In re Kollman, Jr.

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

In re Ronald C. Kollman, Jr., Petition for Expungement (A-126-10) (067807)

Argued March 13, 2012 -- Decided July 9, 2012

RABNER, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court.

The Court considers whether a petition to expunge the criminal record of Ronald C. Kollman, Jr. was correctly denied based on the community s right to be aware of the record and the nature of the offense.

2 In March 2010, Kollman filed a petition to expunge his conviction. He offered proof that he had completed college, worked full-time while in school, and was active in various community service projects. He also provided twenty-one letters of support describing his work habits, community involvement, character, and personal growth in recent years. Kollman certified that he had not been in any further trouble with the law. The State opposed the petition based on the nature of Kollman s conviction and the community s need for continued access to his criminal record. The trial court determined that the State bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that expungement was not in the public interest. Applying that standard, the judge denied the petition. Although the judge acknowledged Kollman s positive activities and behavior since completing probation, he concluded that expungement would not be consistent with the public interest because of the relatively serious nature of the offense and the community s right to be aware of it.

The Appellate Division affirmed. The panel agreed with the standard applied by the trial court and, although it commented that Kollman had led an exemplary life since his conviction, it found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the petition. The Supreme Court granted Kollman s petition for certification. 207 N.J. 189 (2011).

HELD: Defendants seeking relief under the statute s new five-year pathway to expungement have the burden of proving why expungement of a criminal record is in the public interest. Because petitioner appears to have met that burden, the Court reverses the denial of his expungement application and remands to the trial court to assess the petitioner s character and conduct as of the date of its new ruling.

1. To give a second chance to one-time offenders convicted of less serious offenses who have led law-abiding lives since conviction, the Legislature enacted a law that allows certain records to be expunged. Expungement means that criminal records are extracted and isolated. However, expunged records remain available to the courts, prosecutors, and probation officers to set bail, prepare presentence reports, and use at sentencing, and they may be provided to the Parole Board and the Department of Corrections in certain situations. (pp. 2; 10-11)

2. Prior to 2010, expungement was available for certain offenses if a petitioner proved that ten years had passed since the completion of the criminal sentence and there had been no additional convictions. Criminal records for homicide, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, arson, endangering the welfare of a child, perjury, and other serious crimes could not be expunged. The statute permitted expungement of certain CDS offenses only if they involved twenty-five or less grams of marijuana or five or less grams of hashish. If a petitioner met his burden of proof on the objective elements of the statute, expungement was presumed and the burden shifted to the State to prove that a prerequisite had not been met or that there was another statutory basis for denying relief. (pp. 12-14)

3. To promote employability, the Legislature amended the statute in 2010 to reduce the waiting period for certain cases to five years if there have been no additional convictions and if expungement is in the public interest. The amendment also broadened the law to include any third- or fourth-degree CDS conviction. To decide whether expungement is in the public interest, courts consider the nature of the offense and the applicant s character and conduct since conviction. Courts also consider whether the need for the availability of records outweighs the desirability of expungement. Petitioners must establish the objective elements the passage of five years, without an additional conviction, after committing a third- or fourth-degree CDS violation. Petitioners also bear the burden of proving that expungement is in the public interest and of demonstrating that the benefits of expungement outweigh the need for the records. If the State objects on statutory grounds, the burden of proof shifts to the State. (pp. 14-19)

4. The nature of the offense factor of the public-interest analysis examines undisputed or proven facts about the crime and its commission, including the definition, grade, and elements of an offense. Judges also may consider what the petitioner did, how and with whom he acted, and the harm he may have caused, along with any related charges that have been dismissed if the underlying facts have been substantiated or are undisputed. However, the statute does not allow judges to reject expungement applications based on generic grounds; for example, judges cannot add to the list of offenses that the Legislature has found too serious to qualify. For drug offenses that meet the statute s objective criteria, judges cannot rule out expungement by finding a particular drug too serious. But courts may consider how many times the petitioner distributed drugs, whether the drugs were sold to children, whether a weapon was involved, and other relevant factors that are not in dispute or have been proven. (pp. 19-21)

5. To evaluate a petitioner s character and conduct since the conviction, courts may examine performance while in jail and on probation, and whether the petitioner engaged in activities that either enhanced or limited the risk of re-offending. Facts relating to a dismissed charge or an arrest that did not result in conviction may also offer insight into a petitioner s character and conduct. Courts may further consider conduct before the time of conviction to gauge whether the offense was aberrational. With regard to all of these factors, courts may only consider established or undisputed facts, not unproven allegations. If the State s argument extends beyond established facts already in the record and the petitioner contests those assertions, the State must present proofs to support its position. The court must make appropriate findings, after a hearing if necessary, before it can rely on a material fact that remains in dispute. To assist the court, an applicant must include with his petition the transcripts of plea and sentencing hearings and a copy of the presentence report. (pp. 21-24)

6. Kollman met the basic criteria that five years had passed since his conviction, he had not been convicted of any subsequent offenses, and he was convicted of a third-degree CDS offense. He also presented a certification and twenty-one letters to demonstrate that expungement would be in the public interest. The trial court denied the application based on the right of the community to be aware of the convictions and because of the relatively serious nature of the offense. Such universal concerns could rule out expungement in all drug cases. Although the Legislature found all third- or fourth-degree CDS offenses eligible, the judge s ruling focused on the type of drug Kollman sold. The court also considered Kollman s multiple drug sales and his financial motives. The judge deemed unfavorable the fact that Kollman was employed when he sold the drugs and his desire to perform volunteer work with children, but those factors could have been considered in a more positive light. In any event, they should have been weighed alongside the substantial evidence of character and conduct since Kollman s conviction, which received little attention. (pp. 24-28)

7. Kollman has led an exemplary and law-abiding life since his conviction, which weighs heavily in favor of expungement. The Court remands to the trial court to weigh the relevant factors in light of the principles set forth in this opinion and to assess Kollman s character and conduct as of the date of its new ruling. If Kollman has committed another offense in the interim, he may no longer qualify for expungement. On the other hand, additional proof of rehabilitation would weigh further in his favor on the public-interest prong. (pp. 28-29)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Court s opinion.

JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, HOENS and PATTERSON, and JUDGE WEFING (temporarily assigned), join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER s opinion.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A- 126 September Term 2010

067807

INRERONALDC.KOLLMAN,JR.,PETITIONFOREXPUNGEMENT.

ArguedMarch13,2012 DecidedJuly9,2012

 

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

 

RobertD.HermanarguedthecauseforappellantRonaldC.Kollman,Jr.

 

JulieH.Horowitz,AssistantProsecutor,arguedthecauseforrespondentStateofNewJersey(TheodoreF.L.Housel,AtlanticCountyProsecutor,attorney).

 

AkilS.RoperarguedthecauseforamicuscuriaeLegalServicesofNewJersey(MelvilleD.Miller,Jr.,President,attorney;Mr.RoperandMr.Miller,onthebrief).

 

AlexanderR.ShalomarguedthecauseforamicicuriaeAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofNewJerseyFoundationandNewJerseyInstituteforSocialJustice(EdwardL.Barocas,LegalDirectorandCraigR.Levineattorneys;Mr.Shalom,Mr.Barocas,Mr.Levine,andJeanneM.LoCicero,onthebrief).

 

AnalisaSamaHolmes,DeputyAttorneyGeneral,arguedonthecauseofamicuscuriaeAttorneyGeneralofNewJersey(JeffreyS.Chiesa,AttorneyGeneral,attorney).

 

 

CHIEFJUSTICERABNERdeliveredtheopinionoftheCourt.

Millionsofadultsnationwidehavecriminalrecordsthataffecttheirreentryintosocietyyearsaftertheirsentenceiscomplete. Criminalrecordscanpresentbarrierstoemployment,licensing,andhousing,amongotherthings.

Toaffordasecondchancetoone-timeoffendersconvictedoflessseriousoffenses,whohaveledlaw-abidinglivessinceconviction,theLegislatureenactedalawthatallowscertainrecordstobeexpungedaftertenyears. N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a). In2010,theLegislatureamendedthestatutetobroadenopportunitiesforexpungement.

Undertherevisedlaw,defendantsmayapplyforexpungementfiveyearsaftercompletingtheirsentence. N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2). Todecidewhetherexpungementisinthe publicinterest inthosecases,asthestatuterequires,courtsconsiderthe natureoftheoffense aswellastheapplicant s characterandconductsinceconviction. Ibid.

Inthisappeal,weclarifythefactorsthatcourtsmayconsideraspartofthatfact-sensitiveinquiry. Wealsoconcludethatdefendantsseekingexpungementhavetheburdenofprooftodemonstratewhytheircasewarrantsreliefunderthestatute spublic-interestprong.

Applyingthosestandardstothiscase,weconcludethatthemotionforexpungementwasimproperlydenied. WethereforereversethejudgmentoftheAppellateDivision,whichaffirmedthetrialcourt. Wealsoremandthecasetothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedings.

I.

BeginningaroundFebruary2000,lawenforcementofficialsinvestigatedthesaleofcontrolleddangeroussubstances(CDS)atanightclubinSomersPoint,NewJersey. Onthreeseparateoccasions,undercoverofficersallegedlypurchasedecstasyfrompetitionerRonaldC.Kollman,Jr. Kollmansoldanofficertenwhitepillsfor$200onthenightofFebruary24,2000. HourslateronFebruary25,2000,Kollmanallegedlysoldfivepillsfor$100toanotherofficer. AthirdofficeralsoallegedlypaidKollman$100forfivepillsonApril20,2000. Accordingtopolicereports,allthreeofficersidentifiedKollmanasthesellerfromaphoto,andlabtestingconfirmedthatthepillsweremethylenedioxymethamphetamine,commonlyreferredtoasMDMAorecstasy.

ThepolicearrestedKollmanonJune22,2000. HewaslaterindictedforthreecountsofdistributionofCDS,N.J.S.A.2C:35-5(a)(1),threecountsofpossessionofCDSwithintenttodistribute,N.J.S.A.2C:35-5(a)(1),threecountsofdistributionofCDSwithin500feetofapubliczone,N.J.S.A.2C:35-7.1,andthreecountsofpossessionofCDS,N.J.S.A.2C:35-10(a)(1). Thethreecountsforeachoffensecorrespondedtothethreeundercovertransactions.

KollmanpledguiltyonJanuary16,2001toonecountofthird-degreedistributionofCDS,contrarytoN.J.S.A.35-5(a)(1)andN.J.S.A.2C:35-5(b)(13).1 TheplearelatedonlytothesaleofecstasyonFebruary24,2000. Aspartofapleaagreement,theStateagreedtorecommend(a)dismissaloftheremainingchargesintheindictment,and(b)asentenceofforty-fivedaysincountyjailandprobation. TheStatealsoagreednottopursueadditionalchargesrelatedtoeventsatanothernightclubinMarch2000.

OnMarch2,2001,thetrialcourtsentencedKollmantoforty-fivedaysincountyjail(subjecttodailyreportingofatleasttwodaysperweek,ifeligible),athree-yearperiodofprobation,andvariousfinesandpenalties. Kollmanwastwenty-threeyearsoldatthetimeofsentencing.

Aftereighteenmonths,Kollman sprobationwasterminated. HesuccessfullycompletedalloftheconditionsofprobationonSeptember13,2002.

