State v. Eileen M. Ciancaglini

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DATE NAME OF CASE (DOCKET NUMBER)




1-31-11 G.D. v. Bernard Kenny and The Hudson County Democratic Organization, Inc. (A-85-09)

 

Defendants in this case were entitled to assert truth as a defense to the defamation and other related tort actions, even though G.D. s conviction was subject to an expungement order. In addition, G.D. failed to establish that the flyers were not substantially accurate. Moreover, G.D. had no reasonable expectation of privacy that information so long in the public domain before the entry of the expungement order would be erased from the public s mind or from papers already widely disseminated.

 

 

1-26-11 N.J. Division of Youth and Family Services v. P.W.R.

(A-79-09)

 

Because the record in this matter did not demonstrate proof of actionable abuse or neglect of a minor, the court s findings of violations under Title Nine, N.J.S.A.9:6-8.21 to -8.73, were insufficient as a matter of law. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the abuse and neglect judgment against P.W.R. is vacated.

 

 

 

1-25-11 State v. Daniel Twian Brown (A-67-09/A-17-10)

 

At the time Brown fled through a window onto a roof next door, the police had engaged in no misconduct; thus, there was no seizure of any sort in the apartment. When the police arrested Brown after he came down from the roof, they did not need an arrest warrant because they had probable cause to arrest him in a public place (1) for armed robbery committed outside their presence and (2) for resisting arrest, which they observed.

 

1-20-11 State v. Damu Alston (A-72-09)

 

Defendant s statements after he waived his right to counsel, when clarified, were not an assertion of his right to counsel, and the police officer s questions did not exceed the scope of permissible clarification.

 

 

 

1-19-11 State v. Eileen M. Ciancaglini (A-92/93-09)

 

Defendant Ciancaglini s conviction in 2006 for refusing to take a breathalyzer test does not constitute a prior conviction for purposes of determining her sentence for driving while intoxicated in 2008.

 

 

 

1-12-11 Hopewell Valley Citizens Group, Inc. v. Berwind Property Group Development Co., et al. (A-83-09)

 

The circumstances presented in this case satisfy the standards in Rule4:69-6(c) and warrant enlargement of the forty-five-day period because it is manifest that the interest of justice so requires.

 

 

 

12-10-10 Lula M. Henry v. New Jersey Department of Human Services (A-69-09)

 

There is no equitable basis on which to extend the statute of limitations on Henry s retaliation claim. That cause of action accrued at or before the date she resigned in 2004, after being told that if she had not complained, she may have been reclassified. However, a hearing is required to determine whether the discovery rule applies to the discrimination claim. When Henry requested reclassification, she was given a reason that had nothing to do with discrimination, which may have misled her into not pursuing the issue. She is entitled to assert that she had no reasonable suspicion of discrimination until 2006.


12-10-10 David Johnson v. Molly V.G.B. Johnson (A-91-09)


The principles established in Fawzywere intended to be applicable to all child custody arbitrations, including those conducted under the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act. The record created by the arbitrator in this matter, which included a recitation of all evidence considered, a recapitulation of every interview and observation he conducted, a full explanation of the underpinnings of the award, and a separate opinion on reconsideration, satisfies the spirit of Fawzyand is an acceptable substitute for a verbatim transcript.


12-2-10 Joyce Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation

(A-51-09)


The jury charge on plaintiff s retaliation claim was not in error and the jury s verdict in favor of plaintiff on that count was amply supported by the evidence. In addition, on the record presented, there was sufficient evidence of egregiousness to permit or to support the punitive damages awarded to plaintiff.


11-23-10 Paula Alexander , et. al. v. Seton Hall University

(A-87-09)


The payment of unequal wages on the discriminatory basis of age or sex is proscribed by New Jersey s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), and each payment of such discriminatory wages constitutes an actionable wrong that is remediable under the LAD. The two-year statute of limitations applies to such violations by merely cutting off the untimely portion of such claims, thereby limiting the damages recoverable for past discriminatory compensation. As a result, plaintiffs complaint was timely in respect of the allegedly discriminatory wages they received during the two years immediately prior to the filing of their complaint.


11-18-10 The Committee to Recall Robert Menendez v. Nina Wells

(A-86-09)


The matter is ripe for adjudication and the text and history of the Federal Constitution, as well as the principles of the democratic system it created, do not allow the states the power to recall U.S. Senators. Those portions of the UREL and the State Constitution which authorize the recall of U.S. Senators are unconstitutional.

