New Jersey v. Minitee

SYLLABUS

 

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

 

State v. Alnesha Minitee/State v. Darnell Bland (A-70/71-10) (066771)

 

Argued January 17, 2012 -- Decided June 14, 2012

 

JUDGE WEFING (temporarily assigned), writing for a majority of the Court.

The Court considers whether, in the circumstances of this case, evidence obtained from a warrantless vehicle search conducted after the vehicle was towed to police headquarters should be suppressed.

After some period of time, members of the Bergen County Sheriff s Office s Bureau of Criminal Investigation arrived at headquarters and searched the SUV. They did not obtain a search warrant before they conducted the search. The search turned up pages of classified ads for massage parlors in the area, the names of which had been marked with either an asterisk, a no, or next ; rolls of duct tape and electrical tape; a videotape of a robbery of an East Brunswick massage parlor; and other evidence. The record does not reveal the time the SUV was searched, but multiple pursuits were in progress at the time, including one involving a K-9 unit searching for the men who had fled on foot. One of the men, Almustafa Baldwin, was found two miles away in another municipality. While Baldwin was being processed at police headquarters, he told the officers that he had discarded a gun after the robbery. Most of the members of the Fort Lee Police Department were deployed to search for the weapon. They were joined by police from a neighboring municipality and members of the Port Authority Police Department. The officers searched through the night without success, and a resident called police the next morning to report that he had discovered a gun next to his garbage can. In the early morning hours after the robbery, several sites were being processed by officers: the spa, the site where the gun and purse had been discarded by defendant Bland; the site where a jacket discarded by one of the fleeing robbers was discovered; and the site where the SUV came to a halt.

After Minitee and Bland were charged with a series of robberies that took place in Middlesex, Essex and Bergen Counties, the defense filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the warrantless search of the SUV. The trial court, satisfied that there was a confluence of probable cause and exigency, found no basis to suppress the evidence. Bland entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one count of first-degree robbery. Minitee proceeded to trial and was convicted of five counts of first-degree robbery.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court s ruling denying suppression, 415 N.J. Super.475 (App. Div. 2010). The Supreme Court granted the State s petition for certification. 205 N.J.81 (2011).

HELD: Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly denied the defendants motion to suppress because the warrantless search of the SUV that was involved in the robbery fit within the scope of the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement.

1. The United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution guarantee an individual s right to be secure against unreasonable searches or seizures. A search conducted without a warrant is presumed to be invalid. There are exceptions to the warrant requirement, and the State bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the credible evidence that one of the exceptions applies. Only two exceptions are pertinent to this matter the search incident to arrest exception and the automobile exception. With regard to search incident to arrest, when police place an individual under arrest, they may search his person and the area within his immediate grasp. In the automobile context, New Jersey restricts the scope of the search to the area from which an individual may seize a weapon or destroy evidence. The search in this case cannot be sustained as one incident to Minitee s arrest. It can only withstand challenge if its circumstances bring it within the scope of the automobile exception. (pp. 10-13)

2. The New Jersey Constitution provides citizens with greater protections than its federal counterpart. Under New Jersey law, three factors are considered before applying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement: 1) whether the stop was unplanned and unforeseen--the police must have no advance knowledge of the events to unfold so that they cannot create the exigency; 2) whether police had probable cause to believe the automobile contained evidence of criminality; and 3) whether exigent circumstances made it impractical to obtain a warrant. (pp. 13-16)

3. The Appellate Division based its conclusion that exigent circumstances were lacking in this case on State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J.6 (2009), which discussed facts that can contribute to the presence of exigent circumstances, such as the time of day, location of the stop, unfolding events establishing probable cause, whether it would be safe to leave the car unguarded, and others. However, the discussion in Pena-Floreswas not intended to provide an exhaustive list and was focused on the facts of that case. In this case, other facts demonstrate that police were confronted with exigent circumstances. These include an armed robbery, at least two perpetrators on the run who were possibly armed, a search for them that spanned several municipalities, and an attempt to find a discarded weapon before a bystander was injured or it was taken and hidden for future criminal activity. Additionally, the site where the SUV came to rest was poorly lit and not amenable to a thorough search, and the officers had no assurance that the perpetrators on the run were not in the vicinity and able to fire at them. Because the facts of Pena-Floresare distinguishable from this matter, its legal principles are not dispositive of this case. (pp. 16-18)

4. State v. Martin, 87 N.J.561 (1981), is instructive. In Martin, police located a car involved in a robbery and could see in the car a glove that matched the description of a glove worn by one of the robbers. The police had the car towed to the station and searched it without a warrant. The Court upheld the search, explaining that the suspected robbers were at large, lighting where the car was discovered was dim, exigency was heightened by the fact that police were actively involved in an ongoing investigation shortly after the robbery and near to where it occurred, and there was an urgent need to ascertain whether the car contained evidence of the armed robbery before the suspects could leave the area or destroy or dispose of other evidence. (pp. 18-19)

5. In this case, it is not dispositive that the vehicle had been at police headquarters for some time before it was searched. The difficulties the officers faced were exacerbated by the multiple sites that had to be examined for clues, the critical need to locate the handgun, and the fact that events were unfolding close to midnight in the dead of winter. The officers actions were reasonable under the circumstances. (pp. 19-20)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the defendants convictions are REINSTATED.

