarters . . . . [She]
          had to leave her car behind . . . . Clearly,
          if defendant wanted to leave, she would have
          had to ask the police for a ride back or walk
          at least a mile.

                                 4
    Based on the Appellate Division’s opinion one can view the

lack-of-Miranda-warnings argument by defendant as resolved.

Rule 3:22-5 expressly bars post-conviction relief if “a prior

adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief is

conclusive.”   When this Court decided not to take defendant’s

petition, we left defendant with two options:    Being forced to

try to convince a trial court or a PCR court that her arguments

were not fully resolved on appeal and attempt to secure from the

court a fresh look at those arguments, or being relegated to a

claim that her trial attorney’s failure to challenge her

detention amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Defendant’s arguments deserved review along with the

State’s arguments on direct appeal.    That contextual review

mattered here.   Defendant’s appellate counsel tried valiantly to

place in context the essential questions in this matter.    She

did so without breaching professional protocols, even while

including a forthright footnote in her Appellate Division brief,

noted again to us in oral argument, preserving for a potential

ineffective assistance of counsel claim the trial counsel’s

failure to utter the right words:    I challenge the

constitutionality of defendant’s detention.

    We can recognize plain error when it stares us in the face.

The issue of the lawfulness of defendant’s detention permeated

the issues defendant raised in argument before the Appellate

                                 5
Division and incorporated in her petition to this Court.     We

should not be sending this matter back for procedural

permutations that will result in wasting judicial resources,

time, and money.

    By not hearing now defendant’s arguments about the lack-of-

warnings’ impact on her entire interaction with the

investigators, we missed addressing the prerequisite question to

an inventory-search analysis.   We should have allowed that to

come to the fore, rather than waste time answering a back-end

question that may well be unnecessary.   After hearing the oral

argument in this matter, we should have re-considered our denial

of defendant’s petition for certification and indulgently viewed

her multi-faceted argument that improper police procedures

rendered all of her statements and all evidence obtained during

her custodial interrogation fruits of the poisonous tree.     See

Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v.

Lee, 
190 N.J. 270, 277-78 (2007) (“Pursuant to the exclusionary

rule, the State may not introduce evidence obtained from an

unlawful search or seizure by the police.”).   If further

briefing and additional argument was a collateral consequence,

or if a remand for further fact-finding were necessary, none of

that would have been extraordinary for this Court.    See, e.g.,

State v. Dunbar, 
229 N.J. 521, 525 (2017); State v. Moore, 
180 N.J. 459, 460 (2004) (“And this Court having determined on prior

                                6
occasions that when resolution of a critical issue depends on a

full and complete record the Court should await, before

decision, the development of such a record.”).   In the long run,

it would have been more efficient than the road that now lies

ahead in this criminal matter.

    We could have and should have put this case swiftly on

track, and that failure, for me, necessitates this separate

dissent.




                                 7