NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. D.L and M.D
Annotate this CaseRECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1484-19
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
D.L.,
Defendant,
and
M.D.,
Defendant-Appellant,
________________________
IN THE MATTER OF J.L.,
a minor.
________________________
Submitted March 10, 2021 – Decided April 13, 2021
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Warren County,
Docket No. FN-21-0188-19.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender,
of counsel; Christine Olexa Saignor, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs.)
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Lea C. Deguilo, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel; Rachel E. Seidman,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant M.D.1 appeals from a July 10, 2019 Family Part child
protection multipurpose order that: (1) awarded joint legal custody of J.L. to
M.D. and defendant D.L.; (2) awarded physical custody of J.L. to D.L. during
the pendency of the action; (3) awarded supervised visitation to M.D.; and (4)
imposed certain requirements on M.D. He also appeals from an October 25,
2019 order that: (1) terminated the Title 30 litigation; (2) continued physical
1
We refer to the parties and minor child by initials to preserve their
confidentiality. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
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2
custody of J.L. with D.L., with oversight by Maryland Child Welfare Services;
(3) continued supervised parenting time by M.D.; and (4) awarded M.D. liberal
and unsupervised telephonic contact with J.L. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
I.
We derive the following facts from the record. This family became known
to the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division)
in 2009. Since then, the Division has received eleven Child Protective Service
referrals, which "involved allegations of substance abuse, alcohol abuse, sexual
abuse, inadequate supervision, domestic violence, mental health concerns, and
neglect." After investigation, the Division determined that seven of the eleven
referrals were unfounded, two were not established, and one was established.
The latest referral is the subject of this appeal.
J.L., who was born on October 6, 2012, is the son of M.D. and D.L. In
October 2013, as part of a non-divorce application for custody, genetic testing
revealed that M.D. was J.L.'s father. In November 2013, following mediation,
M.D. and D.L. reached a custody and parenting time agreement under which
D.L. would have physical custody of J.L. and M.D. would have alternate
weekend parenting time.
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A September 16, 2014 consent order awarded joint legal custody of J.L.
to M.D., D.L., and E.L., J.L.'s maternal grandmother. Thereafter, J.L. was
placed in the sole physical custody of E.L. because both M.D. and D.L. were
unable to care for J.L. at the time. Although J.L. resided with his grandmother,
M.D. continued to have alternate week parenting time, and J.L. exercised liberal
parenting time.
In January 2015, M.D. sought physical custody of J.L. The court denied
his application, determining it was non-emergent. On April 7, 2015, with D.L.'s
consent, the court entered an order awarding M.D. physical custody of J.L. and
joint legal custody of J.L. to both parents.
On May 27, 2016, M.D. was arrested for making terroristic threats to shoot
store employees after attempting to cash a money order. On June 7, 2016, a
neighbor reported that J.L., then three-years of age, was outside of the house
alone. When the police responded, they found J.L. standing in the road wearing
a soiled diaper and M.D. highly intoxicated inside his home. Upon entering
M.D.'s home, a police officer observed dirty diapers in the living room and live
maggots on a bottle of baby lotion and inside a jar of peanuts in the kitchen.
After instructing M.D. to find a relative to care for J.L., police located M.D.'s
mother to care for J.L. for the night. M.D. was arrested for child endangerment.
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The following day, the Division received a referral regarding the incident
and opened a case. M.D. attended a substance-abuse evaluation and agreed to
attend outpatient treatment to address his mental health disorders and substance
abuse. On June 30, 2017, the Division closed the case after determining J.L.
was no longer at risk.
On February 19, 2019, police responded to M.D.'s home for a welfare
check after M.D. posted violent and suicidal statements on Facebook. When the
officer approached M.D., he started crying and police detected a strong odor of
alcohol. M.D. informed the police that he had taken three pills of Depakote,
which M.D. had been prescribed. M.D. was transported to the hospital for a
mental health evaluation. M.D. tested positive for marijuana and alcohol.
On February 25, 2019, the Division received a referral concerning M.D.'s
statements about committing suicide with a knife while J.L. was in the home
under M.D.'s care. The Division initiated an investigation the same day, and
M.D. acknowledged that he made suicidal statements on social media. M.D.
was unaware J.L. saw him hold a knife to his own throat.