 

JUSTICE ALBIN, DISSENTING, is of the view that because three hours or more separated the seizure of the SUV and its search and no effort was made to secure even a telephonic warrant, the State did not establish that it was impractical to secure a warrant due to an urgent, immediate need to conduct a search. He agrees with the Appellate Division that the State failed to demonstrate exigent circumstances supporting a bypass of the warrant requirement.

 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, HOENS, and PATTERSON join in JUDGE WEFING s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion.

 

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-70/ 71 September Term 2010

066771

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALNESHA MINITEE,

Defendant-Respondent.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DARNELL BLAND,

Defendant-Respondent.

ArguedJanuary17,2012 DecidedJune14,2012

 

OncertificationtotheSuperiorCourt,AppellateDivision,whoseopinionisreportedat415N.J.Super.475(2010).

 

JoieD.Piderit,AssistantProsecutor,arguedthecauseforappellantinStatev.AlneshaMinitee(BruceJ.Kaplan,MiddlesexCountyProsecutor,attorney).

 

StevenA.Yomtov,DeputyAttorneyGeneral,arguedthecauseforappellantinStatev.DarnellBland(JeffreyS.Chiesa,AttorneyGeneralofNewJersey,attorney).

 

StephenW.Kirsch,AssistantDeputyPublicDefender,arguedthecauseforrespondentDarnellBland(JosephE.Krakora,PublicDefender,attorney).

 

MichaelJ.Confusione,DesignatedCounsel,arguedthecauseforrespondentAlneshaMinitee(JosephE.Krakora,PublicDefender,attorney).

 

PeterJ.GallagherarguedthecauseforamicuscuriaeAssociationofCriminalDefenseLawyersofNewJersey(Porzio,Bromberg&Newman,attorneys).

 

JUDGEWEFING(temporarilyassigned)deliveredtheopinionoftheCourt.

Followingthetrialcourt sdenialofdefendants motiontosuppress,defendantBlandenteredanegotiatedpleaofguiltytoonecountoffirst-degreerobbery,N.J.S.A.2C:15-1. DefendantMiniteeelectedtoproceedtotrialandwasconvictedoffivecountsoffirst-degreerobbery,N.J.S.A.2C:15-1. Defendantsappealed,andtheAppellateDivisionconcludedthatthetrialcourterredwhenitdenieddefendants suppressionmotionand,asaresult,vacateddefendants convictions. Statev.Minitee,415N.J.Super.475,478(App.Div.2010). WegrantedboththeState spetitionforcertification,205N.J.81(2011),andthemotionoftheAssociationofCriminalDefenseLawyersofNewJersey( Association )toappearasamicuscuriae. BecausewearesatisfiedthattheAppellateDivisionerredinitsanalysisandconclusion,wereverseandreinstatedefendants convictions.

 

I.

DefendantswerechargedwithaseriesofrobberiesthattookplaceinMiddlesex,Essex,andBergenCounties. DefendantMiniteewasapprehendedalmostimmediatelyaftertheBergenCountyincident,whiledefendantBlandwasarrestedseveralmonthslaterwhenoneofthevictimsoftheBergenCountycrimeidentifiedhispictureinaphotoarray. WhenMiniteewasarrested,shewasstandingnexttoaredSUVthatthepolicehadfollowedfromtherobberyscene. Thesearchofthatvehicleproducedevidencelinkingthepartiestotheseriesofrobberies. DefendantsBlandandMiniteebothmovedtosuppresstheresultsofthatsearchbutwereunsuccessful. AtthetrialofdefendantMinitee,whichledtoherconviction,theStateintroducedevidencethatwasobtainedduringthesearchoftheSUV.

WethusturntothefactssurroundingMinitee sarrestandthesubsequentsearchoftheSUV. Shortlyafter10:30p.m.ontheeveningofJanuary24,2003,PoliceOfficerAlejandroLorenzooftheFortLeePoliceDepartmentheardonhispoliceradiothatanarmedrobberywasinprogressatKOASpa,whichwaslocatedrightaroundthecornerfromwherehewashavingamealbreak. Herushedtothesceneandfoundagroupofpeoplestandingoutside,severalofwhompointedoutaredSUVstoppedintrafficatalight. TheyyelledouttoLorenzothattheoccupantsoftheSUVwerearmedandhad justrobbedtheplace. ThedriveroftheSUVwastryingtosqueezethevehiclearoundthesurroundingtraffic;LorenzodrewhisweaponandorderedtheoccupantsintheSUVtogetout. Afterrepeatinghisorderseveraltimes,oneman,lateridentifiedasdefendantBland,gotoutofareardoorofthevehicle,holdingapurseandagun. OfficerLorenzoorderedhimtodropboth,andhedidso;Lorenzothenorderedhimtogetonhiskneesonthesidewalk. Blandmovedasiftocomplyandthenfledonfoot.

LorenzomadenoattempttofollowBlandbutcontinuedhisfocusontheSUV. HerepeatedhisordertogetouttothoseremainingintheSUV,butthetrafficlightturnedgreenandthevehiclebegantodriveaway. LorenzoranafteritashortdistanceandthenradioedintodispatchtheroutethattheSUVwastakingaswellasthedirectioninwhichBlandhadrun.