Sevenandone-halfyearslater,onMarch18,2010,Kollmanfiledapetitiontoexpungehisconviction. Insupportofhisapplication,KollmanofferedproofthathecompletedcollegeandreceivedaBachelorofSciencedegreefromtheRichardStocktonCollegeofNewJerseyinMay2009. Healsocertifiedthatheworkedfull-timewhileinschoolandhadbecomeactiveinvariouscommunityserviceprojects.

Petitioneralsosubmittedtwenty-oneletterstothecourt. Hisemployerforsixteenyearsdescribedhimasahard-workingleaderandarolemodeltoothers. TheemployercreditedKollmanforacceptingresponsibilityandtakingstepstoimprovehimselfanddeterothersafterhisconviction. TheDistrictDirectorfortheBoyScoutsofAmericapraisedKollmanandhisfamilyforhostingannualtoydrivestohelpunderprivilegedfamiliesandteenagerswithalcoholanddrugabuseproblems. Kollmanalsoservedonthedistrictboardofdirectorsofascholarshipcommitteeforscouting. Severalothercommunitygroupssubmittedlettersaswell. Inaddition,variousattorneys,friends,andfamilymemberswroteaboutKollman sstrongcharacterandpersonalgrowthinrecentyears.

InKollman scertification,headdedthathehadhadnotroublewiththelawsincehisconviction--notevenaspeedingticket. However,heexplainedthatbecauseofhiscriminalrecord,hecouldnotteachaboatingandsafetycertificateclass,ashehaddonepreviouslyforthreetofouryears,couldnothelpcoachwrestlingathighschool,ashehaddonebeforeaswell,andcouldnotacceptanoffertoworkwiththeBigBrothersBigSistersprogramasavolunteer.

TheStateopposedKollman spetition. TheStatearguedthatKollmanhadalreadyreceivedabenefitwhentheCourtdismissedotherchargesagainsthim,andthatthecircumstancesandtypeofhisoffense,aswellastheneedforcontinuedaccesstohiscriminalrecord,weighedagainstexpungementofhisdrugconviction.

Thetrialjudgedeniedthepetitioninawrittendecision. ThecourtacknowledgedKollman spositiveactivitiesandbehaviorsincecompletingprobation. Nonetheless,becauseoftherelativelyseriousnatureoftheoffenseandthecommunity srighttobeawareofit,thecourtconcludedthatexpungementwouldnotbeconsistentwiththepublicinterest.

Kollmanappealed,andtheAppellateDivisionaffirmedthetrialcourt sruling. TheappellatepanelagreedthatKollmanhadled anexemplaryandlaw-abidinglife sincehisconviction. Afterreviewingthetrialcourt sreasoningandconclusion,thepanelexplainedthatitstaskwasnottosubstituteadifferentjudgmentforthetrialcourt sexerciseofdiscretion. TheAppellateDivisionfoundnoabuseofdiscretioninthedenialofKollman spetition.

Thetrialcourtandappellatepaneleachappliedthenewlyamendedexpungementstatute. Theybothruledthatundertherevisedlaw,theStatehadtheburdentoprove,byapreponderanceoftheevidence,thatexpungementwasnotinthepublicinterest. TheAppellateDivisionreasonedthattheprosecutor,asthepublic srepresentative,shouldshoulderthatburden.

WegrantedKollman spetitionforcertification. 207N.J.189(2011). WealsograntedthemotionsoftheAttorneyGeneral,theAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofNewJersey(ACLU)andtheNewJerseyInstituteforSocialJustice(NJISJ)(whofiledajointrequest),andLegalServicesofNewJersey(LSNJ)toparticipateasamicuscuriae.

II.

KollmanarguesthathemetthecriteriaforexpungementoutlinedinN.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2)and(c)(3),andthatthetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretionwhenitdeniedhispetition. Hecontendsthatoncehesatisfiedthestatute sinitialrequirements--thatmorethanfiveyearshadpassedsincehecompletedprobation,thathehadnotbeenconvictedofanotheroffensesincehisconviction,andthathisconvictioninvolvedathird-degreeCDScrime--theStatehadtheburdentodemonstratethatexpungementwasnotinthepublicinterest. Kollmanarguesinthealternativethatifitistheapplicant sobligationtojustifyexpungement,hehassatisfiedthatburden. Healsoclaimsthatthetrialcourt sglobalreasoningwouldpreventexpungementofanythird-degreeCDSoffensedespitetheLegislature spolicydecisiontothecontrary.

TheStatedoesnotdisputethatKollmanmettheinitialrequirementsoftheexpungementstatute. TheStatemaintains,however,thatKollmanalsohadtheburdentoprovethatexpungementwasinthepublicinterest,andthathefailedtomeetthattest. Inthealternative,theStateclaimsthatithasproventhatexpungementofKollman sdrugrecordwasnotinthepublicinterest. TheStatestressesthatthepublic sneedforavailablecriminalrecordsoutweighedthebenefitsfromtheirexpungement. TheStatealsoarguesthattherecentAppellateDivisiondecisioninInreLoBasso,423N.J.Super.475(App.Div.2012),supportsitsposition.

TheAttorneyGeneralhasweighedinontheissueofwhichpartybearstheburdenofproof. Hearguesthatbecausepetitionersareseekingreliefandareuniquelyknowledgeableabouttheircharacterandconductsinceconviction,theyshouldbeartheburdenofestablishingthatexpungementisconsistentwiththepublicinterest.

TheACLUandNJISJcontendthatthetrialcourtmadeerrorsoflawand,inthealternative,thatitabuseditsdiscretionbyimproperlyconsideringcertainfactors. Morespecifically,theyarguethatthetrialcourtsubstituteditsjudgmentfortheLegislature sbygivingundueweighttothecategoryofoffenseinvolved,didnotmakeexplicitfindingsbasedontherecord, consideredconductthatwasneitherprovenattrialnoradmittedataguiltyplea,andtreatedpetitioner semploymentasanaggravatingfactor. Atoralargument,thegroupsagreedthatpetitionersshouldbeartheburdenofprovingthatexpungementisinthepublicinterest.

