STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DANIEL BEDFORD

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1807-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DANIEL BEDFORD,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted April 4, 2022 – Decided April 21, 2022

                   Before Judges Messano and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 13-03-0681.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Phuong V. Dao, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).

                   Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Caroline C. Galda,
                   Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Daniel Bedford appeals from the October 13, 2020 order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary

hearing. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Siobhan A.

Teare's thorough and cogent opinion.

                                     I.

      Because we outlined the underlying facts at length in the decision

resulting from defendant's direct appeal, State v. Bedford, No. A-3518-14 (App.

Div. May 26, 2017) (Bedford I), we provide only a summary of the facts

pertinent to this PCR appeal.

      Defendant admitted at trial to fatally stabbing Kareem Montague during a

drug deal in 2012. According to defendant's testimony, he, Montague, and

Montague's girlfriend, Charlene Fields, were sitting in a car to conduct the drug

transaction. Defendant offered Montague $16, rather than the usual $20 for a

PCP-soaked cigarette, and Montague purportedly became "aggressive" after

taking the "short" payment.     Defendant contended that after the two men

engaged in a physical altercation in the car, Montague pulled out a knife and

lunged at him. Defendant testified that he managed to wrestle the knife away

from Montague, swung it and stabbed Montague in self-defense.




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      Additionally, defendant stated Fields drove the car away from the scene

after Montague collapsed on top of defendant while the two men were still in

the car. He testified Fields stopped the car at some point and jumped out, so he

drove the car for about another a minute before abandoning it on a sidewalk and

running from the scene. In defendant's view, the "[o]nly thing [he] probably

could have [done] better was . . . call[] the police . . . to . . . let them know . . .

[his] side of the story, what happened."

      Fields's account of the incident was quite different. She testified at trial

that defendant entered the car without invitation, Montague looked scared, and

after the two men physically fought, Montague asked her to drive away and get

him to a hospital, stating "This [expletive], he stabbed me." Defendant was still

in the car. Fields stated that as she was driving, defendant told her to "stop the

[expletive] car," which she did. Thereafter, defendant reached for the car key,

Fields exited the car, and defendant drove away with Montague in the car. Fields

ran to a nearby gas station for help. After driving for about a minute, defendant

left the car on the sidewalk and ran. Montague died alone in the car.

      The State produced evidence at trial implicating defendant in the killing,

including a surveillance video of the area near the spot where Montague's car




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was abandoned that showed defendant removing and discarding a sweatshirt

stained with what was subsequently identified as Montague's blood.

      A jury convicted defendant of first-degree aggravated manslaughter,

 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), first-degree carjacking,  N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2, fourth-degree

unlawful possession of a knife,  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d), and third-degree

possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose,  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d).           At

sentencing, the judge merged the convictions for aggravated manslaughter and

possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose and sentenced defendant to

concurrent prison terms of fifteen years for carjacking, twenty-five years for

aggravated manslaughter, and one year on the fourth-degree offense.         The

sentences imposed for aggravated manslaughter and carjacking were subject to

the No Early Release Act (NERA),  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

      We affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded for resentencing.

Bedford I, slip op. at 18. Upon resentencing, defendant received an aggregate

term of twenty-three years in prison, subject to NERA.          We considered

defendant's appeal from his resentence on the excessive sentencing oral

calendar, per Rule 2:9-11, and affirmed. State v. Bedford, No. A-5056-17 (App.

Div. Jan. 9, 2019) (Bedford II); several months later, the Supreme Court denied

defendant's petition for certification.  231 N.J. 150.


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      In August 2019, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition, in part arguing his

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance (IAC). Assigned PCR counsel filed

a supplemental brief in June 2020, incorporating defendant's pro se arguments

and also raising IAC claims. Pertinent to this appeal, PCR counsel specifically

argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and subpoena

Khadidrah Grissom, Montague's former girlfriend and owner of the car in which

Montague was fatally stabbed. PCR counsel argued that if Grissom was called

by trial counsel to testify, "Grissom's testimony would have helped support

[defendant's] argument of self-defense and helped support his testimony that the

victim became aggressive with him" because Grissom gave a statement to the

police the day of the stabbing, implying "the victim had a bad demeanor towards

others and was difficult to deal with" and would "'get real nasty' with his

customers."

