GREGORY JON JURCZAK v. LORI ANN PULEO
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4170-18T1
GREGORY JON JURCZAK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LORI ANN PULEO, f/k/a
LORI ANN JURCZAK,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted September 14, 2020 – Decided January 29, 2021
Before Judges Hoffman and Suter.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
Docket No. FM-14-0512-11.
Laufer, Dalena, Jensen, Bradley, & Doran, LLC,
attorneys for appellant (Mario N. Delmonaco, on the
briefs).
Townsend, Tomaio & Newmark, LLC, attorneys for
respondent (Angela V. Tafro, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Gregory Jon Jurczak appeals the October 24, 2018 Family Part
order enforcing a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) between himself and
defendant Lori Ann Puleo, and requiring him to pay $33,529 for unreimbursed
childcare expenses for an au pair, out-of-pocket medical expenses, parent
coordinator expenses, and extracurricular activity and cell phone expenses. He
contends he did not violate the MSA or other post-judgment orders. He also
appeals the December 10, 2018 order granting defendant's request for attorney's
fees and the May 3, 2019 order denying his request for reconsideration of these
orders. We affirm the Family Part orders, finding no abuse of discretion.
I.
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 2001 and have one child, Nancy, 1
who was born in 2007. Their Dual Judgment of Divorce was entered on August
9, 2011 and incorporated the MSA. Exhibit A of the MSA is the Final Order
Fixing Custody and Parenting Time entered with the consent of the parties.
They agreed under this order to share joint legal custody of Nancy. Defendant
is the parent of primary residence (PPR). They agreed each was the first option
for childcare in the event the other was not available "for any extended period."
1
"Nancy" is a fictitious name intended to maintain her confidentiality. R. 1:38-
3(d)(1).
A-4170-18T1
2
Paragraph twenty-nine of the MSA addressed work related childcare.
Both parties agreed "an au pair or nanny was appropriate . . . ." The cost was
$200 per week plus a $7500 fee to the au pair agency. They agreed to share
these costs by defendant paying fifty-eight percent and plaintiff paying forty-
two percent.
More than fifteen post-judgment orders have been entered from 2012 to
2019, addressing issues the parties have raised in motions and orders to show
cause about custody, parenting time, payment of expenses, who will provide
childcare and who will pay.
In June 2018, defendant filed a motion requesting an order that plaintiff
was in violation of the MSA and three other post-judgment orders. She alleged
plaintiff failed to pay his portion of many expenses, including past and future
expenses for an au pair. Defendant requested a judgment against plaintiff for
unreimbursed expenses. She also requested reengagement of the parent
coordinator after her services were terminated by plaintiff.
In defendant's supporting certification, she alleged plaintiff owed over
$36,592.98 for unreimbursed expenses under the MSA and post-judgment
orders. Defendant claimed plaintiff would not attend mediation and did not
respond to repeated inquiries from her attorney about his nonpayment of
A-4170-18T1
3
expenses. Defendant alleged her job responsibilities required her to have an au
pair for "responsible, reliable childcare for [Nancy]." They have used several
au pairs in the past. She incurred au pair expenses from 2013, and although she
notified plaintiff, he has not paid his portion. Defendant also requested
plaintiff's contribution to Nancy's extracurricular expenses, summer camp,
uncovered medical expenses per the MSA and cell phone expenses per the
January 7, 2016 order. She alleged plaintiff unilaterally terminated the parent
coordinator contrary to their February 26, 2014 consent order. Defendant
requested counsel fees and costs of $22,520.14 for her motion.
Plaintiff filed a cross-motion in response, seeking to hold defendant in
violation of the MSA, the May 20, 2013 and the January 7, 2016 orders, and
raising a number of issues including that the parties should be responsible for
their own work-related childcare services. Plaintiff acknowledged terminating
services of the parent coordinator. He denied he would not attend mediation.
He denied he owed money to defendant for childcare. Plaintiff alleged
defendant unilaterally hired a nanny despite other relatives who could assist with
childcare. Plaintiff claimed they did not intend to continue an au pair once
Nancy was in school full time.
A-4170-18T1
4
In her reply certification, defendant continued to allege that plaintiff did
not pay the additional expenses required by the MSA. She explained why she
needed an au pair, that plaintiff would no longer agree to an au pair and that he
also objected to her aunt or mother providing childcare. She argued that plaintiff
withheld consent for Nancy to attend certain health care providers.
The court's October 24, 2018 order enforced a February 26, 2014 order by
requiring the parties to immediately re-engage the services of the parent
coordinator because of the "toxicity" between the parties. The court denied
plaintiff's request that the parties pay for their own work-related childcare. It
enforced plaintiff's obligation to contribute forty-two percent of the au pair fees,
finding he failed since 2014 to pay these fees.
