EILEEN SEGAL v. RECOVERY AT THE CROSSROADS
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3745-20
EILEEN SEGAL,
Plaintiff,
v.
RECOVERY AT THE
CROSSROADS, BEHAVIORAL
CROSSROADS RECOVERY,
LLC, BEHAVIORAL
CROSSROADS, LLC, and
DEENA LEFKOVITS,
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MICHAEL GITELIS,
Third-Party Defendant-
Respondent.
______________________________
Submitted February 9, 2022 – Decided March 9, 2022
Before Judges Hoffman, Whipple, and Geiger.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester
County, Docket No. L-1434-19.
Hardin, Kundla, McKeon & Poletto, PA, attorneys for
appellant (James L. Fant, of counsel and on the briefs).
Blumberg & Wolk, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Jay
J. Blumberg and Erika L. Mohr, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
By leave granted, defendants/third-party plaintiffs1 appeal from the June
25, 2021 Law Division order denying their motion seeking the dismissal – on
statute of limitations grounds – of a counterclaim filed by third-party defendant
Michael Gitelis. Because the motion judge correctly found that the counterclaim
"relates back" to the date of plaintiff's original complaint, pursuant to Rule 4:9-
3, we affirm.
I.
We glean the following facts from the record. On December 7, 2017,
plaintiff sustained severe bodily injuries near her home in Brooklyn, New York,
when Gitelis assaulted plaintiff. After knocking plaintiff to the ground, Gitelis
1
Plaintiff Eileen Segal filed this action in 2019, asserting claims against
defendants Recovery at the Crossroads; Behavioral Crossroads Recovery, LLC;
Behavioral Crossroads, LLC; and Deena Lefkovits (collectively, the Crossroad
defendants). Defendants operate an outpatient substance abuse rehabilitation
facility in Turnersville.
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jumped into her Toyota Camry, put the car in reverse, and struck her with the
car. A day earlier, Gitelis had been discharged against medical advice by the
Crossroad defendants.
Plaintiff filed her complaint on December 3, 2019, four days before the
running of the statute of limitations on her claims. Plaintiff's complaint did not
include Gitelis as a defendant, only the Crossroads defendants. In relevant part,
plaintiff's complaint alleged:
7. . . . Michael Gitelis was admitted as a patient at the
[Crossroads] . . . on or about December 4, 2017 until
. . . he was discharged at his request against medical
advice ("AMA")[.]
....
11. . . . [O]n or about December 6, 2017, after Mr.
Gitelis was informed that the [Crossroads] required that
he be transported at the 24[-]hour mark of his signing
AMA, Mr. Gitelis became visibl[y] agitated, threatened
self-harm as documented by the defendants herein.
12. At that time . . . Mr. Gitelis then proceeded to leave
the [Crossroads][.] [S]taff members tried to assess his
emotional state and redirect him back to the location
but were unsuccessful.
13. Thereafter, Mr. Gitelis attempted to steal a staff
member[']s car and drive off, at which time [the
Crossroad defendants'] staff contacted the local police,
requesting immediate assistance.
....
A-3745-20
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15. Shortly after the police found . . . Gitelis walking
down the Black Horse Pike, he returned to [the
Crossroads facility], and after requesting a second
chance, he was then admitted again by the [d]efendants
herein to their facility.
16. After his second admittance to the [Crossroads],
that evening, . . . Mr. Gitelis was again displaying
threatening behavior towards other people and staff,
and demanded he be discharged and driven to a bus
station[,] which they apparently complied with.
....
18. At the time Mr. Gitelis left the [Crossroads] facility
the second time . . . it should have been abundantly
clear that he required a police escort lest he pose a
danger to himself and/or others.
19. No police nor law enforcement were contacted[,]
despite Mr. Gitelis . . . displaying threatening behavior
towards other people, and a lawful duty to do so was
required by the New Jersey Duty to Warn Law, and/or
be involuntarily committed as required by law.
....
21. After being discharged by the [Crossroad
defendants] herein, Mr. Gitelis then stole a vehicle and
went on a rampaging crime spree, during which he
attacked and seriously injured [plaintiff] in an attempt
to rob her on December 7, 2017[,] while in Brooklyn,
New York.
22. The plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured
as a result of the attack by Mr. Gitelis.
