C.G v. H.A

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2265-20

C.G.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

H.A.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted May 10, 2022 – Decided May 20, 2022

                   Before Judges Fisher and Currier.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
                   No. FV-15-1749-20.

                   Law Offices of Brian J. Neary, attorneys for appellant
                   (Brian J. Neary, of counsel; Caitlin M. Kenny, on the
                   brief).

                   Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM
        Plaintiff C.G. (Carol, a fictitious name) commenced this action against

defendant H.A. (Harry, also a fictitious name), seeking entry of a restraining

order under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act,  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.

Both parties appeared at the final hearing. Harry was represented by counsel,

Carol was not. Only Carol testified, and the judge credited her testimony in

finding: she and Harry were household members; Harry sexually assaulted her;

and Carol required restraints for her future protection.

        Harry appeals the final restraining order entered against him, arguing the

trial judge erred by:

              I. . . . ISSUING A FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER AS
              DEFENDANT WAS NOT A "HOUSEHOLD
              MEMBER" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
              PDVA'S DEFINITION OF VICTIM OF DOMESTIC
              VIOLENCE. . . .

              II. . . . FAILING TO CONDUCT THE REQUIRED
              LEGAL ANALYSIS TO ENTER A FINAL
              RESTRAINING ORDER UNDER THE SECOND
              PRONG OF SILVER V. SILVER, [1] AND ITS
              PROGENY. . . .

              III. . . . ISSUING A FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER
              AGAINST DEFENDANT AS THERE WAS
              INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THAT
              DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE PREDICATE ACT
              OF SEXUAL ASSAULT PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A.
              2C:14-2(c)(1).

1
    Silver v. Silver,  387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006).
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We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant further discussion in a

written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), adding only a few brief comments.

      As for the second and third points, Carol's unrebutted testimony, which

the trial judge credited, provided ample support for her claim and the judge's

finding that Harry sexually assaulted her. Our standard of review compels

deference to a family judge's finding of fact when, as here, it is based on

sufficient, credible evidence. Cesare v. Cesare,  154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998).

And, even though the judge said little about Carol's need for a protective order,

the very act found to have occurred supports the judge's conclusion about a need

for Carol's protection from future acts of violence; in other words, in a case like

this, the second Silver prong is implicit and requires no amplification, see S.K.

v. J.H.,  426 N.J. Super. 230, 233 (App. Div. 2012), so Harry's argument about

the sufficiency of the judge's analysis on the second prong is without merit.

      Much of the same can be said for Harry's first point. To be sure, the parties

were not in a relationship normally found in domestic violence cases, but they

were members, however briefly, of the same household when the sexual assault

occurred.  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) defines a "[v]ictim of domestic violence" as,

among others, one "who has been subjected to domestic violence by . . . any




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other person who is a present household member or was at any time a household

member."

      The evidence on which the judge relied revealed Harry was a Florida

resident and Carol's boss or employer. Harry was planning to work on a

construction project in New Jersey and required a place to stay, so he accepted

Carol's offer to rent him a room in her South Toms River home. Harry had been

living in Carol's home – renting a room and sharing the common areas with her

– for approximately one week when the sexual assault occurred.

      Harry argues these facts do not support a determination that Carol was

subjected to domestic violence by a household member. We disagree.  N.J.S.A.

2C:25-19(d) does not require familial or emotional ties between parties to render

them household members, as we recognized in S.Z. v. M.C.,  417 N.J. Super.
 622, 624-25 (App. Div. 2011). Even if more than just the fact that Harry was

renting space from Carol was required, the circumstances alone demonstrate that

at least one of the parties desired the other, just as was the case in S.Z. See id.

at 623-24.

      We also find no relevance in the fact that the household relationship lasted

only a week. In urging his theory about the duration of his stay in Carol's home,

Harry argues such a relationship should endure for at least a period of months


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to trigger the protections of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. We cannot

deny that similar cases like S.Z., and Bryant v. Burnett,  264 N.J. Super. 222,

224-25 (App. Div. 1993), considered longer household membership – the

defendants in those cases resided in the plaintiff's household for seven and three

months, respectively. But our decisions in those cases did not attach any

importance to the passage of time – and we find no significance to the

relationship's duration here – because  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) does not impose a

minimal time period for determining when a guest or boarder becomes a

household member.

      Affirmed.




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