During the Division's assessment, M.D. revealed that he was diagnosed
with bipolar disorder, depression, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
He further informed the Division caseworker that he recently began individual
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therapy at Kwenyan and Associates and was registered at Easter Seals. In
response, the Division developed a plan for M.D. to continue addressing his
mental-health needs through individual counseling and Easter Seals.
Ultimately, the Division determined J.L. was safe at the time of the assessment
but expressed concerns that needed to be addressed to keep J.L. safe while under
M.D.'s care.
On March 19, 2019, the Division initiated an action under Title 302 for
care and supervision of J.L. (the Title 30 case or litigation) after receiving a
referral that J.L. saw M.D. attempt suicide. The Division's investigation
revealed that M.D had been struggling with untreated mental health disorders
and substance abuse and that M.D. had prior incidents of consuming alcohol
while taking his psychotropic medications. Although the Division attempted to
assist M.D. after its February visit, he refused to cooperate or accept services.
On March 27, 2019, the court granted the Division care and supervision
of J.L. because it was necessary to "stabilize the father and son so they [could]
continue to live together." However, J.L. remained in M.D.'s physical custody.
2
Although the Division sought care and supervision of J.L. under Title 30, the
case was assigned an FN docket number. References in the record and this
opinion to the FN case refer to the Title 30 action.
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During the hearing, the court found that M.D., who was struggling with
substance abuse and mental health issues, was the sole caretaker for J.L., a
special-needs child diagnosed with autism. M.D. had failed to take his
prescribed psychotropic medications, and J.L.'s school expressed concerns about
J.L.'s behavior. The court ordered M.D. to attend individual therapy and
psychiatric care, submit to urine screenings, and comply with the Easter Seals
program. The court further ordered that J.L. attend a special-needs assessment,
psychiatric evaluation, and play therapy. The Division provided no notice to
D.L. because it was unable to locate her.
On April 10, 2019, the court held a hearing on the return date of an order
to show cause. M.D. was represented by counsel and appeared for the hearing
via telephone, but D.L. did not appear because she still had not been located by
the Division. The court continued physical custody of J.L. with M.D. and
granted the Division continued care and supervision of J.L. It ordered M.D. to
undergo psychiatric and substance-abuse evaluations, submit to at least two drug
screens per month, comply with the Easter Seals program, ensure J .L.'s
attendance at school, and to advise the Division of D.L.'s whereabouts or her
contact information. The court also ordered J.L. to undergo a psychiatric
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evaluation and participate in individual and play therapy through Kwenyan and
Associates.
On June 27, 2019, the Division reported that M.D. failed to maintain
consistent contact with mental health service providers and continued to test
positive for marijuana but negative for his prescribed medications. As a result
of his claimed inability to attend his scheduled appointments, M.D. had received
inconsistent mental health treatment. The report further revealed that on June
18, 2019, M.D. was arrested because he ran after a vehicle with a machete and
threw a bottle at the vehicle. M.D. was charged with aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, bias crime with purpose to intimidate, disorderly conduct, and
threatening violence. While M.D. remained in custody, M.D.'s mother and a
family friend took care of J.L.
The Division further reported that M.D. knew of D.L.'s whereabouts and
her contact information but had failed to inform the Division. On June 24, 2019,
D.L. unexpectedly arrived at the Division's office after learning of M.D.'s recent
arrest for aggravated assault. She informed the Division that she spoke to M.D.
frequently and that he was "aware of her telephone number and whereabouts all
along." D.L. showed evidence of their communications to a Division worker.
She had been unaware of the Division's involvement with J.L. and traveled to
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New Jersey to take him back to Maryland where she lived with her two other
children and her mother. On the same day, the Division served D.L. with a
verified complaint for care and supervision.
On June 25, 2019, D.L. filed an emergent application for physical custody
of J.L. The court denied DL.'s application for lack of emergency but directed
her to file a proper application under the Non-Dissolution (FD) docket. That
same day, M.D. was released from jail. The Division instituted a safety
protection plan whereby M.D.'s parenting time would be supervised.
On July 10, 2019, the court held a Title 30 summary hearing and also
heard D.L.'s FD application for physical custody of J.L. Both M.D. and D.L.
appeared and were represented by counsel. During the hearing, the court
admitted the June 27, 2019 Division report into evidence but excluded police
reports with embedded hearsay.
