STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. KENNETH B. GREEN
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5522-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KENNETH B. GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted January 4, 2021 – Decided February 2, 2021
Before Judges Currier and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 09-09-0823
and 09-09-0824.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a May 30, 2019 order denying his petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of the following offenses: second-
degree attempted burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(b)(2), and
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(3); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2); second-
degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1);
second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); first-
degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1) and/or 2C:15-2(a)(2); and second-
degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) and/or 2C:15-1(a)(2). He was also
found guilty of second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-7(b)(1), under a second indictment.
After merger, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
forty years in prison subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,
on the first indictment and a consecutive sentence of ten years' incarceration
subject to five years of parole ineligibility under the second indictment.
We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State
v. Green, No. A-2342-13 (App. Div. Mar. 8, 2017). Defendant then filed a PCR
petition asserting multiple claims, including assertions that his trial counsel was
ineffective for: (1) failing to inform defendant that his prior convictions could
A-5522-18T2
2
be sanitized if he elected to testify; (2) failing to investigate a diminished
capacity defense; and (3) failing to request a jury charge on the defense of
necessity.
In a comprehensive written opinion issued on May 30, 2019, Judge Lara
K. DiFabrizio carefully considered and rejected all of defendant's PCR
arguments.
In considering defendant's contention that his counsel failed to inform him
that his prior convictions could be sanitized if he testified, Judge DiFabrizio
stated:
[Defendant's] claim, however, that he would have
testified had he known of sanitization, is factually
unsupported and legally unavailing. The record shows
the decision not to testify was made by [defendant].
Whether [defendant's] twenty-one prior convictions
were or were not to be sanitized in no way alters the
voluntariness of his choice.
....
[Defendant] was informed of his right to testify,
consulted with counsel on the issue, and decided he
would exercise his right to not take the stand. See State
v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 631 (1990). No basis for
[PCR] is shown. Moreover, this [c]ourt finds it
incredible, due to the volume of convictions, sanitized
or not, that [defendant] would have testified.
A-5522-18T2
3
Defendant also asserted before the PCR court that his counsel was
"ineffective for failing to investigate" a diminished capacity defense based on
defendant's use of "certain psychotropic medication[s]." In support of his
petition, defendant certified:
I had informed my attorneys that at the time of the
incident I had been prescribed certain psychotropic
medication for the treatment of schizophrenia and other
conditions. At the time of the incident, I explained that
because I had not taken my medication I did not
remember the incident. I believe that my attorneys
should have had me evaluated and presented a defense
of diminished capacity.
In her determination of this argument, Judge DiFabrizio found the record
contradicted defendant's contention, remarking that defendant's failure to take
his medication was his "go-to scapegoat, without any credible basis." Judge
DiFabrizio noted and relied on the following testimony given by police officer
Michael Novak in which he recalled the following conversation he overheard
between defendant and co-defendant while they were being treated at the
hospital:
[CO-DEFENDANT]: Hey, [y]o, I ain't trying to go back
to jail.
[DEFENDANT]: Don't worry, you didn't know nothing
about what I was doing, you know, because I didn't
[t]ake my mental medications[.]
A-5522-18T2
4
....
[CO-DEFENDANT]: Oh, all right.
[DEFENDANT]: Yo, you just say that when you heard
something going on upstairs you came upstairs and saw
me laying on the ground.
[CO-DEFENDANT]: Oh, all right. Hey, yo, they said
I told them to get into the room.
[DEFENDANT]: Oh, yeah, nah, you just say you didn't
know nothing about what I was doing and that you
didn't know anything about how I had the gun.
[CO-DEFENDANT]: Oh, all right, word up.
....
[CO-DEFENDANT]: Yeah, I know, word up. Hey, yo,
you're going to be a legend in the hood, yo.
[DEFENDANT]: Ha, ha, ha, yeah, I know, word up,
hey, got shot [thirteen] times, yo.
[CO-DEFENDANT]: Oh, yeah, word up.
[DEFENDANT]: Yo, just remember I didn’t know what
I was saying because of the fact I didn't take my mental
medications and that you don't know nothing about
what was planned or what did end up happening.
[CO-DEFENDANT]: Okay. All right.
During the robbery, defendant was shot by one of the victims – an off-
duty police officer. Nevertheless, defendant was able to flee the scene in a
A-5522-18T2
5
vehicle which he stole from the motel parking lot. In his PCR petition defendant
stated: "I believe that my attorney should have argued the defense of necessity
related to the carjacking . . .[.] I had been shot nine times, I feared for my life,
and when I took the Infinity FX I did so because I believed my life was in
danger."
Judge DiFabrizio rejected this claim, reasoning:
A review of the record makes clear that [defendant] was
not entitled to a defense of necessity in this matter as
he cannot meet the elements of the defense, primarily
element one. It is clear the situation of emergency arose
from the criminal actions of [defendant] and [co-
defendant]. The evidence made clear that [defendant]
and [co-defendant] attempted to rob an off-duty police
officer who used his . . . weapon to defend himself by
shooting [defendant] and [co-defendant]. Since fault
lies upon [defendant], he is legally barred from the use
of the necessity defense.
On appeal, defendant renews his arguments:
THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE
DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS.
A. Trial Counsel Abridged Defendant's Constitutional
Right To Testify.
B. Trial Counsel Failed To Pursue A Diminished
Capacity Defense.
A-5522-18T2
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C. Trial Counsel Failed To Request A Jury Charge On
The Defense Of Necessity Regarding The Carjacking.
We affirm for the reasons stated in Judge DiFabrizio's well-reasoned
opinion, adding only the following comments.
The standard for determining whether counsel's performance was
ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution was formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (l987). To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the
two-prong test of establishing both that: (l) counsel's performance was deficient
and he or she made errors that were so egregious that counsel was not
functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) the
defect in performance prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial such that there
exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687, 694.
To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must present legally competent evidence rather than "bald assertions."
See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). Defendant
has not met that standard.
A-5522-18T2
7
It is clear the trial judge engaged in a lengthy conversation with defendant
during trial to ensure he understood his right to testify, the risks associated with
testifying and to confirm defendant wished to waive his right to testify.
Nevertheless, defendant states if counsel had informed him that his prior
convictions could be sanitized, he would have testified.
Defendant has an extensive criminal history and has been convicted of
twenty-one felony offenses. Even if defendant met the first prong of Strickland
that counsel failed to advise him of sanitization, he did not show there was a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficiency, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Here, defendant has not stated what convictions would have been sanitized
and what his testimony might have been had he taken the stand. He has not
provided any information that would have contradicted the evidence presented
at trial or that would have provided a defense to any of the charges he faced. In
addition, even if defendant's prior convictions were sanitized, the jury would
still have been apprised of defendant's long criminal history and considered it in
evaluating his credibility. Therefore, defendant failed to demonstrate that trial
counsel's alleged error was "so serious as to undermine. . . confidence in the
. . . result reached." State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004).
A-5522-18T2
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Defendant also has not supported his ineffective assistance claim
regarding a possible diminished capacity defense. Defendant's certification
failed to indicate what medication he was prescribed, the doctor who prescribed
the medication, and when defendant last took the medication prior to the offense.
In addition, defendant did not provide any expert reports documenting a mental
illness. He did not provide any evidence of his inability to recall events or
understand the nature of his actions. To the contrary, defendant's conversation
with his co-defendant in the hospital shows that he understood the nature of the
incident and his actions.
In summary, defendant did not present a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance and was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Preciose,
129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). Any remaining arguments not addressed lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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