A-3745-20
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On April 24, 2020, the Crossroad defendants were granted leave to file a
third-party complaint against Gitelis, which they filed on May 1, 2020. After
the court dismissed the third-party complaint for lack of prosecution, the trial
court signed a consent order on March 19, 2021, permitting reinstatement of the
third-party complaint and permitting Gitelis to file a responsive pleading.
On April 1, 2021, Gitelis filed an answer to the third-party complaint. In
his answer, Gitelis asserted eleven separate defenses and a counterclaim against
the Crossroad defendants. The allegations in the counterclaim closely mirrored
the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint, alleging that the Crossroad
defendants failed to screen Gitelis for mental illness and involuntary
commitment, resulting in his discharge at a time when he was a danger to himself
and to others. Gitelis also alleged that the Crossroad defendants "violated the
standard of care for facilities . . . trained to evaluate and treat mental health
issues as well as substance abuse issues"; as a result, the Crossroad defendants
"caused injury to [Gitelis] and others."2
2 On July 26, 2021, Gitelis served an affidavit of merit from David T. Springer,
MD, who opined that "from [his] review of the records . . . there exists a
reasonable probability that the care, skill, and/or knowledge exercised and/or
exhibited in the treatment of Mr. Gitelis" by the Crossroad defendants "fell
outside the acceptable professional standards and duties required by law[.]"
A-3745-20
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After the Crossroad defendants filed an answer to the counterclaim, they
promptly filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the
counterclaim as barred by the statute of limitations. Gitelis opposed the motion,
arguing that his counterclaim was timely in the context of this litigation,
pursuant to the "relation back" principles set forth in Rule 4:9-3.
Following oral argument, the motion judge entered an order denying
summary judgment, rejecting the argument that the counterclaim filed against
the Crossroad defendants must be dismissed as untimely. The judge appended
to the order a statement of reasons for his decision, explaining that: 1) plaintiff's
original complaint was timely filed; 2) plaintiff's complaint alleged that the
Crossroad defendants failed to screen Gitelis for mental illness and involuntary
commitment, leading to his discharge and the subsequent injury of plaintiff; 3)
the counterclaim pled by Gitelis "relates back [to] the claims of the original
complaint as both arise from the same conduct and occurrences"; and 4) because
the counterclaim "relates back" to the date of plaintiff's complaint, it is not
barred by the statute of limitations. The judge also found that genuine issues of
material fact exist regarding Gitelis' counterclaim and that a rational fact finder
could resolve this matter in his favor. Thereafter, this court granted the
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Crossroad defendants leave to file this interlocutory appeal challenging the
motion judge's denial of their summary judgment motion.
II.
We review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo. Branch v. Cream-O-Land, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021);
Christian Mission John 3:16 v. 63 Passaic City, 243 N.J. 175, 184 (2020);
Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). We apply the same standard as the trial court and consider
"whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving
party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
A motion for summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a
matter of law." Ibid. "To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
the trial court must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of
the non-moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 450, 472 (2020)
A-3745-20
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(alteration in original) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480
(2016)); see also Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.
The Crossroad defendants argue the motion judge erred when he denied
the summary judgment dismissal of the counterclaim against them . They
contend the relation-back doctrine does not apply because Gitelis' counterclaim
is affirmative in nature, and therefore does not constitute a "germane"
counterclaim. They argue the two-year statute of limitations thus bars the
counterclaim. We disagree.
In civil actions for personal injury, including actions alleging medical
malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations is two years. N.J.S.A. 2A:14- -
2(a); Martinez v. Cooper Hosp. Univ. Med. Ctr., 163 N.J. 45, 52 (2000). Rule
4:8-1 governs third party practice when a third party is brought in by a
defendant: "The third-party defendant shall assert defenses to the third-party
plaintiff's claim as provided by R. 4:6 and shall assert counterclaims against the
third-party plaintiff . . . as provided by R. 4:7." R. 4:8-1.