First, the court addressed the issue of physical custody. M.D. objected to
transferring custody of J.L. to D.L. and argued that he was back on his
psychotropic medications and attending counseling. D.L. represented that she
was prepared to take custody of J.L., that she was ready to put services in place
for her son, and that she had contacted social services in Maryland. D.L.
informed the court that she would permit M.D. to communicate with J.L. and
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that her mother and M.D.'s mother could supervise his contact with J.L. The
Division supported D.L.'s custody application and reported that Maryland Social
Services checked D.L.'s home and found no concerns.
The court awarded physical custody of J.L. to D.L. and continued the Title
30 case because M.D. still needed services to address his mental health and
substance abuse issues. The court explained that M.D.'s mental health issues
were "of paramount concern" as he had "expressed suicidal ideations and made
posts on . . . social media" depicting himself with a knife on his throat and saying
"he was going to kill himself." In addition, the court described M.D.'s lack of
candor with the court, noting he had failed to disclose D.L.'s whereabouts,
falsely reported that he did not know where she was, and said she had basically
abandoned J.L. The court found M.D.'s actions revealed he was "only looking
out for himself, his own interests, not the interests of his six-year-old autistic
son." The court expressed concern about M.D.'s "mental stability, lack of candor
to the [c]ourt," and "his ability to take care of [J.L.] on his own."
The court made the following additional findings:
[M.D.] made suicidal posts on social media. He was
also found to be in possession of marijuana and his
blood alcohol content was .253 at one point, and [M.D.]
was not taking his psychotropic medications as
prescribed. I'm not quite sure what he was doing with
his psychotropic medications because he kept telling
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. . . the doctor, "I need more medication, I need more
medication," but he didn't test positive for any of his
medication and he clearly wasn't taking his
psychotropic medications. So that is a concern to this
[c]ourt.
[J.L.] is a child who has autism and ADHD. He is only
six years old.
[M.D.], again, has been inconsistent with his . . . mental
health regimen and therapy, not taking his psychotropic
medications, and, most recently, on June 18th, 2019, he
was arrested and charged with aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon, bias crime[] with purpose to
intimidate, and disorderly conduct.
....
Apparently, he was in the middle of the street. He was
wearing all black. Somebody honked at him because
he was in the middle of the street. He turned around.
They exchanged words between [M.D.] and the driver.
Perhaps there were some threats made. [M.D.] then
escalated . . . the conflict by going into his house,
grabbing . . . a machete, and wielding it at the driver.
The police were called and rather than de-escalating, he
took a glass bottle and threw it at the vehicle.
....
This pattern, however, of criminal conduct, lack of
control and his mental health is of grave concern to me
as he is unable to take care of himself and his
impulsivity indicates that he is clearly not in a stable
mental state.
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The court explained that the Division investigated D.L.'s ability to care
for J.L. through social services in Maryland and determined that she was
prepared to take care of J.L. The court noted that D.L. had an ongoing
relationship with J.L. despite M.D.'s misrepresentations to the court that she
abandoned her son. D.L. drove from Maryland to New Jersey and filed an
emergency application for custody as soon as she found out about the open Title
30 case. The court explained that it initially denied her application because there
was no emergency but indicated that she could file a proper application for
custody, which she ultimately did under an FD docket.
After considering the facts, including the April 2015 joint custody order,
the fact that D.L. lived in Maryland with her two other children, and that she
was willing and able to take care of J.L., the court granted D.L. temporary
physical custody because it was in J.L.'s "best interest." The court found that
M.D. was "unable to take care of himself, let alone a six-year-old autistic child."
Under the FN docket, the court entered a July 10, 2019 order detailing that J.L.
would "continue under the care and supervision of the Division" but D .L. would
retain physical custody of J.L.
The court then addressed the services portion of the Title 30 matter,
explaining that M.D.'s drug screenings revealed the use of marijuana and that he
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had not been taking his prescribed medications. The court found that
particularly concerning since M.D. had been prescribed various medications.
The court further noted that M.D. was inconsistent with counseling and declined
services through Easter Seals. The court found that he refused to comply with
court orders and failed to take care of himself. The court ordered M.D. to
maintain stable housing and submit to random drugs screens, as well as
psychological, substance abuse, and psychiatric evaluations. The order awarded
supervised parenting time because of M.D.'s untreated mental-health and
substance-abuse issues.
In response to objections raised by M.D.'s counsel, the court explained
that it relied upon N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.D., 453 N.J. Super.
