State v. Brent D. Lark

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SYLLABUS
 

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).

State v. Brent D. Lark (A-113-98)

 
Argued January 18, 2000 -- Decided March 2, 2000

VERNIERO, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

[Note: The Court did not write a full opinion in this case but supplemented the opinion of Judge Eichen in the Appellate Division. The facts and history of the case outlined below are drawn from the Appellate Division's opinion.]

On May 22, 1996, a Berkeley Heights police officer pulled over a car because of a missing license plate. The owner of the car, Jason Lewis, was in the passenger seat. He provided the officer with a valid registration, insurance card, and his own license. The driver, Brent Lark, told the officer that he did not have his license with him. At the officer's request, Lark wrote down information that would have appeared on the license. When the officer called the data in over his mobile computer; there was no record of such a license.

Because he believed that he had received false information from Lark, the officer called for backup. After two additional officers arrived at the scene, Lark told the officer that his wallet had been taken the week before when he had been mugged. Not believing that statement, the original officer ordered Lark and Lewis out of the car. Lark was placed with the other officers while the original officer searched the car for identification information. He discovered drug paraphernalia wedged behind the driver's seat. Lark and Lewis were arrested and placed in separate patrol cars. The officer returned to his search and uncovered bags containing approximately ten ounces of cocaine.

Lark moved to suppress the search of the car and the seizure of the drug items. The Law Division upheld the search. After reserving his right to appeal that issue, Lark pled guilty and was sentenced to a twelve-year term with a four-year parole ineligibility component.

The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the case did not present any of the recognized automobile exceptions to the requirement that a warrant must be obtained prior to a search. It found that the officer did not have probable cause to conduct his search.

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification.

HELD: The Appellate Division correctly concluded that there was no sustainable basis for a warrantless search of defendant's automobile.

1. Routine motor vehicle offenses justify only the issuance of a summons. Driving without a license, standing by itself, clearly falls within that category of offenses. In this case, Lark's offering of false information to the officer, which led to inability to identify him accurately, justified his arrest. Given the accurate information that was provided by the car's owner, however, there was no basis on which to search and impound the vehicle incident to Lark's arrest. (pp. 2-3)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.

CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate.


SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 113 September Term 1998

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRENT D. LARK,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued January 18, 2000 -- Decided March 2, 2000

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 319 N.J. Super. 618 (1999).

Steven J. Kaflowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Thomas V. Manahan, Union County Prosecutor, attorney).

Paul M. Klein, Deputy Public Defender II, argued the cause for respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney).

Kristen A. McKearney, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
VERNIERO, J.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Eichen's opinion below. State v. Lark, 319 N.J. Super. 618 (App. Div. 1999). We agree that defendant's rights were violated and that the evidence of the drug offenses should be suppressed. We add only the following.
Routine or simple motor vehicle offenses will usually warrant only the issuance of a summons. As we previously explained, police officers and law-enforcement officials should not assume that the statutory authorization to arrest for motor vehicle violations [pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5-25] is unlimited or unreviewable. The exercise of the statutory power to make warrantless arrests for traffic offenses cannot arbitrarily and unreasonably infringe on 'the fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens.' State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 208 (1994)(quoting Gundaker Cent. Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 79 (1956), appeal dismissed, 354 U.S. 933, 77 S. Ct. 1397, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1533 (1957)). Thus, driving without a license, without more, would not constitute sufficient grounds for a custodial arrest.
In instances such as this, when a driver is without a license and offers false information in response to a reasonable police inquiry, there exists a sufficient basis for the police officer to detain the driver for further questioning until the officer learns the true identity of the driver. State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 476-83 (1998) (discussing contours of permissible investigative stops). Assuming that the driver persists in concealing his or her identity and there appears to be no other reasonable alternative, the police officer may take the driver into custody. However, even in that instance, the officer generally may not search the vehicle unless one of the existing exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable. State v. Pierce, supra, 136 N.J. at 213-15 (discussing those exceptions, including automobile exception, in addition to circumstances justifying weapons search for officer protection and lawful boundaries of search incident to arrest).
Following a driver's valid arrest, the police may, under certain circumstances, impound the automobile and conduct an inventory search. State v. Dickey, supra, 152 N.J. at 483-84; State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575 (1980). In this case, however, because the passenger produced valid credentials indicating ownership of the vehicle, the police officer had no reasonable basis to believe that the vehicle had been stolen. The passenger, who was not under suspicion, could have retained custody of the vehicle; thus, there was no basis to impound the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest.
We do not perceive the rules applied in this case as significantly burdening the legitimate function of law enforcement in policing our roadways. Even if we assume that there is some inconvenience to the police, that inconvenience is not an objectively reasonable basis to justify 'nibbling away' at our constitutional rights. State v. Lark, supra, 319 N.J. Super. at 631. The burden, if any, would also be outweighed by the benefit to law enforcement officers in having clear guidance in this area of the law.

CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
 

NO. A-113

SEPTEMBER TERM 1998
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRENT D. LARK,

Defendant-Respondent.

DECIDED March 2, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz

PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Verniero
CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST
AFFIRM CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ X JUSTICE O'HERN X JUSTICE GARIBALDI X JUSTICE STEIN X JUSTICE COLEMAN X JUSTICE LONG ----------------- --------------- ----- JUSTICE VERNIERO X TOTALS
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