 

11-15-10 Robert R. Dean, et al. v. Barrett Homes, Inc. et al.

(A-15-09)


The economic loss rule embodied in the Products Liability Act precludes recovery of damages for harm that the EIFS caused to itself. The purpose of the Act to provide a remedy for harm that a defective product causes to people or property. There is no room to expand it to create a new remedy for the cost of replacing the product based on assertions that it failed to perform as expected. However, because the EIFS was not fully integrated into the structure, plaintiffs retain a cause of action against the product s manufacturer to the extent that the product caused damage to the house or its immediate surroundings.


11-9-10 In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of W.X.C.

(A-33-09)


The Court concludes that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) is remedial and regulatory in nature, and that its incidental effects, including the use of confinement as part of the treatment methodology, do not alter the essential character of the statute. The Court thus declines to conclude that the SVPA is transformed into a punitive, and therefore unconstitutional, enactment merely because it applies to some individuals, like defendant, who were not provided with specialized treatment prior to civil commitment.



10-27-10 In the Matter of the Expungement Petition of D.H.

(A-82-09)


In the context of an expungement application and in order to give full expression to the Legislature s will, a mandatory order of permanent forfeiture of public employment must be severed from and preserved from the expungement of the conviction that originally triggered the order of forfeiture.

10-26-10 State v. Brian M. Yohnnson (A-37-09)


State v. O Neill does not apply in this case, where police did not use a question-first, warn-later approach and defendant said nothing relevant to the crimes being investigated before receiving proper warnings. Under the familiar totality of the circumstances test, defendant s waiver of his rights was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

10-18-10 Raymond Marcinczyk v. State of New Jersey Police Training Commission (A-19-09)


The agreement that plaintiff Raymond Marcinczyk was required to sign before attending police academy training, in which he agreed that he would not assert any claims for injuries or other damages sustained as a result of the training, was invalid because it contravened public policy as expressed in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A.59:1-1 to 59:12-3. A public entity cannot condition the provision of a public service on the recipient s execution of a waiver of liability.

9-30-10 Melissa Lee v. Carter-Reed Company, L.L.C. (A-38-09)


Based on a review of the record, Melissa Lee s claims, Carter Reed s defenses, and the applicable substantive law, and in light of the analysis of the predominance, superiority, and manageability factors of Rule4:32-1(b) (3), the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion in not certifying the class of New Jersey Relacore purchasers on Lee s Consumer Fraud Act claim.

9-29-10 In the Matter of D.C. & D.C., Minors (A-71-09)

Under the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6B-1 to -6, visitation between siblings placed outside the home is presumed in the period before adoption, and the Division has an independent obligation to facilitate visitation. To oppose visitation, the Division must prove it is contrary to the child s welfare under the standards provided in the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act. After adoption, adoptive parents are free, within the same limits as biological parents, to raise their child as they see fit. Parental autonomy is not absolute, however. A biological or adoptive family may be ordered to permit third-party visitation where necessary to avoid harm to the child.

 

 

9-21-10 City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, et al. (A-9-09)

 

In this eminent domain action, the trial court properly determined that the expanded dry beach (previously tidally flowed) that was produced by the government-funded beach replenishment program fell within the public trust doctrine and was not the property of the upland owners, the Lius. Therefore, the Lius were not entitled to compensation for property they did not own. In addition, the jury determination that a reasonably willing purchaser would not have paid substantially more for the property with the furnishings, fixtures, and equipment was not a miscarriage of justice. The Court rejects the Lius contention that they did not receive just compensation for their property.

 

 

9-20-10 State v. Frank Dellisanti (A-29-09)

 

Defendant Frank G. Dellisanti effectively waived his right under Rule3:16(b) to be present throughout his criminal trial, therefore his convictions are affirmed.

 

 

9-13-10 Roy M. Victor v. State of New Jersey (A-2-09)

 

The Court concurs in the Appellate Division s judgment that the verdict must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. The Court does so because, regardless of whether or not there is room in the Law Against Discrimination s strong protective embrace of persons with disabilities to recognize that there may be circumstances in which a failure to accommodate in and of itself gives rise to a cause of action, this plaintiff s claim for failure to accommodate cannot meet the proofs required on his prima facie case.