      Judge Teare, who also conducted defendant's jury trial in 2014, heard

argument on defendant's petition in September 2020. On October 13, 2020, the

judge entered an order, rejecting defendant's IAC claims and denying his

petition without an evidentiary hearing.         In the eleven-page opinion

accompanying the judge's order, she addressed defendant's IAC claims

regarding Grissom, stating:


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The [c]ourt notes, while Ms. Grissom did state the
decedent would get verbally nasty with customers who
"shorted" him,[] a fair reading of her June 6, 2012
statement to police clearly shows that she was
mourning the death of her ex-boyfriend whom she was
still friendly with and that she believed him to be a
gentle and sweet person. . . . Thus, this was not a
witness who would necessarily provide favorable
testimony that the decedent was the aggressor to
support Defendant’s claim of self-defense.

      ....

[T]he court’s task is to fairly assess defendant's trial
counsel's decisions in the context of the State's case
against the defendant and the strengths and weaknesses
of the evidence available to the defense. Here, trial
counsel had reason not to call Grissom to the stand,
because there was no way to know what kind of witness
she would be on the stand.

      ....

This [c]ourt determines that trial counsel engaged in
reasonable representation, and his representation of the
Defendant-Petitioner in no way rose to a level of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner has failed
to show deficient performance that mandates [PCR]
. . . . Instead, Petitioner points to numerous instances
that illustrate trial strategy that trial counsel followed,
and that Petitioner was fully aware of the strategy
counsel planned to take. It is for the aforementioned
reasons that Defendant-Petitioner's [PCR] Motion is
hereby DENIED.




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       Considering her assessment of the issues raised by defendant, Judge

Teare further found "a testimonial hearing is not required to adequately review

the Defendant-Petitioner's arguments pertaining to his [IAC] claims."

                                     II.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

                               POINT I

            BECAUSE       DEFENDANT         RECEIVED
            INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL,
            HE WAS PREJUDICED AND THEREFORE, HE IS
            ENTITLED   TO    [PCR], INCLUDING     AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

            (a) Trial counsel failed to prepare for trial and
                subpoena Ms. Grissom's testimony at trial.

                                POINT II

            DEFENDANT HAS MADE A PRIMA FACIE
            SHOWING OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
            COUNSEL, AND THUS, THE PCR COURT ERRED
            IN NOT GRANTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

     We conclude these arguments lack merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add the

following brief remarks.

     "[W]here the [PCR] court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may

exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn

from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell,  435 N.J. Super. 351, 373


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(App. Div. 2014) (citation omitted). Additionally, we review a PCR court's

legal conclusions de novo.        State v. Harris,  181 N.J. 391, 415-16

(2004) (citing Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor,  173 N.J. 502, 549

(2002)).

      To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, defendant must establish,

first, that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness" and, second, "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Strickland v. Washington,  466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also State

v. Fritz,  105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New

Jersey). "[T]here is 'a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance[,]' [and t]o rebut that strong

presumption, a defendant must establish that trial counsel's actions did not

equate to 'sound trial strategy.'" State v. Castagna,  187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006)

(quoting Strickland,  466 U.S. at 689). In that vein, we are cognizant that

deciding which witnesses to call to the stand is "an art," and we must be "highly

deferential" to such choices.         State v. Arthur,  184 N.J. 307, 321

(2005) (quoting Strickland,  466 U.S.  at 689, 693).




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      To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must present legally competent evidence rather than "bald assertions."

State v. Cummings,  321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). The petitioner

must allege specific facts sufficient to support a prima facie claim. Ibid. Such

facts must be presented by the petitioner in the form of admissible evidence. Id.

at 167.   In short, the relevant facts must be shown through "affidavits or

certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person

making the certification." Id. at 170; see also R. 3:22-10(c). And even if there

is a showing that counsel was deficient, a "defendant must demonstrate a

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the

merits." State v. Marshall,  148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (quoting State v. Preciose,

 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)).

      Simply raising a PCR claim does not entitle a defendant to an evidentiary

hearing. Cummings,  321 N.J. Super. at 170 (citing Preciose,  129 N.J. at 462).

Instead, an evidentiary hearing is required only when: a defendant establishes

a prima facie case in support of PCR; the court determines there are disputed

issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record;

and the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the

claims asserted. State v. Porter,  216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)).


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We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without an evidentiary

hearing for abuse of discretion. Preciose,  129 N.J. at 462.

      Governed by these standards, we agree with Judge Teare that defendant

failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland/Fritz test and was unable to

demonstrate a reasonable likelihood his PCR claim would ultimately succeed on

the merits. Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

      Affirmed.




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