Rule 4:7-1 provides that, "a pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against the opposing party whether or not arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." Comments
to Rule 4:7-1 provides support for the motion judge's decision:
A-3745-20
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Although this rule does not expressly so state,
ordinarily a germane counterclaim will not be barred by
the statute of limitations if the complaint itself is
timely. A germane counterclaim is conceptually akin
to an amended pleading that states a claim or defense
arising out of the same conduct, transaction, or
occurrence as the original claim, and R. 4:9-3 expressly
provides for relation back in that situation. The only
difference is the identity of the party raising the
germane claim, and it would seem to make little
functional difference whether a party amends his own
pleading to add a germane claim or if the adverse party
responds with a germane claim. The policy of the
statute of limitations is no more offended in one case
than the other.
[Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2
on R. 4:7-1 (2022).]
Accordingly, for a germane counterclaim to "relate back" to the filing of
the original complaint the following conditions must be met: (1) the original
complaint must have been timely filed and (2) the counterclaim must "arise out
of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original claim." R. 4:7-
1, at cmt. 4; R. 4:9-3.
We explored this rationale in Molnar v. Hedden, 260 N.J. Super. 133
(1992), rev'd on other grounds, Molnar v. Hedden, 138 N.J. 96 (1994). In an
opinion authored by Judge Pressler, we permitted the filing of a germane
counterclaim after the expiration of the statute of limitations under the "relation-
back" doctrine set forth in Rule 4:9-3. Id. at 140. Judge Pressler reasoned that
A-3745-20
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the "relation back" doctrine could permit the filing of a counterclaim after the
expiration of the statute of limitations:
Application of our well-settled and liberal
jurisprudence dictates that a counterclaim arising out of
the same transaction as pleaded by the complaint and
therefore meeting the test of R. 4:9-3 – that is to say, a
litigation component embraced by the entire
controversy doctrine – is eligible for the relation back
principle of the rule and consequently for protection
from the limitations bar.
[Ibid.]
The Court reversed Molnar on other grounds, leaving "open" whether a
germane counterclaim "relate[s]-back" to the original complaint when that
counterclaim was filed outside the applicable limitations period. Molnar, 138 N.J. at 105. Because the claims embraced in the plaintiff's complaint "had
effectively been disposed of by [the] time" the defendant sought to file his
counterclaim, id. at 103, the Court concluded that "nothing remained to which
the counterclaim could relate back," id. at 105.
Relevant to the matter under review, the Court clarified that
we do not rule on whether defendant's counterclaim
whether considered germane or new, pressed after the
statute of limitations expired but while plaintiff’s claim
was still "alive" could be saved by virtue of the relation-
back doctrine. Because we find nothing to which
defendant’s amendment can relate back, we save such
A-3745-20
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a determination for a case that provides the proper
factual support.
[Ibid.]
We are satisfied that this case provides the proper factual support found
lacking by the Court in Molnar. Plaintiff's timely-filed complaint remained
pending when Gitelis filed his first responsive pleading asserting his
counterclaim. Gitelis' counterclaim is clearly "germane" to the claims set forth
in plaintiff's complaint, where she asserted causes of action arising out of the
failure of the Crossroad defendants to respond appropriately to the dangerous
and threatening behavior exhibited by Gitelis during his two stays at their
facility, including the failure to notify the police after Gitelis' second departure
from their facility.
The counterclaim filed by Gitelis closely mirrored plaintiff's original
complaint. Specifically, Gitelis asserted that, upon his second release, an
employee of the Crossroad defendants was ordered to escort Gitelis "to the
nearest bus station." Gitelis alleged that, given his threatening behavior towards
himself and others, the Crossroad defendants should have "screen[ed] and /or
involuntarily commit[ed]" him, as required by law.
A comparison of plaintiff's complaint and the counterclaim filed by Gitelis
demonstrates that his counterclaim is germane to plaintiff's original cause of
A-3745-20
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action. Gitelis asserted that the Crossroad defendants should have "screen[ed]
and /or involuntarily commit[ed]" him because he clearly posed a danger to
himself and others. Plaintiff's complaint similarly alleged that the Crossroad
defendants should have done more to protect the public from Gitelis based on
the obvious threat that he posed to himself and others. Gitelis based his
counterclaim on the same facts as plaintiff. We are satisfied that the
counterclaim filed against the Crossroad defendants is "germane" to the cause
of action plaintiff alleged in her complaint, allowing for application of the
"relation-back" doctrine. Clearly, the facts absent in Molnar are present here.
Any arguments not addressed lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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