STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DONALD PETERSON
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2948-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DONALD PETERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted October 26, 2020 – Decided January 05, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 12-07-
0564.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (John V. Molitor, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Michael H. Robertson, Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Amanda Frankel, Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a December 7, 2018 order denying his petition
for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant
contends that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Judge Anthony F. Picheca, Jr., entered the order and rendered a comprehensive
and well-reasoned fourteen-page opinion. We affirm.
In July 2012, defendant was indicted for second-degree possession of a
firearm by a previously convicted person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b), and fourth-
degree possession of a non-firearm weapon (a machete) by a previously
convicted person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a).1 Defendant was the subject of an
investigation into the unexplained death of a sixteen-year old boy, J.M. 2
Pursuant to the investigation, police obtained warrants to search defendant's
apartment and trucks for microscopic and other evidence that connect ed
defendant and J.M. The police subsequently found a rifle in defendant's
apartment and a machete in one of his vehicles. Defendant moved to suppress
the evidence, claiming police exceeded the scope of the warrant and that the
1
Defendant was previously convicted of aggravated assault, precluding him
from thereafter possessing a firearm and other specified weapons.
2
An autopsy of J.M. revealed that he died of acute alcohol poisoning.
Defendant was not charged in connection with the death.
A-2948-18T2
2
warrant application failed to particularly describe the weapons that were seized.
In December 2013, the motion court suppressed the rifle and machete. The
motion court rejected the State's argument that this evidence was lawfully seized
under the plain view doctrine, reasoning that police were aware the firearm
would be present based on a statement defendant gave to police before the
warrant was executed. 3 We granted the State's interlocutory motion for leave
to appeal and reversed the suppression order, holding that the weapons were
admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusion rule. State
v. Peterson, No. A-2161-13T2 (App. Div. Dec. 12, 2014).
In April 2015, defendant pled guilty to both weapons charges pursuant to
a negotiated plea agreement. Defendant appealed his convictions, claiming once
again that the evidence should have been suppressed. We dismissed defendant's
appeal, ruling that we had already decided that issue in the interlocutory appeal.
State v. Peterson, No. A-0356-15 (App. Div. Apr. 13, 2016). The Supreme Court
denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Peterson, 228 N.J. 240
(2016). Thereafter, the PCR judge entered the order under review.
3
We note that in State v. Gonzales, the New Jersey Supreme Court
prospectively eliminated the "inadvertence" element of the plain view exception
to the warrant requirement. 227 N.J. 77, 99 (2016). That decision applies only
to searches conducted after November 15, 2016.
A-2948-18T2
3
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE [PCR]
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEYS WERE
INEFFECTIVE WHEN THEY DID NOT ARGUE
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT
THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT TO SEARCH
DEFENDANT'S APARTMENT
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE [PCR]
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEYS WERE
INEFFECTIVE WHEN THEY DID NOT REQUEST A
HEARING CHALLENGING THE VERACITY OF
THE WARRANT APPLICATION
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE [PCR]
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEYS NEVER
OFFERED A COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO THE
APPELLATE DIVISION'S HOLDING THAT THE
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIED
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S FIRST ATTORNEY WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR ABANDONING HIS
CHALLENGE TO THE ADMISSION OF
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED CONFESSION
A-2948-18T2
4
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S FIRST ATTORNEY WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR REFUSING TO ALLOW
DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY BECAUSE
DEFENDANT WAS THE ONLY PERSON WHO
COULD HAVE REFUTED SCHUTTA'S
TESTIMONY REGARDING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
DEFENDANT'S FOUR STATEMENTS
FPOINT VI
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE PCR
JUDGE'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM THAT HIS FIRST ATTORNEY PROVIDED
INACCURATE ADVICE ON THE MAXIMUM
SENTENCE DEFENDANT COULD RECEIVE
We disagree and affirm substantially for the reasons given by Judge Picheca.
We add the following remarks.
Post-conviction relief serves the same function as a federal writ of habeas
corpus. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). It is not a substitute for
direct appeal. State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 583 (1992). To establish a
violation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
meet the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), and adopted in State v. Fritz, 195 N.J. 42 (1987). "First, the defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant
A-2948-18T2
5
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687.
To meet the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant must show
"that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Ibid. Reviewing courts indulge
in a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. The second prong of the
Strickland/Fritz test requires the defendant to show that counsel's errors created
a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different than if counsel had not made the errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
The Strickland/Fritz two-pronged standard also applies to claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. State v. Morrison, 215 N.J. Super.