511, 514 (App. Div. 2018), which held that an FD application and FN case may
be heard together because of their intertwined nature. The court stated it had
"considered all the evidence under both cases to make its determination."
The court concluded the hearing by continuing the Title 30 litigation
because it was clear that M.D. still needed services to address his mental health
and substance abuse issues. Accordingly, the court entered an order stating that
it determined, by a preponderance of evidence, that J.L. required care and
supervision by the Division and that M.D. and D.L. were unable to adequately
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care for the child. The court determined that continued services under Title 30
were needed to address M.D.'s mental health and substance abuse to ensure J.L.'s
health and safety.
On September 25, 2019, the Title 30 case returned to court for compliance
review. M.D. failed to appear even though he was represented by counsel. D.L.
appeared telephonically and was represented by counsel. A September 12, 2019
Division report was admitted into evidence.
The Division requested dismissal of the Title 30 litigation because J.L.
relocated to Maryland to live with his mother at his grandmother's house and
had been receiving assistance from Maryland Child Protective Services. The
Division noted that D.L.'s mother had been very attentive to J.L.'s needs. D.L.
supported the Division's request to terminate the Title 30 litigation, arguing that
M.D.'s failure to appear indicated that he was not interested in regaining custody
of J.L. M.D.'s attorney asked the court to keep the Title 30 case open to afford
M.D. additional time for rehabilitation and to preserve his right to a best-interest
hearing.
The court denied the Division's application to terminate the Title 30
litigation and explained that the case would remain open for a short period to
provide M.D. with the opportunity to re-engage in services and to request the
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transfer of custody. Consistent with its rulings, the court entered a September
25, 2019 order allowing J.L. to "continue under the care and supervision of the
Division" and remain in D.L.'s physical custody.
On October 15, 2019, the court held a plenary best-interests hearing and
case management conference. Only M.D. testified at the hearing. The Division
again sought dismissal of the Title 30 litigation. The court admitted the
Division's October 11, 2019 report into evidence after excluding certain
imbedded hearsay statements.
The Division explained that J.L. continued living with his maternal
grandmother in Maryland and Maryland Child Protective Services continued
assisting him. J.L. was enrolled in school and was covered by medical
insurance. The Division asserted that M.D. failed to maintain consistent contact
with the Division and failed to attend his first appointment at Freedom House.
Although he attempted to re-engage with Easter Seals, his caseworker informed
the Division that his participation and communication were minimal.
M.D. did not request that custody be immediately returned to him. His
counsel explained that M.D. "had been engaged in therapeutic services" but
"obviously" could not yet make that request.
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The court noted the Title 30 case "had been open for 210 days" and that
M.D. had "not engaged in the services recommended." The court explained that
M.D. completed psychological, psychiatric, and substance abuse evaluations but
had failed to follow through with subsequent treatment.
The court issued an October 28, 2019 written decision denying M.D.
physical custody of the of J.L. and terminating the Title 30 litigation. It
determined that despite D.L.'s unstable housing, it was in J.L.'s best interests to
remain in his mother's physical custody where he received assistance from both
his maternal grandmother and Maryland Child Welfare Services. M.D. and D.L.
continued to share joint legal custody of J.L. in the companion FD action.
The judge found M.D.'s testimony not credible. She observed that M.D.
"made poor eye contact throughout his testimony, especially when asked about
compliance with medical appointments and administration of psychotropic
medications for himself and [J.L.] He looked down at his hands and let his voice
trail off, giving the impression that not even [he] believed his own words." The
judge noted that M.D. "skated around critical questions regarding compliance
with court orders." For example, when questioned "about his attendance at
counseling appointments between March 2019 and July 2019, [M.D.] testified
he and [J.L.] attended 'as often as allowed.' [M.D.] blamed transportation as a
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barrier to attendance, even though he acknowledged Kwenyan and Associates
provided free transportation."
The judge also found M.D.'s negative remarks about Easter Seals
untrustworthy since his testimony was directly contradicted by a report from
Easter Seals, which revealed that M.D.'s participation and communication were
minimal. Similarly, the judge found M.D.'s description of D.L. as a drug addict
with a poor work history, to be highly suspect. The judge also concluded that
M.D.'s claim that D.L. abandoned J.L. when he was nine months old was belied
by previous custody orders.