LSNJsimilarlyarguesthatthetrialcourtdidnotproperlyconsidereachofthefactorsinthestatutewhenthecourtassessedthepublic-interestprong. LSNJmaintainsthattodenyexpungementbasedsolelyonthenatureoftheoffenserendersmeaninglessthelaw sfocusonapetitioner sconductandcharactersinceconviction.

TheACLU,NJISJ,andLSNJalsohighlightthenegativecollateralconsequencesofacriminalrecordandthecorrespondingbenefitsofexpungement. Theycontendthattheeffectsofacriminalrecordfalldisproportionatelyonpeopleofcolor. Forthoseandotherreasons,theysubmitthatexpungementofrecordsforone-timeoffendersissoundpublicpolicy.

III.

A.

ThiscaserequirestheCourttointerprettherecentlyrevisedlawsrelatingtotheexpungementofcriminalrecords. N.J.S.A.2C:52-1to-32. TheCourt sprimarygoalwheninterpretingastatuteistodetermineandcarryouttheLegislature sintent. Allenv.V&ABros.,Inc.,208N.J.114,127(2011)(citationomitted). Todoso,courtsbeginwiththelanguageofthestatute. DiProsperov.Penn,183N.J.477,493(2005)(citationomitted). Iftheplainlanguageisclear,thecourt staskiscomplete. N.J.Ass nofSch.Adm rsv.Schundler,___N.J.___,___(slipop.at17)(2012)(citingInreYoung,202N.J.50,63(2010)). Ifthelanguageofthestatuteisambiguous,acourtmayresorttoextrinsicevidenceforguidance,includinglegislativehistoryandcommitteereports. Ibid.(citingBurnettv.Cnty.ofBergen,198N.J.408,421(2009)).

B.

Westartwithcertainbasicprinciplesabouttheexpungementstatute. Thegoalofthestatutoryschemeisclear. TheLegislatureexpresslystatedthatexpungement

shall be construed with the primary objective of providing relief to the one-time offender who has led a life of rectitude and disassociated himself with unlawful activity, but not to create a system whereby periodic violators of the law or those who associate themselves with criminal activity have a regular means of expunging their police and criminal records.

 

[N.J.S.A.2C:52-32.]

 

Inotherwords,thestatuteisdesignedtoeliminate thecollateralconsequencesimposeduponotherwiselaw-abidingcitizenswhohavehadaminorbrushwiththecriminaljusticesystem. InreT.P.D.,314N.J.Super.643,648(LawDiv.1997),aff do.b.,314N.J.Super.535(App.Div.1998). Consistentwiththataim, [t]hegeneralrulefavorsexpungementofafirst-timecriminalconviction aftertenyears. InreP.A.F.,176N.J.218,221(2003).

Whenacourtordersexpungement,criminalrecordsareextractedandisolated,seeN.J.S.A.2C:52-1(a),butnotdestroyed,seeInreD.H.,204N.J.7,17(2010)(citingStatev.XYZCorp.,119N.J.416,421(1990)). Thoserecordsincludecomplaints,warrants,arrests,docketrecords,andrelateditems. N.J.S.A.2C:52-1(b).

Expungedrecordsremainavailabletothecourts,prosecutors,andprobationofficerstosetbail,preparepresentencereports,anduseatsentencing. N.J.S.A.2C:52-21. TherecordsmayalsobeprovidedtotheParoleBoardtoassessparolerequests,N.J.S.A.2C:52-22,andtotheDepartmentofCorrectionstoclassifyinmates,N.J.S.A.2C:52-23. Exceptforcertaindefinedcircumstances,though,asuccessfulapplicantdoesnothavetoanswerquestionsaffirmativelyrelatingtoexpungedcriminalrecords,andhispriorarrest,conviction,andrelatedproceedings shallbedeemednottohaveoccurred. N.J.S.A.2C:52-27.

C.

Toevaluatewhatfactorscourtsshouldconsiderundertheamendedstatute,aswellaswhobearstheburdenofproof,itishelpfultotracethehistoryoftheexpungementlaw.

Priortotheamendmentin2010,andcontinuingthroughtoday,expungementwaspresumptivelyavailableforcertainoffensesaftertenyears. N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)statedthat

[i]nallcases,exceptashereinprovided,whereinapersonhasbeenconvictedofacrimeunderthelawsofthisStateandwhohasnotbeenconvictedofanypriororsubsequentcrime,whetherwithinthisStateoranyotherjurisdiction,andhasnotbeenadjudgedadisorderlypersonorpettydisorderlypersononmorethantwooccasionsmay,aftertheexpirationofaperiodof10yearsfromthedateofhisconviction,paymentoffine,satisfactorycompletionofprobationorparole,orreleasefromincarceration,whicheverislater,presentadulyverifiedpetitionasprovidedinsection2C:52-7totheSuperiorCourtinthe

countyinwhichtheconvictionwasenteredprayingthatsuchconvictionandallrecordsandinformationpertainingtheretobeexpunged.

 

Recordsofconvictionforhomicide,kidnapping,aggravatedsexualassault,robbery,arson,endangeringthewelfareofachild,perjury,andotherseriousoffensescouldnotbeexpunged. N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(b). Undersection2(c),recordsofconvictionforthesaleordistributionofaCDS,orpossessionwithintenttosell,couldnotbeexpungedexceptforoffensesinvolvingtwenty-fiveorlessgramsofmarijuanaorfiveorlessgramsofhashish. N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(c).

