State of New Jersey v. Tyrone Wilson

SYLLABUS
 

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).

State of New Jersey v. Tyrone Wilson (A-80-99)

(NOTE: The Court wrote no full opinion in this case. Rather, the Court's affirmance of the judgment of the Appellate Division is based substantially on the Per Curiam opinion below)
 
Argued September 26, 2000 -- Decided November 20, 2000

PER CURIAM

Tyrone Wilson was convicted of knowing and purposeful murder, hindering apprehension, and two weapons offenses. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment plus fifteen years, with a thirty- seven and one-half-year period of parole ineligibility.

Wilson appealed his conviction and sentence to the Appellate Division, challenging the propriety of the jury instructions; the procedures surrounding the readback of testimony of several witnesses; the trial court's handling of a witness's outburst; and the length of his sentence.

Wilson conceded from the beginning of trial that he had killed the victim, Roman Bernard, by shooting him three times at close range with a handgun. Wilson raised the defenses of insanity, diminished capacity, and imperfect self-defense. The shooting occurred on July 22, 1994 after a party held at the apartment of Leslie Ann Brown. Wilson's former girlfriend, Nikia Williams, and another of her former boyfriends, the victim, Roman Bernard were at the party. At some point in the evening, Wilson, over a microphone, jokingly teased Williams and Bernard about their relationship.

Carolyn Brown, Leslie's mother, was watching people leave the party from the porch of a friend's apartment. On direct-examination at trial, Carolyn Brown testified that she saw Wilson run up to within arm's length of Bernard, who was leaning against the wall of a building, and saw five flashes and heard bangs. She testified that as Wilson walked past her, she thought she heard him say, That's what he gets. On cross- examination, the defense was able to point out inconsistencies in this testimony.

Bernard was able to tell police prior to his death that Wilson had shot him. Wilson admitted the shooting to his uncle, Thomas Wilson, to an ex-girlfriend, and the his cousin Angelo Quinones. He did not tell any of them that he had shot Bernard in self-defense.

Dr. David Bogacki, an expert in clinical and forensic psychology, testified on behalf of the defense. He testified to Wilson's low IQ, his substance abuse, his clinical depression and suicidal ideation, and his paranoid personality disorder. Dr. Bogacki testified that on the night in question, Wilson believed his life was in danger. In reaching his opinion, Dr. Bogacki relied on Wilson's statement to him, never otherwise placed before the jury as substantive evidence, that he thought Bernard had a weapon and was going to kill him.

The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions and sentence. In reaching its decision, the appellate panel found that the trial court did not err in failing to charge separately that imperfect self-defense could reduce murder to manslaughter. The court noted that such a charge is not required. In addition, the panel found no substantive evidence to support the theory that Wilson had acted in self-defense.

The Appellate Division also addressed Wilson's claims that the trial court, in its charge to the jury, failed to make any reference to the principles of State v. Hampton and State v. Kociolek in respect of statements made by Wilson to two non-police witnesses. The Appellate Division found that Hampton was inapplicable and that the failure to address Kociolek was not capable of producing an unjust result.

In respect of the emotional outburst of the victim's mother, the Appellate Division noted that the jury was firmly instructed to ignore it and to decide the case without bias, prejudice, or sympathy. The panel concluded that the failure to poll the jury as to the affect of that outburst on it was harmless error, particularly in light of the defenses raised, the concessions made by the defense, and the overwhelming strength of the State's case.

In respect of Wilson's arguments relating to the length of his sentence, the Appellate Division concluded that the trial court adhered to the sentencing guidelines.