The court found plaintiff was in violation of litigant's rights. There were
"significant arrearages," demonstrating that plaintiff failed to comply with the
MSA and court orders dated May 20, 2013, February 26, 2014, and January 7,
2016. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the MSA "expired" or that
any of the other orders cited by plaintiff and entered after the MSA relieved him
of his obligations under the MSA to contribute to childcare. The court found
plaintiff owed $35,821 for childcare and other unreimbursed expenses and
reduced this to a judgment. The court rejected defendant's request for attorney's
A-4170-18T1
5
fees for prior motions but would allow her to resubmit a certification for fees
related just to this motion.
In November 2018, plaintiff requested reconsideration of the October 24,
2018 order. Plaintiff explained that defendant violated their May 2013 consent
order by retaining an au pair without his approval. He objected to payment of
her counsel fees because they were "inflated and unrelated" to the motion.
Referencing the $35,821 in unreimbursed expenses, plaintiff claimed "[t]he
monies that weren't paid resulted from [defendant's] noncompliance with the
[May 2013 consent order]." Plaintiff acknowledged he terminated the services
of the parent coordinator "because she was unprofessional and ineffectual in
solving problems."
Defendant filed a cross-motion to enforce the October 24, 2018 order,
arguing plaintiff was willfully in violation of its terms, and requested counsel
fees. Defendant alleged she repeatedly asked plaintiff to pay his portion of the
unreimbursed expenses. She claimed he unreasonably withheld consent on
several issues including the selection and payment for an au pair.
On December 10, 2018, the Family Part judge awarded defendant
$11,286.14 for attorney's fees and costs. The court considered factors under
Rule 5:3-5 and Rule 4:42-9, finding it relevant that the fees were incurred to
A-4170-18T1
6
enforce existing orders. However, the court reduced the award "to some degree"
based on the parties' respective financial positions. The court also reviewed
counsel's certification, finding some entries did not relate to this motion and
subtracted those entries.
In February 2019, the court heard oral argument on plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration and defendant's cross-motion. By order dated May 3, 2019, the
Family Part judge denied plaintiff's motion, finding he did not show the court's
decision was palpably incorrect or rested on an irrational basis. The court noted
plaintiff's factual assertions and arguments were largely the same as in his
original certification. Plaintiff did not highlight for the court what it had
overlooked. The court determined the MSA is "binding and enforceable."
The court found the parties agreed to hire an au pair for work-related
childcare. None of the prior orders cited by plaintiff relieved the parties of their
obligation to pay for childcare.
The court found plaintiff willfully and intentionally failed to comply with
the court's October 24, 2018 order. This finding was based on "numerous
exchanges via text and email that indicate the [p]laintiff has taken positions that
are unreasonable." However, the court reduced the amount of unreimbursed au
A-4170-18T1
7
pair expenses to $33,529 by deducting monies paid to defendant's aunt for
childcare.
The court explained it enforced the February 26, 2014 order about the
parent coordinator based on the parties' difficulty in communication and
coparenting. The court found a parent coordinator was in Nancy's best interest;
it was not an arbitrary or capricious requirement.
The court denied defendant's request for attorney's fees without prejudice.
The economic disparity between the parties did not favor this relief, fees were
previously awarded to defendant, and plaintiff's motion for reconsideration
"yielded [him] one small award."
Plaintiff appealed the order denying reconsideration. He has since
amended his notice to appeal to include the underlying October 24, 2018 order
and the December 10, 2018 order for attorney's fees.
On appeal, plaintiff raises these arguments:
I. THE COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
RESPONDENT RELIEF THAT WAS
UNWARRANTED AND UNSUPPORTED BY ALL
COURT ORDERS ISSUED SUBSEQUENT TO THE
ENTRANCE OF THE PARTIES' MARITAL
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ON AUGUST 9, 2011.
II. THE COURT EXPRESSED ITS MAY 3, 2019
DECISION BASED UPON A PALPABLY
INCORRECT AND IRRATIONAL BASIS, AND
A-4170-18T1
8
FURTHER FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF PROBATIVE, COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
III. THE COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR COURT COSTS
AND COUNSEL FEES AS THE COURT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE REQUIRED FACTORS SET
FORTH IN [RULE] 4:42-9, AS WELL AS THOSE
FACTORS SET FORTH IN N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.
II.
We accord "great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part
judges," Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012)
(citations omitted), in recognition of the "family courts' special jurisdiction and
expertise in family matters . . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C.
III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413
(1998)). "The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on
appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare,
154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474,
484 (1974)). We "should not disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions
of the trial judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably
credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Id. at 412 (quoting Rova,
65 N.J. at 484). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
A-4170-18T1
9
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 26 (2014) (quoting
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995)).