OthermembersoftheFortLeePoliceDepartment,includingPoliceOfficerMichaelGerardo,heardLorenzo'sbroadcast. GerardospottedtheSUVandfollowedit. Gerardodidnotturnonhislightsandsirenbecausehedidnotwanttoalertthedrivertohispresence. TheroutetheSUVtookledtoBeverlyHillsRoad,whichwasadead-endstreet. WhenGerardoarrivedatthestoppedSUV,MiniteeandLiakeshaJoneswerestandingnexttothevehicle. ThewomentoldGerardotheywerethevictimsofacarjacking. Gerardononethelessorderedthemtolayontheground,andhewaitedforbackupofficers,whoarrivedshortlythereafter. Miniteetoldthepolicethattheyhadbeencarjackedbytwoblackmaleswhohadfledonfootwhenthecarreachedtheendofthedead-endstreet.

Thedriver s-sidedooroftheSUVwasopen,andoneofthebackupofficerswhohadarrivedonthescene,DetectiveHowardGinsburg,lookedintothevehicle. Hesaw,inplainview,tworollsofducttapeontherearpassengerseatandfloor. Theofficersatthesceneknewfromradiotransmissionsthatthevictimsoftherobberyhadbeentiedupwithducttape. Fromamotorvehiclecheck,theofficerslearnedthatMiniteewastheregisteredowneroftheSUV. BasedonGinsburg sobservationoftheducttapeandGerardo strackingoftheSUVfromtheimmediatevicinityoftherobbery,thepolicetookMiniteeandJonestopoliceheadquartersforquestioningandarrangedfortheSUVtobetowedtothatlocationaswell.

TherecordisunclearastotheexacttimesMinitee,Jones,andtheSUVarrivedatpoliceheadquarters. Itisclear,however,thattheydidnotarrivesimultaneously. ThepolicehadtocallanindependenttowcompanytotowtheSUVtopoliceheadquartersand,whenMiniteeandJonesweretakentopoliceheadquarters,anotherofficerwasleftwiththeSUVtoawaitthearrivalofthetowtruck. Whenthevehicleultimatelyarrivedatpoliceheadquarters,itwasnotimmediatelysearchedbut,rather,wasplacedinasecuresallyportforsafekeeping.

Aftersomeperiodoftime,theexactlengthofwhichcannotbedeterminedfromtherecordbeforeus,membersoftheBergenCountySheriff sOfficeassignedtoitsBureauofCriminalInvestigation( Bureau )arrivedatheadquartersandsearchedtheSUV. Thesearchofthevehicleturnedupthefollowingitems: pagesofclassifiedadsfromTheStarLedgerformassageparlorsinthearea,thenamesofwhichhadbeenmarkedwitheitheranasterisk,a no or next ;fourrollsofducttapeandonerollofelectricaltape;avideotapeofarobberyofamassageparlorinEastBrunswick;abrownandwhitewoolhat;ablackskullcap;ablackwoolvisor;ablackskimask;acheckbookinthenameofAnthonyHerns;acellphone;andapieceofpaperwithhandwrittendirections.

AlthoughtherecorddoesnotindicatetheexacttimetheSUVwassearched,therewastestimonyatthesuppressionhearingthatthemembersoftheBureaudidnotfinishprocessingthecrimesceneatthespauntilshortlybefore2:00a.m. Therewasalsotestimonythatthereweremultiplepursuitsinprogressduringtheinterim,includingoneinvolvingaK-9unit,aspolicesearchedforthemenwhohadfledonfoot. Oneofthemen,AlmustafaBaldwin,wasfoundsometwomilesawayinanothermunicipality;defendantBland,aswenotedearlier,wasnotapprehendeduntilmonthslater.

DetectiveGinsburgtestifiedatthesuppressionhearingthatwhenBaldwinwasbeingprocessedatpoliceheadquarters,hetoldtheofficersthathehaddiscardedagunaftertherobbery. Baldwinvolunteeredtoshowthemwherehehadtossedit. Afterbeingplacedinapolicecartogoretrievetheweapon,Baldwinchangedhismindandsaidthathewouldnottaketheofficerstothesite. Ginsburgtestifiedthatatthatpoint,mostofthemembersoftheFortLeePoliceDepartmentweredeployedtosearchfortheweapon;hetestifiedthattheywerejoinedintheireffortsbypolicefromaneighboringmunicipality,aswellasbymembersofthePortAuthorityPoliceDepartment. Theysearchedthroughthenightwithnoluck. Thenextmorning,aresidentofBeverlyHillsRoadcalledthepolicetoreportthathehaddiscoveredagunnexttohisgarbagecan.

TestimonyrevealedthatinfacttherewereseveralsitestheBureauneededtoprocessinthoseearlymorninghours: thespa;thesitewherethegunandpursehadbeendiscardedbydefendantBland;thesitewhereajacketdiscardedbyoneofthefleeingrobbershadbeendiscovered;andthesitewheretheSUVhadcometoahalt.

ThepolicehadnotobtainedawarrantpriortoundertakingthesearchoftheSUV. Thetrialcourt,satisfiedthattherewasaconfluenceofprobablecauseandexigency,foundnobasistosuppresstheproductsofthesearch. TheAppellateDivision,ontheotherhand,consideringthesituationgovernedbyStatev.Pena-Flores,198N.J.6(2009),reversed.

II.