540, 547 (App. Div. 1987). The hallmark of effective appellate advocacy is the
ability to "winnow[] out weaker arguments on appeal and focus[] on one central
issue if possible, or at most, on a few key issues." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1983). Importantly for purposes of this appeal, it is well-settled
that failure to pursue a meritless claim does not constitute ineffective assistance .
State v. Webster, 187 N.J. 254, 256 (2006). Appellate counsel has no obligation
to raise spurious issues on appeal. Ibid.
A-2948-18T2
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Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may prove that an
evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with
an ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462–63. The PCR court
should grant an evidentiary hearing only when a defendant is able to prove a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, there are material issues of
disputed fact that must be resolved with evidence outside of the record, and the
hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief. R. 3:22-10(b); Preciose,
129 N.J. at 462. To meet the burden of proving a prima facie case, a defendant
must show a reasonable likelihood of success under the Strickland/Fritz test.
Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463.
After carefully reviewing the record in light of these legal principles, we
conclude that defendant is unable to meet the Strickland/Fritz prongs as to any
of his contentions. Nor has he established a prima facie case warranting an
evidentiary hearing.
We begin by considering defendant's argument—made for the first time
on this appeal—that both his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to challenge the validity of the search warrants. Defendant
now claims there was no probable cause to search for microscopic and other
evidence relating to J.M.'s death. We disagree. The record contains defendant's
A-2948-18T2
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statements to police confirming his interactions with J.M. Furthermore,
distinctive post-mortem lividity and skin compression marks on J.M.'s body
matched the pattern of the ridges on the bed liner of defendant's F250 truck,
suggesting the youth had been transported after his death. These circumstances,
and especially the apparent link between J.M.'s corpse and defendant's truck,
established ample probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrants.
Neither trial nor appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
pursue a baseless suppression argument. Nor was defendant prejudiced by their
failure to raise an argument that ultimately would have proved unsuccessful.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
We likewise reject defendant's argument, also raised for the first time on
this appeal, that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to
challenge the veracity of the affidavit in support of the search warrants under
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563
(1979). Those cases require a hearing only when a defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that the search warrant affiant presented a
deliberate falsehood or demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth. Franks,
438 U.S. at 171; Howery, 80 N.J. at 567. Furthermore, a defendant must show
A-2948-18T2
8
that the warrant would not be supported by probable cause without the false
information. Franks, 438 U.S. at 172; Howery, 80 N.J. at 568.
Defendant now argues that the search warrant affiant did not inform the
warrant judge that an initial cursory consent search of defendant's residence
found nothing of evidential value. This argument lacks sufficient merit to
warrant extensive discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Defendant acknowledges in his
appeal brief that, "[a]dmittedly, Franks does not prohibit the police from
omitting crucial facts. Nevertheless, to the extent the doctrine first announced
in Franks does not address the precise scenario herein, the doctrine should be
expanded." We agree with defendant only insofar that Franks and Howery do
not require that search warrant applications include every fact and circumstance
known to the affiant. In these circumstances, however, the fact that police failed
to find microscopic evidence during the initial consent search was not
exculpatory and had no bearing on whether there was probable cause to believe
a more thorough search would reveal evidence relating to J.M.'s demise. Many
of the items described in the search warrant, see note 3, supra, could not have
been detected or properly collected in the truncated consent search. In any
event, we decline defendant's invitation to extend the Franks/Howery doctrine
to situations that lack deliberate falsehoods or a reckless disregard for the truth.
A-2948-18T2
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We next turn to defendant's argument that his appellate counsel did not
address the inevitable discovery doctrine that we relied on to reverse the trial
court's order suppressing the rifle and machete. In resolving search and seizure
issues, we are not bound by the legal theory relied on by a trial court. See, e.g.,
State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498 (1983) (sustaining search based on a theory not
relied on at the trial court level where the record contained facts from which the
Court could decide the applicability of another warrant exception). See also
State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146 (1983) (sustaining search even though the
telephonic warrant application was defective because the record on appeal
contained an objective basis for the Court to conclude that no warrant was
required to search the car).