A.
Plaintiff argues that paragraphs twelve through sixteen of the court's
October 24, 2018 order should be vacated because the parties have not agreed
on an au pair who satisfies the guidelines in the court's May 20, 2013 order. He
argues defendant's June 25, 2018 certification did not bring to the court's
attention relevant portions of other court orders, which then mislead the court
into thinking he did not comply with the MSA. Plaintiff argues that without
agreement, childcare is to be provided by maternal and paternal family members.
Plaintiff claims defendant failed to include the court's August 15, 2013
order that did not permit defendant to unilaterally retain the au pair. He also
contends he should not have to pay attorney's fees because he complied with
court orders.
We find no abuse of discretion by the Family Part judge because his
decisions were supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. The
trial court very clearly considered all of the prior orders, the evidence in the
A-4170-18T1
10
record and heard from the parties before making its decision. With respect to
the au pair, the trial court's October 24, 2018 and May 3, 2019 orders found that
plaintiff "refused to meet a substantial number of his obligations under the MSA
and various post-judgment orders." Although defendant tried mediation and
other efforts to resolve their disputes, the trial court found "plaintiff did not
intend to compromise with the [d]efendant, nor comply with the MSA or any
subsequent orders with regard to the childcare provider expenses." The record
in this case, having been carefully reviewed, fully bears out the trial court's
conclusions.
Moreover, although plaintiff cites to various orders in the record, we agree
that there was no abuse by the trial court as none of the orders vacated the MSA's
requirement that plaintiff pay forty-two percent of the childcare costs and that
their standard during the marriage was to use an au pair.
B.
Plaintiff contends the Family Part judge abused his discretion by denying
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. According to plaintiff, the May 3, 2019
order was based "on the incorrect belief and assumption that the parties had
mutually agreed upon, and hired an au pair or rematch au pair" in June 2014.
Defendant argues that had the court reviewed the February 22, 2019 transcript,
A-4170-18T1
11
it would have been clear they had not agreed on an au pair, and that defendant
could not unilaterally hire one based on the court's August 15, 2013 order.
Plaintiff argues the orders entered after the 2011 MSA "obviate" his
payment toward childcare costs because they were to use relatives for childcare.
He contends nothing in paragraph twenty-nine of the MSA allows any party to
unilaterally decide who would be the au pair. Plaintiff argues he terminated the
parent coordinator within the terms of the February 26, 2014 consent order and
that these costs were unnecessary because the service provided was ineffective.
"[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging
Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Capital Fin. Co.
of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008)).
Reconsideration should only be used for those cases which fall into that narrow
corridor in which either: "1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a
palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either
did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent
evidence." Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. at
310). "[A] trial court's reconsideration decision will be left undisturbed unless
it represents a clear abuse of discretion." Ibid.
A-4170-18T1
12
The Family Part judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
reconsideration. The record does not support plaintiff's arguments that the
challenged orders were palpably incorrect or irrational. The trial court found
previously that plaintiff did not intend to compromise with defendant. Nothing
in the record shows plaintiff would agree with defendant on childcare. In his
reconsideration motion, plaintiff did not provide new evidence or point out what
the court did not consider. Instead, plaintiff simply raised the same issues,
arguing with the court that its decision was made in error. As the trial court held
"[a] motion for reconsideration is not a mechanism for unhappy litigants to
attempt once more to air their positions and re-litigate issues already decided."
This does not satisfy the standard for reconsideration. The trial court was correct
in denying plaintiff's motion.
C.
Plaintiff contends the court erred by awarding attorney's fees to defendant.
Plaintiff argues he did not violate the MSA or court orders. Rather, it is
defendant who engaged in self-help by unilaterally hiring an au pair contrary to
the May 30, 2013 order.
We will not reverse a decision regarding counsel fees "absent a showing
of an abuse of discretion involving a clear error in judgment." Tannen v.
A-4170-18T1
13
Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248, 285 (App. Div. 2010). An application for counsel
fees must be supported by a certification of the attorney's services. R. 4:42-9(b).
"[T]he party seeking to be awarded attorneys' fees ordinarily bears the burden
of proving that they are reasonable, and . . . contractual fee-shifting provisions
are strictly construed . . . ." Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 455 (2013);
McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 326-27 (1991) (noting that
contractual fee-shifting provisions are strictly construed). In evaluating whether
to award fees, the trial court is to assess factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c).
The record does not support an abuse of discretion. The court considered
the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c) and Rule 4:42-9 in awarding fees against
plaintiff to enforce existing orders, but reduced them to take into consideration
plaintiff's financial position and that he had prevailed on a small issue. It then
declined to award other fees on reconsideration.
Affirmed.
A-4170-18T1
14
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