BeforethisCourt,theStatepresentsdistinctargumentswithrespecttodefendantMiniteeanddefendantBland. AstodefendantMinitee,theStatearguesthattheAppellateDivisionwasincorrectwhenitdeemedthismattertobecontrolledbyPena-Flores. Itcontendsthat,instead,thismatterisanalogoustoStatev.Martin,87N.J.561(1981),acaseinwhichthisCourtupheldthewarrantlesssearchofavehiclebelievedtobetiedtoarobbery. TheStatecontendsthatthepoliceactedinanentirelyreasonablemannerwhentheydidnotimmediatelysearchtheSUVwhereitcametoahaltbutinsteadhadittowedtoheadquarters. TheStatestressestheongoingandfluidnatureofthesituationthatconfrontedthepoliceandarguesthattheAppellateDivisionshouldnothavetakenthisCourt sreferenceinPena-Flores,toobtainingatelephonicsearchwarrant,asastandardbywhichtomeasurepoliceconductthatoccurredsomesixyearsbeforethisCourtdecidedPena-Flores.

WithrespecttodefendantBland,theStatestressesthatthepoliceweredealingwithexigentcircumstances. TheStatearguesthatevenifthepolicehadbeenabletoapplytelephonicallyforasearchwarrantin2003,exigentcircumstanceswouldberequired. Initsview,becauseexigentcircumstancesexisted,thewarrantlesssearchin2003waspermissible. TheStatealsoarguesthatBland,asapassengerintheSUV,lackedstandingtochallengethesearchoftheSUV;itcontendsthathedidnothavetherequisiteproprietaryorparticipatoryinterestinthevehicleortheitemsseized. Inaddition,theStatearguesthatthisCourtsetdownanewruleoflawinPena-Floresandthattheruleswearticulatedinthatcaseshouldnotbeappliedretroactivelytothismatter.

DefendantMinitee,ontheotherhand,arguesthattheAppellateDivisioncorrectlyheldthathermotiontosuppressshouldhavebeengranted. ShecontendsthatthesearchoftheSUVcannotbeupheldasasearchincidenttoarrestandthatitdoesnotfitwithintheautomobileexceptiontothewarrantrequirement. AccordingtoMinitee,whateverexigencymayhaveexistedwhenthepolicefirstcameupontheSUVattheendofthedead-endroadhadevaporatedbythetimethevehiclewassearchedatpoliceheadquarters.

DefendantBlandarguesthatnoexigencyexistedatthetimethatthevehiclewassearchedandthusthatthefailureonthepartofthepolicetosecureawarrantpriortothesearchrequiredthathismotiontosuppressbegranted. DefendantBlandcontendsthatthereisnoincongruitybetweenMartinandPena-Flores;heurgesthatthesituationconfrontingtheFortLeepolicewasnotcomparabletothatpresentedinMartinandthatMartinprovidesnobasistoupholdthewarrantlesssearchthattookplacehere. Finally,hestressesthisState straditionallygenerousviewofstandingwhenanalyzingmotionstosuppressandassertsthathehadtherequisiteparticipatoryinterestintheSUVanditscontents. SeeStatev.Mollica,114N.J.329,339(1989)(notingNewJersey appliesabroadstandard toquestionsofstanding).

AmicusAssociationarguesthattheAppellateDivisioncorrectlyheldthesearchoftheSUVwasimpermissible. Itstressesthepolicyconsiderationsunderlyingtheautomobileexceptiontothewarrantrequirementandcontendsthatthosepolicyconsiderationsdonotpermittheremovalofavehiclefromthesceneandasubsequentwarrantlesssearchinthesecurityofapolicelot.

III.

Wenoteattheoutsetthestandardgoverningourreviewofthismatter. Asanappellatecourt,wedonotmakeindependentfindingsoffact. Statev.Locurto,157N.J.463,471(1999). Rather,we mustupholdthefactualfindingsunderlyingthetrialcourt sdecisionsolongasthosefindingsaresupportedbysufficientcredibleevidenceintherecord. Statev.Robinson,200N.J.1,15(2009)(quotingStatev.Elders,192N.J.224,243(2007)). Morethanfiftyyearsago,thisCourtsuccinctlystatedthegoverningprinciples: ifareviewingcourtissatisfiedthatatrialcourtcouldreasonablyhavereacheditsfindingsonsufficientcredibleevidenceintherecord, itstaskiscompleteanditshouldnotdisturbtheresult,eventhoughithasthefeelingitmighthavereachedadifferentconclusionwereitthetrialtribunal. Statev.Johnson,42N.J.146,162(1964). ThisCourthasnotretreatedfromthoseprinciplesbut,rather,hascontinuedtorestatethem. See,e.g.,Statev.Handy,206N.J.39,44-45(2011);Elders,supra,192N.J.at243-45. Ontheotherhand, areviewingcourtowesnodeferencetothetrialcourtindeciding mattersoflaw. Statev.Mann,203N.J.328,337(2010)(citingStatev.Gandhi,201N.J.161,176(2010)).

Wenotealsothefundamentalprinciplesthatmustguidetheanalysisofanymotionseekingtosuppressevidence. BoththeUnitedStatesConstitutionandtheNewJerseyConstitutionguaranteeanindividual srighttobesecureagainstunreasonablesearchesorseizures. U.S.Const.amend.IV;N.J.Const.art.I, 7. Soimportantistherequirementthatthepoliceobtainawarrantbeforeproceedingtoconductasearchthatasearchconductedwithoutawarrantispresumedtobeinvalid. Statev.Cooke,163N.J.657,664(2000)(citingStatev.Alston,88N.J.211,230(1981)). Therearecertainexceptionstothegeneralrequirementthatawarrantbeobtainedpriortoasearch,butifawarrantlesssearchischallenged,theStatebearstheburdenofestablishingbyapreponderanceofthecredibleevidencethatthesearchfitswithinthescopeofoneofthoseexceptions. Statev.Wilson,178N.J.7,12-13(2003);Cooke,supra,163N.J.at664.