Defendant nonetheless contends that because we addressed the inevitable
discovery exception sua sponte, he was deprived of the opportunity to argue
against its application. Defendant suffered no prejudice, however, from our
resolution of the inevitable discovery issue in the interlocutory appeal. We have
carefully reviewed defendant's current arguments and find no basis upon which
to reach a different conclusion than the one we previously reached. All of the
elements of the inevitable discovery exception were established, clearly and
A-2948-18T2
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convincingly, based on the record that was before us when we heard the
interlocutory appeal. See State v. Sugar (II), 100 N.J. 214 (1985). 4
We add that appellate counsel petitioned for certification from our
subsequent order dismissing defendant's appeal. That circumstance belies
defendant's current contention that his initial appellate counsel failed to pursue
the inevitable discovery issue. Defendant has thus failed to establish that the
result would probably have been different had his initial appellate counsel
argued against invocation of the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
We next address defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective
for withdrawing a motion to suppress statements defendant gave to police during
4
To invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine, a court must find there is clear
and convincing evidence that
(1) proper, normal and specific investigatory
procedures would have been pursued in order to
complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of
the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of
those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the
discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the
evidence through the use of such procedures would
have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of
such evidence by unlawful means.
Sugar, 100 N.J. at 238.
A-2948-18T2
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a custodial interrogation. On two occasions during the interrogation, defendant
invoked his right to counsel. Each time he did so, the detectives immediately
ceased posing questions. After each invocation, defendant on his own initiative
informed the detectives that he had changed his mind and wanted to continue
the interview.
Trial counsel intended initially to argue that police did not scrupulou sly
honor defendant's invocation of the right to consult with an attorney. Counsel
withdrew the motion to suppress defendant's statements, however, when he
reviewed the transcript of the interrogation and realized that defendant twice re-
initiated the conversation and was provided each time with fresh Miranda
warnings.5 See State v. Mallon, 288 N.J. Super. 139, 147 (App. Div. 1996) ("[I]f
a defendant initiates further police conversations after invoking his right to
remain silent, the resumption of police questioning will not constitute a failure
to scrupulously honor that right."). See also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (addressing when reinitiation of interrogation by the accused
after invoking the right to counsel indicates a waiver of the Fifth Amendment
right to have counsel present during the interrogation). Importantly, as we have
noted, in both instances, the detectives re-administered Miranda warnings before
5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
A-2948-18T2
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resuming the interrogation, thereby establishing that defendant was kno wingly
and voluntarily waiving his right to have counsel present notwithstanding his
prior invocations of that right.
Counsel explained to the trial court the reason for withdrawing the
Miranda suppression motion, acknowledging,
I can't in good faith claim a Miranda issue at this point
in time. I don't have one. I raised it because I felt there
might have been an issue depending on what Detective
Schutta said, but he has satisfied me, and the transcripts
corroborate what he said, that the defendant was
Mirandized.
We agree with Judge Picheca that counsel's decision to withdraw the
Miranda motion and focus instead on the motion to suppress physical evidence
was a reasonable strategy that "falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." Stickland, 466 U.S. at 689. As we have noted, an
attorney is not required to pursue a meritless argument. Defendant cannot meet
the second prong of the Strickland test, moreover, because any such motion
would not have resulted in the suppression of defendant's statements.
We also reject defendant's related contention that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by advising him not to testify to refute Detective Schutta's
testimony at the suppression hearing. As Judge Picheca aptly noted in his
written opinion:
A-2948-18T2
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[T]here are strategic reasons for a defense attorney to
refrain from calling the defendant to testify at the
pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. For
instance, providing such testimony may prematurely
reveal trial strategy and hinder one's defense, or such
testimony may later be used against a defendant if he
also chooses to testify at trial. There are likely many
other reasons to refrain from calling a defendant at such
a hearing.
In State v. Arthur, the Court remarked that, "a defense attorney's decision
concerning which witness to call to the stand is 'an art,' and a court's review of
such a decision should be 'highly deferential[.]'" 184 N.J. 307, 321 (2005)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). Applying that deferential standard, we
conclude counsel's decision to prevent his client from testifying—and being
subjected to cross examination—was a sound strategic decision reflecting
reasonable professional assistance. We add that defendant has not shown that
had he testified the outcome would have been different.
Finally, we consider defendant's contention that his counsel misinformed
him regarding the maximum sentence that could be imposed. This contention
lacks sufficient merit to warrant all but brief discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Counsel correctly informed defendant that by virtue of his criminal history, he
would be subject to an extended term as a repeat offender if he rejected the plea
offer and was convicted at trial. The plea form that defendant initialed explained
A-2948-18T2
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that by pleading guilty, he could be sentenced to a seven-year prison term with
a five-year period of parole ineligibility. In accordance with the plea agreement,
the State did not seek an extended term and defendant ultimately received the
sentence contemplated in the agreement.
Affirmed.
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