Petitionershadtheburdenofestablishingtheobjectiveelementsofsection2(a)--thepassageoftenyearswithnoadditionalconvictions--byapreponderanceoftheevidence. InreD.H.,supra,204N.J.at18(citationsomitted);InreLoBasso,supra,424N.J.Super.at488(citationsomitted). Afterdoingso,applicantswere presumptivelyentitled toexpungement. InreLoBasso,supra,424N.J.Super.at488(citingInreJ.N.G.,244N.J.Super.605,610(App.Div.1990)).

TheburdenthenshiftedtotheStatetoovercomethepresumptionwithproofthatoneoftheprerequisiteshadnotbeenmetorwithsome otherstatutorybasisfordenyingrelief. N.J.S.A.2C:52-14(a). Tomeetitsburden,theStatehadtodemonstratesomecausefordenialbyapreponderanceoftheevidence. SeeInreD.H.,supra,204N.J.at18(citingInreG.R.,395N.J.Super.428,431(App.Div.),certif.denied,193N.J.275(2007));XYZCorp.,supra,119N.J.at422-24;InreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at489(citationomitted).

Section14ofthestatuteoutlinesvariousgroundsfordenialofrelief. Relevanttothiscase,section14(b)barredexpungementwhen [t]heneedfortheavailabilityofrecordsoutweigh[ed]thedesirabilityofhavingapersonfreedfromanydisabilities tiedtoarecordofconviction. N.J.S.A.2C:52-14(b).2

D.

TheLegislatureamendedthestatuteandbroadenedopportunitiesforexpungementin2010. TheamendmentsrespondedtoaseriesofrecommendationsbytheExecutiveBranchin2007. Amongotherthings,theGovernor sOfficerecommendedmodifyingtheexpungementstatute topromoteemployability ofrehabilitatedex-offenders,including allowingfirstoffenderstoseekexpungementinawidervarietyofcases and reducingthetimeframerequirementsforcompellingcases. SeeAStrategyforSafeStreetsandNeighborhoods,ExecutiveSummary,issuedbyGov.JonS.Corzine(2007),at24,http://www.nj.gov/oag/crimeplan/safe-exec-summ-complete.pdf(SafeStreetsStrategy);seealsoS.3061(Sponsors Statement),213thLeg.7(N.J.Nov.23,2009)(notingthatproposedchangetoexpungementstatuteembodiedrecommendationsofSafeStreetsStrategy);A.1771(Sponsors Statement),213thLeg.8(N.J.Jan.8,2008)(same).

Therevisedlawincludesanumberofchanges. First,thelawnowallowsforexpungementofcertaincasesafterfiveyears,ifexpungementisinthepublicinterest. Inadditiontothepresumptiveten-yeartimelimitforapplicationsinN.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a),courtsmaynowgrantexpungementwhen

at least five years has expired from the date of [] conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or parole, or release from incarceration, whichever is later; the person has not been convicted of a crime, disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly persons offense since the time of the conviction; and the court finds in its discretion that expungement is in the public interest, giving due consideration to the nature of the offense, and the applicant s character and conduct since conviction.

 

[N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2).]

 

Inessence,expungementunderthenew public-interest pronginitiallyrequiresthreethings: thepassageoffiveyears;noadditionalconvictions;andafindingthatexpungementisinthepublicinterest.

Second,inadditiontoallowingforexpungementofconvictionsthatinvolvesmallquantitiesofmarijuanaandhashishunderN.J.S.A.2C:52-2(c)(1)and(2),theamendmentidentifiedathirdcategoryofcrimesthatmaybeexpunged:

Anycontrolleddangeroussubstance[conviction]providedthattheconvictionisofthethirdorfourthdegree,wherethecourtfindsthatexpungementisconsistentwiththepublicinterest,givingdueconsiderationtothenatureoftheoffenseandthepetitioner scharacterandconductsinceconviction.

 

[N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(c)(3).]

Third,becauseoftheprecedingchange,theLegislaturemodifiedthegroundsfordenialofrelief. Therevisedlawnowstatesthat inregardtoexpungementsoughtforthirdorfourthdegreedrugoffensespursuantto[N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(c)(3)],thecourtshallconsiderwhether theneedfortheavailabilityofrecordsoutweighsthedesirabilityofexpungement, regardlessofwhetheranypartyobjectsonthisbasis. N.J.S.A.2C:52-14(b).

E.

Webrieflyaddresswhichpartybearstheburdenofprooffortherevisedpartsofthestatute--thenewobjectiveelementsandthepublic-interestfinding.

Weconcludethatpetitionermustestablishtheobjectiveelementsofthenewavenuesforexpungement--thepassageoffiveyears,withoutanadditionalconviction,aftercommissionofanoffensethatmaybeathird-orfourth-degreeCDSviolation. Asdiscussedabove,settledcaselawplacedtheresponsibilitytoprovetheobjectiveelementsoftheoriginalversionofsection2(a)ontheapplicant,andtheLegislaturemadenochangesinthatregard. SeeInreD.H.,supra,204N.J.at18(citationsomitted);InreLoBasso,supra,424N.J.Super.at488(citationsomitted);seealsoCoylev.Bd.ofChosenFreeholders,170N.J.260,267(2002)(citationomitted)( Thereisalong-standingcanonofstatutoryconstructionthatpresumesthattheLegislatureisknowledgeableregardingthejudicialinterpretationofitsenactments. ). Asaresult,thereisnoreasontomodifytheexistingapproachthatrequiresapplicantstosatisfythestatute sobjectivecriteria.