Ofthoseseveralexceptionstothewarrantrequirement,onlytwoarepertinenttothismatter--thesearchincidenttoarrestexceptionandtheautomobileexception. Whenthepoliceplaceanindividualunderarrest,theymaysearchhispersonandtheareawithinhisimmediategrasp. Chimelv.California,395 U.S. 752,762-63,89 S. Ct. 2034,2040,23 L. Ed. 2d 685,694 (1969). Evenintheautomobilecontext,NewJerseyrestrictsthescopeofsuchasearchtotheareafromwhichanindividualmayseizeaweaponordestroyevidence. Statev.Eckel,185N.J.523,541(2006);Statev.Dunlap,185N.J.543,548-49(2006)( [T]hesearchincidenttoarrestexceptioncannotbeinvokedwhereadefendanthasnocapacitytoreachtheinteriorofthevehicletodestroyevidenceortoendangerthepolice. ).

Based upon the narrow scope with which we have interpreted the search incident to arrest exception, we agree with defendant Minitee that this search cannot be sustained as one incident to her arrest. Both its timing and its situs preclude characterizing this search as incident to the arrest of Minitee and Jones.

Thissearchcanonlywithstanddefendants challengeifitscircumstancesbringitwithinthescopeoftheautomobileexception. OurreviewofthisrecordconvincesusthatthesearchoftheSUVdoesfitwithinthescopeoftheautomobileexceptionandthat,accordingly,thetrialcourtwascorrectwhenitdenieddefendants motiontosuppress.

NewJerseyjurisprudencedoesnotfollowtheroutelaiddownbythefederalcourtswithrespecttotheautomobileexception. Underfederalconstitutionalprinciples,policemayconductawarrantlesssearchofanautomobileundertheautomobileexception solongasthevehicleisreadilymobileandthereisprobablecausetobelieveitcontainsevidenceofcriminality. Pena-Flores,supra,198N.J.at20(citingPennsylvaniav.Labron,518 U.S. 938,940,116 S. Ct. 2485,2487,135 L. Ed. 2d 1031,1036(1996)). Underfederalconstitutionalprinciples,thereisnoseparaterequirementthatexigentcircumstancesexistbeforethepolicemayproceedundertheautomobileexceptiontosearchamotorvehicle. Marylandv.Dyson,527 U.S. 465,466,119 S. Ct. 2013,2014,144 L. Ed. 2d 442,445(1999).

OurdivergencefromfederalanalysisinthisareaspringsfromthisCourt srecognitionthatourStateConstitution afford[s][our]citizensgreaterprotectionsthanthoseaffordedbyitsfederalcounterpart. Cooke,supra,163N.J.at666;accordEckel,supra,185N.J.at538( [W]ehavenothesitatedinthepasttoaffordourcitizensgreaterprotectionagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresunderArticleI,Paragraph7thanwouldbethecaseunderitsfederalcounterpart. );Statev.Hempele,120N.J.182,196(1990)( WhentheUnitedStatesConstitutionaffordsourcitizenslessprotectionthandoestheNewJerseyConstitution,wehavenotmerelytheauthoritytogivefulleffecttotheStateprotection,wehavethedutytodoso. ).

Ratherthanembracingthefederalconstructoftheautomobileexception,wehaveadheredtotheprinciplethatthepresenceofexigentcircumstancesisanessentialelementoftheautomobileexceptiontothewarrantrequirement. Pena-Flores,supra,198N.J.at28(notingthreeelementstotheautomobileexception: anunexpectedstop,probablecause,and exigentcircumstances...underwhichitisimpracticabletoobtainawarrant ).

InPena-FloresandCooke,wetracedthedevelopmentoftheautomobileexception,bothunderfederalconstitutionalprinciplesandunderourownconstitution. Pena-Flores,supra,198N.J.at20-28;Cooke,supra,163N.J.at664-71. Thereisnoneedtoduplicatethathistorywithinthisopinion. Tosome,itmayappearthatouranalysesoftheautomobileexceptionhavenotalwaystraveledinastraightline;this,however,isduenottomerevagaryorwhimbuttothemyriadsituations,andtheinherentlyunpredictablenatureofthosesituations,inwhichtheautomobileexceptioncomesintoplay. Incidentsthatare unforeseenandspontaneous, Pena-Flores,supra,198N.J.at21,donotlendthemselvestoneatcategorization. Wehave,forinstance,inthepast,observedthedifficultiesinvolvedinanalyzingasearchthat fitsneatlyintonocategory,althougharguablyfittingintoseveral. Statev.Esteves,93N.J.498,503(1983)(upholdingwarrantlesssearchofvehiclefollowingareportthatarmedmanhadbeenseeninit). Lawnolessthanlifedoesnotfitexactlyintocategories. Statev.Hill,115N.J.169,178(1989)(O'Hern,J.,dissenting).