The Appellate Division noted the following facts in addressing Wilson's arguments concerning the readback of the testimony of Carolyn Brown, Leslie Brown, and Denise Dozier. Only the direct examination of these witnesses was read back for the jurors. The trial court refused the defense request that the cross-examination also be read back to the jurors. The Appellate Division agreed that the jurors' intent not to hear anything beyond Carolyn Brown's direct examination was more than clear in view of the jury's conduct in leaving the courtroom after a pause between the direct and cross-examination. In addition, the court clerk informed the trial judge after the direct examination of Denise Dozierth that the jurors had heard enough. The Appellate Division, citing clear case law which provides that a judge is not required to continue the reading of testimony when the jury indicates that it has heard enough, was satisfied that the trial court did not err in acceding to the jury's request, made at the conclusion of direct examination of Carolyn Brown and Dozier, to stop the replay. The Appellate Division commented that, even if the request to discontinue the readback had not been sufficiently clear, it was not reversible error because Wilson was unable to demonstrate prejudice by showing that the cross-examination in fact impeached significant testimony that was read back. The Appellate Division did find that the trial court's refusal to replay the cross-examination of Leslie Brown was clearly erroneous because the jury did not indicate at any point that it had heard enough. Nonetheless, the panel concluded that this error did not have the capacity to lead the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.

The Supreme Court granted certification.

HELD: Judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed by the Appellate Division in its written opinion. Wilson's challenges to the trial court's handling of the outburst of a witness, the propriety of the jury instructions, and the length of his sentence are without merit. After having readback the direct examination testimony of several witnesses to the jurors, the trial court's failure to have the cross-examination of those witnesses also readback to the jury was not reversible error.
 
1. It is well-established that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to allow the reading of all or part of the testimony of one or more witnesses at a trial at the specific request of the jury during its deliberations. That discretion, however, is not unbridled. If the testimony is reasonably available, the request should not be refused merely for considerations of time. (Pp. 2-3)

2. As a general rule, if a jury requests a readback of the testimony of a witness, that readback should include both direct and cross-examination. Cross-examination affords a full view of the witness's testimony, including inconsistent and impeaching material. Of course, if a jury makes a readback request that is clearly circumscribed, the trial court has no obligation to compel jurors to hear testimony that they have not asked for or continue to readback after the jury has expressly indicated that they have heard enough. However, if the scope of the jury's request is unclear or if something occurs during readback to raise a question about the extent of the testimony sought, the obligation of the trial court is to ascertain the will of the jury. (Pp. 3-5)

3. Every readback and the exchanges accompanying the readback must be recorded in full. (P. 5)

CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ, and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LAVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in this PER CURIAM opinion.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 80 September Term 1999

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TYRONE WILSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued September 26, 2000 -- Decided November 20, 2000

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at ___ N.J. Super. ___ (1999).

Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney).