Thenewstatuterequiresoneadditionalfinding: thatexpungementisinthepublicinterest. N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2). Tomakethatdetermination,courtsaretoconsiderandbalancethe natureoftheoffense andthe applicant scharacterandconductsinceconviction. Ibid. Foranumberofreasons,weconcludethattheapplicantmustbeartheburdenofproofonthatfactoraswell. Tobeginwith,thepetitionerisuniquelyqualifiedtodemonstratefactsabouthisorhercharacterandrecentconduct. ThatburdencouldnotfairlybeplacedontheStateinitially. Inaddition,afindingthatexpungementisinthepublicinterestfurtherstheapplicant scause. UnderN.J.S.A.2C:1-13(d)(1),theburdenofproofforafindingoffactthatisnotanelementofanoffensefallsontheside whoseinterestorcontentionwillbefurtheredifthefindingshouldbemade. Becausetheexpungementlawdoesnotprovideotherwise,theCode sdefaultprovisionapplies,andapplicantsmustthereforedemonstratethatexpungementisinthepublicinterest,byapreponderanceoftheevidence. SeeInreD.H.,supra,204N.J.at18(citationsomitted);InreLoBasso,supra,424N.J.Super.at488(citationsomitted). ThesamereasoningextendstotheidenticalfindingcourtsmustmakeforcertainCDSoffensesundersection2(c)(3).

Asbefore,theStatemaystillobjecttoexpungementbasedonvariousgroundslistedinsection14--forexample,iftherecordsarethesubjectofongoingcivillitigation. TheburdenofproofstillshiftstotheStateunderthosecircumstances. SeeInreD.H.,supra,204N.J.at18(citingInreG.R.,supra,395N.J.Super.at431);XYZCorp.,supra,119N.J.at422-24;InreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at489(citationomitted). Thatincludesmattersbroughtundersection2(a)(2)only--thefive-yearpathwaytoexpungement--inwhichtheStatecontendsthatrecordsmustremainavailablepersection14(b).

Thenewamendments,though,affecttheburdenofproofrelatingtosection14(b)forapplicantswhoseektoexpungethird-andfourth-degreeCDSoffensesundersection2(c)(3). Astothoseoffenses,courtsmustnowconsiderontheirownwhethertheneedforavailablerecordsoutweighsthebenefitsofexpungement. SeeN.J.S.A.2C:52-14(b). Asaresult,thatfactorisyetonemoreelementthatapetitionermustsatisfytoobtainexpungement. Theburdenofproofonthatpointthusrestsonthepetitioner. Werecognizethatmanyofthefactorspetitionerswillpresentonthepublic-interestprongwillapplytotheanalysisundersection14(b)aswell.

Intheend,applicantsmustsatisfythebalancingtesttheLegislatureoutlinedtoestablishthatexpungementisinthepublicinterest--nomoreandnoless. Petitionersarenotrequiredtodemonstratethattheyare exceptional or extraordinary applicants. SeeInreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at496.

IV.

Wenowaddressthefactorsacourtmayconsidertoassesswhetherexpungementisinthepublicinterest. Thestatuteliststhreethings: thenatureoftheoffense,andtheapplicant scharacterandconductsinceconviction. N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2)&(c)(3). Wedrawonathoughtful,recentAppellateDivisionopinionbyJudgeOstrer,whichexploresthosefactors,asweexamineeachinturn. SeeInreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at491-95.

The natureoftheoffense encompassesundisputedorprovenfactsaboutthecrimeanditscommission. Thatcertainlyincludesbasicinformationaboutthedefinition,grade,andelementsofanoffense. Id.at494. Wenotethatthestatuteusestheterms nature and circumstances oftheoffenseindifferentplaces,compareN.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2)withN.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(fourthparagraph),yettheLegislaturealsoplacedbroaddiscretionintrialjudgestodecidethepublic-interestprong,seeN.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2). Inthatcontext,wedonotreadtheterm nature oftheoffenseinsection2(a)(2)asalimitationonajudge sinquiry. SeeN.J.S.A.1:1-1(notingthatstatutory wordsandphrasesshallbereadandconstruedwiththeircontext ). Tofulfilltheirobligationunderthestatute,therefore,judgesmayalsoconsiderdetailsaboutwhatthepetitionerdid,howandwithwhomheacted,andtheharmhemayhavecausedinconnectionwiththeoffenseofconviction.

Similarly,todecidetheoverarchingpublic-interestquestion,courtsmayconsiderrelatedchargesthathavebeendismissediftheunderlyingfactshavebeensubstantiatedorareundisputed. SeeInreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at495. Thatinformationfurthersthefact-specificinquirycourtsmustundertake. Inshort,courtsexamininghowthe natureoftheoffense affectsthepublicinteresthavewidelatitude.

Bycontrast,thestatutedoesnotallowjudgestorejectexpungementapplicationsbasedoncategoricalorgenericgrounds. Forexample,theLegislaturehasidentifiedparticularoffensesthatare tooserious toqualifyforexpungement. SeeN.J.S.A.2C:52-2(b). Courtscannotaddtothelist. TheChanceryDivisionthusproperlydeclinedtoholdthatconvictionsfordomesticviolencecouldnotbeexpungedasageneralrule. SeeInreH.M.H.,404N.J.Super.174,175,179-80(Ch.Div.2008). Instead,thecourtconsideredtherequestaspartofthelaw sbalancingofinterests. Id.at180.3

Fordrugoffensesthatmeetthestatute sobjectivecriteria,then,courtscannotruleoutexpungementbecauseofthejudge sviewthattheparticulardruginvolvedisserious. Butjudgesmayconsiderhowmanytimespetitionerdistributeddrugs,whetherhesoldthemtochildren,whetheraweaponwasinvolved,andotherrelevantfactsthatarenotindisputeorhavebeenproven. Dependingonthenatureofagivenpleaagreement,thoseandotherfactorsmaybepresentinasinglethird-orfourth-degreeconviction.