Certainprinciplescannonethelessbedistilledfromthevariouscasesinwhichwehavehadoccasiontoconsidertheautomobileexceptiontothewarrantrequirement. First,thestopitselfmustbeunplannedandunforeseen;thepolicemust havenoadvanceknowledgeoftheeventstounfold. Statev.Colvin,123N.J.428,437(1991)(upholdingwarrantlesssearchofparkedcarconductedwithoutadvanceplanningwherepolicehadarticulablereasonstofearevidencewouldbelostordestroyed). Thus,thepolicecannot,bytheiractions,createtheexigencytheylaterusetojustifythesearch. Statev.Hutchins,116N.J.457,475-76(1989)(notingthatprincipleinthecontextofthewarrantlessentryintoahome);Statev.Williams,168N.J.Super.352,358(App.Div.1979)(suppressingresultsofsearchwhenpolicepurposelydelayedsearchingavehicleuntilitwasenroute).

Second,thepolicemusthaveprobablecausetobelievetheautomobilecontainscontrabandorevidenceofcriminality. Pena-Flores,supra,198N.J.at28. Meresuspicionisnotenoughforprobablecause. Statev.Brown,205N.J.133,144(2011).

Itisthethirdelement,exigentcircumstancesmakingitimpracticabletoobtainawarrant,Pena-Flores,supra,198N.J.at28,thattheAppellateDivisionfoundlackinghere,Minitee,supra,115N.J.Super.at486. ThepanelreachedthatconclusionbaseduponthisCourt smostrecentdiscussionofexigentcircumstancesinPena-Flores. Id.at485-86. ItpointedtoourrecitationinPena-Floresofvariousfactorsthatcancontributetothepresenceofexigentcircumstances:

They include, for example, the time of day; the location of the stop; the nature of the neighborhood; the unfolding of the events establishing probable cause; the ratio of officers to suspects; the existence of confederates who know the location of the car and could remove it or its contents; whether the arrest was observed by passersby who could tamper with the car or its contents; whether it would be safe to leave the car unguarded and, if not, whether the delay that would be caused by obtaining a warrant would place the officers or the evidence at risk.

 

[Pena-Flores,supra,198N.J.at29.]

 

TheAppellateDivisionexaminedtheseenumeratedfactorsandconcludedthattheydidnotsupportthewarrantlesssearchthattookplacehere. Minitee,supra,415N.J.Super.at485-86. OurrecitationinPena-Flores,however,wasneverintendedtobeanexhaustivelistofthefactorsthatmustcomeintoplay. Thecreationofsuchalistisbeyondourskilltooutline;itisasboundlessasthepossiblesituationsthatmayconfrontanofficer. Indeed,wenotedinPena-Flores,supra,that [l]egitimateconsiderationsareasvariedasthepossiblescenariossurroundinganautomobilestop. 198N.J.at29.

InPena-Flores,weweredealingspecificallywithavehiclethathadbeenstoppedforanobservedmotorvehicleinfraction. Id.at12. Ourattemptinthatopiniontosketchtheparametersofexigentcircumstancesmustbeunderstoodwithinthatfactualcomplex. Here,therewereotherfactors,notrelevanttothePena-Floresfactualcontext,whichdemonstratedthattheFortLeepolicewere,indeed,confrontedwithexigentcircumstances. Thesefactorsincludeanarmedrobbery,atleasttwoperpetratorsontherunwhowerepossiblyarmed,asearchforthoseperpetratorsthatspannedseveralmunicipalities,andanattempttofindadiscardedweaponbeforeaninnocentbystanderwasinjuredoritwastakenandhiddenforfuturecriminalactivity. Inaddition,theincidentoccurredonacoldwinternight,andthesitewheretheSUVcametorestwaspoorlylitandnotamenabletoathoroughsearch. Thoseonthescenewerecognizant,moreover,ofthepossibilityofahastysearchimpairingtheevidentialvalueofwhattheymayhavecomeupon. Further,theyhadnoassurancethatthosewhoranfromtheSUVwerenotintheimmediatevicinityandabletofireatthematwill. Wehaveinothercasesupheldthewarrantlesssearchofavehiclethathadbeentowedtoasafeplace. Martin,supra,87N.J.at563-64;Statev.LaPorte,62N.J.312,316(1973). Pena-Flores,whichdealtwithanentirelydifferentfactualscenario,didnotpurporttooverrulethosecases. AndbecausethefactsofPena-Floresaresodistinguishablefromthismatter,itslegalprinciplesarenotdispositiveofthismatter.

WeconsiderMartintobeespeciallyinstructive. Inthatcase,twomenrobbedtheemployeesofanice-creamstoreatgunpointastheywereclosingtheshopatapproximately1:30inthemorning. Martin,supra,87N.J.at564. Thepolicehadadescriptionoftherobbersandthecarinwhichtheyfled. Ibid. Theofficerslocatedthecarinaparkinglotabouttwentyminuteslater,andtwoemployeesofthestorepositivelyidentifiedit. Id.at565. Lookingintothecar,thepolicecouldseeaglovethatmatchedthedescriptionofaglovewornbyoneoftherobbers. Ibid. Thepolicehadthecartowedtothepolicestationandproceededtosearchitwithoutobtainingawarrant. Ibid. Inupholdingthissearch,wenotedthatthesuspectedrobberswereatlarge,aswellasthefactthatthelightingwherethecarwasdiscoveredwas dimatbest. Id.at569-70.