Melaney S. Payne, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

PER CURIAM

Tyrone Wilson was convicted of knowing and purposeful murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2), hindering apprehension, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(1), and two weapons offenses, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a, -5b. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of life in prison plus fifteen years, thirty-seven and one-half years without parole.
Wilson appealed, challenging the propriety of the jury instructions; the procedures surrounding the readback of the testimony of several witnesses; the trial court's handling of a witness's outburst, and the length of his sentence. The Appellate Division rejected all of Wilson's arguments in a thorough and thoughtful opinion. ___ N.J. Super. ___ (1999). We granted his petition for certification, 163 N.J. 78 (2000), and we now affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed by the Appellate Division.
We add only this. The rules governing the readback of testimony are relatively straightforward. It is well-established that the reading of all or part of the testimony of one or more of the witnesses at a trial, criminal or civil, at the specific request of the jury during their deliberations is discretionary with the trial court. State v. Wolf, 44 N.J. 176, 185 (1965) (citing Higgins v. Polk, 14 N.J. 490, 493 (1954)); State v. Ciniglio, 57 N.J. Super. 399, 403 (App. Div. 1959), certif. denied, 31 N.J. 295 (1960); accord United States v. Rabb, 453 F.2d 1012, 1013 (3d Cir. 1971) ( Normally, a request by the jury to have a portion of the transcript read back ... lies within the broad discretion of the trial judge. ) (citing United States v. Chicarelli, 445 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1971)); State v. Wilkerson, 60 N.J. 452, 460 (1972) (noting that trial court has ultimate discretion on issue of readbacks); State v. Richter, 21 N.J. 421, 428, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 975, 76 S. Ct. 1039, 100 L. Ed. 1492 (1956); State v. Rodriguez, 234 N.J. Super. 298, 311 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that trial court has discretion to honor jury's request for readback of testimony, and that was not error to ask the jury to rethink its request because readback would take approximately two days), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 656 (1989); State v. Reddy, 137 N.J. Super. 32, 37 (App. Div. 1975).
However, that broad grant of discretion is not unbridled. For example, where the testimony is reasonably available, a judge should not refuse to grant a jury request to have it read merely because the reading would take time. . . . [T]here is no just reason for insisting that laymen jurors must have an unfailing and unanimous memory of all the testimony they hear in the courtroom. Wolf, supra, 44 N.J. at 186..
Moreover, as a general rule, if a jury requests a readback of the testimony of a witness, the readback should include both direct and cross- examination. The reason is obvious: cross-examination affords a full view of the witness's testimony including inconsistencies and impeaching material. Thus, a jury's uncircumscribed request for a readback of a witness's testimony ordinarily is presumed to include cross-examination. People v. Jenkins, 562 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (citing People v. Sepulveda, 355 N.Y.S.2d 637, 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)) appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1991); accord People v. Faulkner, 600 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
That is not to suggest that a witness's entire testimony is required to be read back in every single case. We assume that when jurors request a readback, what is being sought is only... those portions of the testimony about which they are in doubt or disagreement. Wilkerson, supra, 60 N.J. at 460 (quoting Wolf, supra, 44 N.J. at 185). Accordingly, where a request is clearly circumscribed, the trial court has no obligation to compel jurors to hear testimony they have not asked for or to continue a readback after they have expressly indicated that they have heard enough. State v. Garrigan, 126 N.J. Super. 442, 446-47 (App. Div. 1973) aff'd o.b. 64 N.J. 287 (1974). That is so even if one of the parties registers a request for a further readback. Wolf, supra, 44 N.J. at 186.
But if the scope of the jury's request is unclear or if something occurs during the readback to raise a question about the extent of the testimony sought, the obligation of the trial court is to ascertain the will of the jury. State v. Middleton, 299 N.J. Super. 22, 30 (App. Div. 1997). For example, in this case, the jury did not initially limit its request to direct examination. However, at the end of the readback of the direct testimony of a witness, when the tape was stopped briefly, the reconstructed record reveals that the foreperson of the jury said something to the effect of okay, fine, and the jurors got up to leave. The trial court and the lawyers took that as a signal that the jurors had heard enough, although defense counsel continued to argue that they should be required to hear the whole statement. To lay to rest any possible doubt regarding the meaning to be ascribed to the jurors' words and actions, and for record purposes, it would have been preferable for the trial court to have asked the jury directly whether it wished to hear the cross-examination of the witness. Whenever there is the slightest doubt, such an inquiry should ensue. Because all of the participants agreed about the import of the jurors' words and actions in this case, the failure to inquire further was of no moment.
It goes without saying that every readback and the exchanges accompanying it must be recorded in full. Eden v. Conrail, 175 N.J. Super. 263, 289 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd 87 N.J. 467 (1981); see R. 1:2-2. Indeed, much of the procedural maneuvering that occurred in this case could have been avoided had such recording occurred. The rules to which we have adverted are not complicated and should be followed in every case in which a readback is sought.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in this opinion.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
 

NO. A-80

SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TYRONE WILSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

DECIDED November 20, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz

PRESIDING
OPINION BY PER CURIAM
CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST
AFFIRM CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ X JUSTICE STEIN X JUSTICE COLEMAN X JUSTICE LONG X JUSTICE VERNIERO X JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X JUSTICE ZAZZALI X TOTALS
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