Thestatutealsodirectscourtstoconsider theapplicant scharacterandconductsinceconviction. N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2)&(c)(3). Inthatregard,courtsmayexamineanapplicant sperformancewhileinjailoronprobation. SeeInreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at492(contrastingearlydischargefromprobationwithhistoryofprobationviolations). Duringandafterthattime,courtsmayalsoconsiderwhetheranapplicant

hasengagedinactivitiesthathavelimitedtheriskofre-offending,orhasavoidedactivitiesthatenhancedthatrisk[including]whetherapetitionerhasobtainedjobtrainingoreducation,compliedwithotherlegalobligations(suchaschildsupportandmotorvehiclefines),andmaintainedfamilyandcommunitytiesthatpromotelaw-abidingbehavior,aswellaswhetherthepetitionerhasseveredrelationshipswithpersonsinthecriminalmilieu.

 

[Id.at491-92.]

Factsrelatedtoanarrestthatdidnotresultinconviction,ortoadismissedcharge,mayalsoofferinsightintoanapplicant scharacterandconduct. Id.at492. Toassessthepublicinterest,InreLoBassoinvitedcourtstoconsiderconductbeforethetimeofconvictionaswell,togaugewhethertheoffensewasaberrationalorpartofa patternofdisrespectforthelaworathreattopublicsafety. Id.at495.

Astoalloftheaboveareas,courtsmayonlyconsiderestablishedorundisputedfacts,notunprovenallegations. Inthatregard,theStateisnotlimitedtoanapplicant sadmissionsatapleaorsentencinghearing,ortoconcessionsinapresentencereport. IftheState sargumentextendsbeyondestablishedfactsalreadyintherecord,though,andthepetitionerconteststhoseassertions,theStatemustpresentcognizableproofstosupportitsposition. SeeStatev.Merendino,293N.J.Super.444,450-51(App.Div.1996)(notingthatcourtsmayreview extraneousrelevant evidence,includinglabreportsofmultiplesales,toassessquantityofnarcoticsanddecideexpungementmotion). Intheend,thetrialjudgemustmakeappropriatefindings,afterahearingifnecessary,beforethecourtcanrelyonamaterialfactthatremainsindispute. SeeInreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at492;seealsoStatev.Brooks,175N.J.215,229(2002)(notingcourtmaynotinferguiltsolelyfromdismissedcharge);Statev.Green,62N.J.547,571(1973)(notingsentencingcourtmaynotinferguiltfromchargedefendantdoesnotadmit).

Toassistthecourtinitsevaluationofthepublic-interestprong,wedirectthatapplicantsforexpungementunderN.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2)and(c)(3)includewiththeirpetitionalltranscriptsofpleaandsentencinghearings,aswellasacopyofthepresentencereport. SeeInreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at483n.3.

Inpractice,trialjudgeswillbalancetheabovefactorsastheydecidewhetherexpungementservesthepublicinterestinaparticularcase. Indoingso,theyweightherisksandbenefitstothepublicofallowingorbarringexpungement. SeeInreOp.No.26oftheComm.ontheUnauthorizedPracticeofLaw,139N.J.323,327(1995). Thefocus,asthestatutesays,isonthe publicinterest, whichisbroaderthanthepersonaldesiresofanapplicant,althoughtheconceptscanoftenbeintertwined.

Thelegislativehistoryofferssomeguidanceforthejudge stask. Itremindsusthatexpungementispartofanoverallplannotonlytoprotectpublicsafetybutalsotopromotethesuccessfulreentryofex-offendersintothecommunity. SeeSafeStreetsStrategy,supra,at2,24. Weexaminethebalancingprocessfurtherinlightofthoseaimsandthefactsofthiscase.

V.

Thetrialcourtinthiscasefoundthatexpungementwas notconsistentwiththepublicinterest. Wereviewthecourt sbalancingofcompetingfactorsforabuseofdiscretion. SeeInreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at496. Underthatstandard,areviewingcourtshouldnotsubstituteitsjudgmentifthetrialcourt srulingwaswithin arangeofacceptabledecisions. Parishv.Parish,412N.J.Super.39,73(App.Div.2010). However,thetrialcourt sinterpretationofthelawisnotentitledtospecialdeference. ManalapanRealty,L.P.v.Twp.Comm.ofManalapan,140N.J.366,378(1995)(citationsomitted). Wereviewlegalquestionsdenovo. SeeStatev.Ghandi,201N.J.161,176(2010)(citationomitted).

NoonedisputesthatKollmanmetthestatute sbasic,objectivecriteria: fiveyearshadpassedsincehisconviction;hehadnotbeenconvictedofanyoffensesince;andtheconvictioninquestionisathird-degreeCDSoffense. SeeN.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a)(2)&(c)(3). Kollmanalsopresentedacertificationandtwenty-oneletterstodemonstratethatexpungementwouldbeinthepublicinterest.

The trial court assessed those materials and stated it was satisfied that Kollman s activities and recent behavior were consistent with those of a good citizen who has benefited from the rehabilitative aspects of community supervision. The court nonetheless denied the application [d]ue to the relatively serious nature of the offense. As the trial court explained,

[e]cstasyisadesignerdrugthatthePetitionersold,onmorethanoneoccasion,purelyformonetarygain. Thesewerenotsalesoutoffinancialdesperationorunrelentinghabit. Atthetimeofthesales,hewasgainfullyemployedasamanageratawatersportsstore. Further,itisinthepublicinterestnottoexpungethePetitioner sconvictionatthistime. ThecommunityhasarighttobeawareofthePetitioner sconvictionfordrugdistribution. Thepublicisnotbenefitedbyremittingtheadverseconsequencesstemmingfromapubliclyaccessiblecriminalconviction. ThosewhowouldconsiderthePetitioner sapplicationtoworkwithchildrenoradolescentshavetheneedtoknowthattheirwould-bementorhasaconvictionfordrugdistribution. SuchinformationisnecessaryforacompletepictureofthePetitionerandhisentirebackground. Thisinformationiscriticalfordecision-makerschargedwiththeprotectionofyouth. Assuch,atleastforthetimebeing,itisnotinthepublic sinteresttoexpungethisconviction,despitethePetitioner sstepstowardrepairinghisgoodnameandreputation.