Thelevelofexigencyinthecircumstancessurroundingthissearchwasheightenedbythefactthatthepolicewereactivelyinvolvedinanongoinginvestigationshortlyafterthearmedrobberyandneartowhereithadoccurred....Therewasanurgent,immediateneedforthepolicetoascertainwhetherthecarcontainedevidenceofthearmedrobbery,beforethesuspectshadanopportunitytoleavetheareaortodestroyordisposeofotherevidence.

 

[Id.at570.]

 

ThesewordsarefullyapplicabletothesituationconfrontingtheFortLeepolice.

Moreover,wedonotconsideritfataltothevalidityofthissearchthatbythetimeittookplacethevehiclehadbeenatpoliceheadquartersforsomeperiodoftime. Thedifficultiesthepolicefacedwereexacerbatedbythemultiplesitesthathadtobecarefullyexaminedforclueswithrespecttotheidentityoftheperpetrators,thecriticalneedtolocatethehandgunBaldwintoldthepolicehehaddiscardedwhenhewasontherun,aswellasbythefactthattheeventswerenotunfoldingduringnormalbusinesshoursbut,rather,closetomidnightandthehoursbeyondinthedeadofwinter. Theconfluenceofthosemultiplefactorsleadustoconcludethattheactionsofthepolicewerereasonableunderthecircumstances. [T]hequestionisnotwhetherthepolicecouldhavedonesomethingdifferent,butwhethertheiractions,whenviewedasawhole,wereobjectivelyreasonable. Statev.O Donnell,203N.J.160,162(2010)(quotingStatev.Bogan,200N.J.61,81(2009)). Itisonlysearchesthatareobjectivelyunreasonablethatrunafoulofconstitutionalprinciples. Statev.O Hagen,380N.J.Super.133,141(App.Div.2005),aff d,189N.J.140(2007)(upholdingrequirementthatuponconvictiondefendantprovideaDNAsample). NothingwithinPena-Floreswouldleadustoconcludethatthesearchofthisvehiclewasobjectivelyunreasonableinthetotalityofthecircumstances.

Becausewearesatisfiedthatthetrialcourtcorrectlydenieddefendants motiontosuppress,itisunnecessarytoaddresstheState sadditionalarguments,includingitsassertionthatdefendantBlandlackedtherequisitestandingtochallengethesearch.

IV.

ThejudgmentoftheAppellateDivisionisreversed,anddefendants convictionsarereinstated.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, HOENS, and PATTERSON join in JUDGE WEFING s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion.

 

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-70/ 71 September Term 2010

066771

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALNESHA MINITEE,

Defendant-Respondent.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DARNELL BLAND,

Defendant-Respondent.

JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting.

Ourjurisprudenceholdsthattojustifythewarrantlesssearchofavehiclebasedonexigentcircumstances,thepolicemustestablishthatthesecuringofawarrantwas impracticable andthattheneedtoconductthesearchwas urgent and immediate. SeeStatev.Pena-Flores,198N.J.6,28,32(2009);Statev.Martin,87N.J.561,569-70(1981). Bythatnowwell-establishedstandard,theAppellateDivisiondeterminedthattheStatefellshortofshowingthatthesearchofavehicle,heldformorethanthreehoursinpolicecustody,wasexigent. Nevertheless,themajorityreversestheappellatepanel sunremarkableapplicationofourprecedentstothepresentfacts.

Althoughthemajoritysavestheevidenceinthiscasefromsuppression,itdoessoatasignificantcosttothewarrantrequirementofArticleI,Paragraph7oftheNewJerseyConstitution. Nothingintherecordsuggeststhatthepoliceeverattemptedtoobtainasearchwarrantinthemorethanthreehoursbeforetheyundertookthesearchorthattheneedforthesearchwas immediate and urgent aftersolongadelay. Becausethemajorityhastakentheexigencyoutofexigentcircumstances,thuserodingtheprimacyofthewarrantrequirement,Irespectfullydissent.

 

I.

Atapproximately10:34p.m.,aBoroughofFortLeepoliceofficerpursuedaredsportutilityvehicle(SUV)reportedtohavebeeninvolvedinanarmedrobbery. WhentheofficerapproachedtheSUV,whichwasstoppedatalight,amanexitedwithahandgunandhandbag. Ontheofficer scommand,thesuspectdroppedthehandgunandbagontheground;hethenfledonfoot. TheotheroccupantsoftheSUV--indisregardoftheofficer sorder--tookflightinthevehicle. AnotherofficerfoundtheSUVstoppedattheendofadeadendstreet,withtwofemaleoccupants--defendantAlneshaMiniteeandLiakeshaJones--standingoutsidethevehicle. Althoughthewomenclaimedtobevictimsofacarjacking,theywereplacedinseparatepolicecarsandlaterarrestedfortheirallegedrolesintherobbery. Atthistime,atleastfiveotherFortLeepoliceofficerswereonthescene. AdetectiveobservedtworollsofducttapeintherearoftheSUV. Ducttapehadbeenusedtorestraintherobberyvictims.

No one questions that the police had probable cause to search the vehicle. One could hardly question that, at the scene, exigent circumstances would have justified an immediate search of the vehicle; after all, it was believed that two robbers -- one possibly armed -- were on the loose. However, despite the number of officers at the scene who undoubtedly were equipped with standard-issue flashlights, the police evidently did not consider an immediate search to be of urgency.

At some point, the SUV was towed to a sally port at the Fort Lee Police Department, where it remained impounded until members of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) came to process the contents of the SUV. The search of the vehicle did not begin until sometime after 2:00 a.m. -- and perhaps much later. In any event, the search did not commence until more than three hours after the seizure of the vehicle.

The officers who testified at the suppression hearing indicated that the decision had been made to await the arrival of BCI officers to process and preserve the vehicle and to secure evidence. The BCI officers had been busy processing the crime scenes. Apparently, the concern was not to disturb anything of evidential value in the vehicle and to leave the task of processing evidence to the BCI experts.

No one testified that it would have been impracticable to secure a warrant -- telephonic or otherwise -- in the more than three hours before the search. No one testified that there was not a single Fort Lee police officer familiar with the investigation available to call a judge. No one explained why, if there was an urgent, immediate need to search the SUV to assist in ascertaining the whereabouts of the suspects, the police had the luxury of waiting more than three hours for the BCI officers to formally process the vehicle. Obviously, if time were of the essence, a search of the SUV would not have been suspended for more than three hours.

Onthisbasis,followingthisCourt sdecisioninPena-Flores,theAppellateDivisionsuppressedtheevidenceobtainedfromthevehicle. Statev.Minitee,415N.J.Super.475,488-89(App.Div.2010).

 

II.

Warrantlesssearchesarepresumptivelyunreasonable[underArticleI,Paragraph7ofourStateConstitution]andthusareprohibitedunlesstheyfallwithinarecognizedexceptiontothewarrantrequirement. Pena-Flores,supra,198N.J.at18. TheStateclaimsthatthewarrantlesssearchoftheSUVwasjustifiedbytheexigent-circumstancesexception. TheStatebearstheburdenofprovingbyapreponderanceoftheevidencethejustificationforawarrantlesssearch. Statev.Wilson,178N.J.7,12-13(2003). Here,theStatehadtoprovethepresenceof exigentcircumstances thatmadeit impracticabletoobtainawarrant. Pena-Flores,supra,198N.J.at28;seealsoStatev.Colvin,123N.J.428,437(1991)( Thejustificationtoconductawarrantlessautomobilesearch....turnsonthecircumstancesthatmakeitimpracticabletoobtainawarrant.... ). [E]xigentcircumstanceswillbepresentwheninactionduetothetimeneededtoobtainawarrantwillcreateasubstantiallikelihoodthat...evidencewillbedestroyedorremovedfromthescene. Statev.Johnson,193N.J.528,553(2008). Inthiscase,nopromptactionwastakentoconductasearchtopreserveorutilizeevidencefortheongoinginvestigation,andnosatisfactoryexplanationwasgivenforthefailuretoseekawarrant.

ThemajorityimpreciselycomparesthepresentcasetoMartin. InMartin,thepolicefoundthestationwagonbelievedtohavebeeninvolvedinanearlierstorerobberyandremovedthevehicletoheadquarterstobesearched. Martin,supra,87N.J.at564-65. TheCourtdeterminedthattherewasan urgent,immediateneedforthepolicetoascertainwhetherthecarcontainedevidenceofthearmedrobbery, yetalsorecognizedthatit wasimpracticalandperhapsnotsafefortheofficers toconductthesearchatthescene. Id.at570-71. Thus,theCourtheldthatexigentcircumstanceswerepresenttobypassthewarrantrequirement. NothinginMartinevenremotelysuggeststhatthepolicedelayedeitherthetowingofthevehicleoritssearchonceitarrivedatheadquarters. Indeed,adelayofthreehoursormoreinconductingthesearchinMartin--haditoccurred--wouldhaverenderedamockerythelanguagetheCourtused: an urgent,immediateneed toconductthesearch.

The majority endorses the seemingly limitless expansion of the exigent-circumstances exception, validating a warrantless search of a vehicle more than three hours after its seizure, despite the State s failure to show that it was impracticable to secure a warrant. The application of the exigent-circumstances exception to circumstances that are clearly not exigent indicates that this constitutional doctrine is so formless that it can justify almost any outcome.

 

III.

In summary, I do not doubt that a search of the SUV at the scene or even its immediate search at headquarters, provided that the vehicle was promptly towed, would have fallen within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. But that is not what happened here.

The record shows that more than three hours passed from the time the SUV was seized until its search and that, in the meantime, no effort was made to secure even a telephonic warrant. The State did not establish that it was impracticable to secure a warrant because of the urgent, immediate need to conduct a search. Any uncertainty concerning how long the search was delayed -- whether three, four, or five hours -- must be held against the State, for it bore the burden of establishing a legitimate exception to the warrant requirement. Because I agree with the Appellate Division that the State failed to prove that exigent circumstances justified a bypass of the warrant requirement, I respectfully dissent.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPREME COURTOF NEWJERSEY

NO. A-70/ 71 SEPTEMBER TERM 2010

ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALNESHA MINITEE,

Defendant-Respondent.

____________________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DARNELL BLAND,

Defendant-Respondent.

D12 ECIDED June 14, 2012

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Judge Wefing (temporarily assigned)

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY

DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Albin

CHECKLIST

REVERSE AND REINSTATE

AFFIRM

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER

X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA

X

JUSTICE ALBIN

X

JUSTICE HOENS

X

JUSTICE PATTERSON

X

JUDGE WEFING (t/a)

X

TOTALS

5

1

 

2