 

Thecourt sexplanationappearstorelyonamixofcase-specificandcategoricalfactors. Toidentifytheseriousnessoftheoffense,thecourtfirstfocusedonthetypeofdrugKollmansold. TheLegislature,however,hasdeterminedthatallthird-orfourth-degreeCDSoffensesareeligibleforexpungement--includingcasesthatinvolveecstasy. Thecourtalsohighlighted,inpart,thegeneralrightofthecommunitytobeawareofKollman sdrugconvictions. Totheextentsuchuniversalconcernsareapplied,theycouldruleoutexpungementinalldrugcases. Instead,theweighingandbalancingprocessinthestatutemustrelatetothespecificfactsofeachcase.

Next,thecourtreliedonKollman smultipledrugsales. Accordingtotheindictment,Kollmansoldecstasytoundercoverofficersonthreeoccasions. Hepleadedguiltytoasinglecountofdistributiontiedtoonesale,andtheStatedismissedtheremainingcharges. AlthoughtherecordbeforeusdoesnotestablishthatKollmanmademultiplesales,hehasnotdisputedthatpoint.

Thetrialcourtalsoconsideredpetitioner smotiveatthetimeoftheoffenseandhisplantoworkwithchildrenoncommunity-serviceprojects. Initsexerciseofdiscretion,thecourtdrewnegativeinferencesastobothitems. Itexplainedthatpetitionerhadactedformonetarygainwhenhesolddrugsyearsbefore,andthathisoffenseshouldbeknowntothosewhomightallowhimtovolunteerwithadolescents. Kollman semploymentatthetimeoftheoffensecouldwellhavebeendeemedapositivefactor. Also,inlightofKollman spriorhistoryofteachingboatingsafetyandcoachingwrestling,therecordcouldhavesupportedamorepositiveassessmentofhisdesiretocontinueservingasavolunteer. Regardless,thosetwofactorsshouldhavebeenweighedalongsidethesubstantialevidenceaboutpetitioner scharacterandconductsincehisconviction,whichreceivedlittleattention.

Accordingtotheevidencepresented,Kollman completedprobationinhalftheallottedtime,maintainedfull-timeemployment,obtainedacollegedegree,andvolunteeredinvariouscommunityactivities. Hemadeapositiveimpressiononthetwenty-oneindividualswhowrotelettersvouchingforhischaracter,personalgrowth,andeffortsonbehalfofdifferentcharitableandserviceprojects--allsincehisconviction. Inaddition,Kollmanexplainedthathisrecordofconvictionhadhamperedhisattemptstovolunteerincertainareas. Althoughapplicantsarenotrequiredtoshowhowacriminalrecordhasimpededtheireffortstoresumeaproductivelife,courtsmayconsiderthattypeofevidenceastheyassessthepublic-interestprong. SeeInreLoBasso,supra,423N.J.Super.at495.

WeagreewiththeAppellateDivisionthattherecordshowspetitionerled anexemplaryandlaw-abidinglife afterhisconviction. Theevidenceofhischaracterandconductsincethenweighsheavilyinfavorofexpungement. Consideringpetitioner srecenthistoryalsocomportswiththeLegislature sgoals: torewardeffortsatrehabilitationandfacilitatereentrywhenappropriate,andtoproviderelieftocertainone-timeoffenderswhohaverejectedtheircriminalpast. SeeN.J.S.A.2C:52-32;SafeStreetsStrategy,supra,at2,24.

Genericconcernsaside,ourbalancingofthefactorsthatremainintherecordatthistimesuggeststhatexpungementwouldbeinthepublicinterest. Inanabundanceofcaution,weremandtothetrialcourttoweightherelevantfactorsagaininlightoftheaboveprinciplesandtoevaluatepetitioner sconductsincethecourtdeniedhispetitionin2010.

Onremand,thetrialcourtmustassesspetitioner scharacterandconductasofthedateofitsnewruling. Ifpetitionerhascommittedanotheroffenseintheinterim,hemaynolongerqualifyforexpungement. Ontheotherhand,additionalproofofrehabilitationwouldweighfurtherinhisfavoronthepublic-interestprong.

VI.

Forthereasonsstatedabove,wereversethejudgmentoftheAppellateDivisionandremandtothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, HOENS, and PATTERSON, and JUDGE WEFING (temporarily assigned) join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER s opinion.

SUPREMECOURT OFNEW JERSEY

NO. A- 126 SEPTEMBER TERM 2010

ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

IN RE RONALD C. KOLLMAN, JR.,

PETITION FOR EXPUNGEMENT.

D12 ECIDED July 9, 2012

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Chief Justice Rabner

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY

DISSENTING OPINION BY

CHECKLIST

REVERSE AND REMAND

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER

X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA

X

JUSTICE ALBIN

X

JUSTICE HOENS

X

JUSTICE PATTERSON

X

JUDGE WEFING (t/a)

X

TOTALS

6

1 We glean the essential facts from the presentence report petitioner provided and the judgment of conviction submitted jointly by amicus American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice. The record does not contain a copy of the plea agreement or transcripts of either the plea or sentencing hearings.

2 Other grounds for denial include the following: (1) pending civil litigation related to the records sought to be expunged, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(d); (2) prior expungements (with certain exceptions), N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(e); and (3) prior dismissal of criminal charges after completion of supervisory treatment or some other diversionary program, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(f).

3 Some of the same concerns apply to section 14(b), which requires that courts consider the need for the availability of records. See, e.g., XYZ Corp., supra, 119 N.J. at 424 (rejecting per se rule that State s need for records in environmental cases always outweighs corporation s interest in expungement); In re J.N.G., supra, 244 N.J. Super. at 610 (noting that State cannot simply assert that bad crimes establish a need for the availability of the records ).