Lastly, the court noted that M.D.'s "memory was faulty and he was not
able to remember accurately important dates," including events that occurred
just a few days before the hearing. The court concluded that M.D.'s "lack of eye
contact, evasion of straightforward questions, and inaccurate recollection of
recent events" revealed that he "was not a reliable historian."
"Based on the evidence adduced at the plenary hearing," the judge
concluded it was in J.L.'s best interests to remain in D.L.'s physical custody,
"with oversight by Maryland Child Welfare Services." The judge reasoned:
The court considered the credible testimony adduced at
trial and finds that [M.D.] has not demonstrated
changed circumstances to warrant a return of physical
custody. A few days before the best interests hearing
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[M.D.] re-engaged in substance abuse treatment at
Freedom House. He has yet to show consistent
attendance and commitment to sobriety. [M.D.] has not
re-engaged with Kwenyan and Associates for
individual therapy. And regarding medication
monitoring, he attended a psychiatric appointment the
day before the best interests hearing and received
prescriptions for psychotropic medications, which
prescriptions he has yet to fill. . . . [M.D.] has not
scratched the surface to address and ameliorate the
concerns that led to the commencement of the [Title 30]
litigation. By his own admission, [M.D.] remains
addicted to illicit substances, and he has not engaged in
individual counseling or psychotropic medication
management to address his mental health disorder.
Because of [M.D's] failure to prove changed
circumstances, his application to return [J.L.] to his
physical custody is denied. It is not necessary to engage
in a best interests analysis under N.J.S.A 9:2-4;
however, [D.L.] wishes to remain in Maryland with
[J.L.] and the Division seeks to terminate the [Title 30]
litigation in New Jersey. Because the court transferred
custody of [J.L.] to [D.L.] in Maryland, the court is
constrained to engage in a best interests analysis under
Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309 (2017) before closing
this case.
The judge then considered the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.3 The court
found that only factor eight favored custody with M.D., whereas factors three,
3 N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 enumerates the following factors to be consider by
the trial court in making an award of custody:
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seven, and ten favored D.L. The judge found that factors one, two, and twelve
were in equipoise, and factors four, five, six, nine, eleven, thirteen, and fourteen
were inapplicable.
The court found factor three weighed in favor of D.L. because granting
her custody would reunite J.L. with his half-siblings. The court noted, however,
that J.L. has a strong relationship with both parents.
the parents' ability to agree, communicate and
cooperate in matters relating to the child [(factor one)];
the parents' willingness to accept custody and any
history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not
based on substantiated abuse [(factor two)]; the
interaction and relationship of the child with its parents
and siblings [(factor three)]; the history of domestic
violence, if any [(factor four)]; the safety of the child
and the safety of either parent from physical abuse by
the other parent [(factor five)]; the preference of the
child when of sufficient age and capacity to reason so
as to form an intelligent decision [(factor six)]; the
needs of the child [(factor seven)]; the stability of the
home environment offered [(factor eight)]; the quality
and continuity of the child's education [(factor nine)];
the fitness of the parents [(factor ten)]; the geographical
proximity of the parents' homes [(factor eleven)]; the
extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior
to or subsequent to the separation [(factor twelve)]; the
parents' employment responsibilities [(factor thirteen)];
and the age and number of the children [(factor
fourteen)]. A parent shall not be deemed unfit unless
the parents' conduct has a substantial adverse effect on
the child.
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The court found factor seven weighed in favor of D.L. because there were
no concerns with medical care for J.L. in Maryland. Given J.L.'s autism and
behavioral needs, the Division became concerned about M.D.'s ability to care
for him and to regularly attend his medical appointments. In contrast, after J.L.
relocated to Maryland, he was enrolled in school, obtained medical insurance
coverage, and began receiving services through Maryland Child Welfare
Services.
The judge found that factor ten weighed heavily in D.L.'s favor because
M.D. "has demonstrated that he is unable to care for himself." She court found
M.D. "ha[d] not been attending mental health appointments with regularity" and
that "he ha[d] not filled the prescriptions necessary to stabilize his mental
health." The judge noted that M.D. had only obtained prescribed medications
the day before the best interests hearing. She explained that there was "no
evidence that" M.D. had been "taking his medications as directed" and
emphasized the problematic nature of M.D.'s insistence on continued marijuana
use. Moreover, even though M.D. had completed an intake appointment at
Freedom House and was recommended for intensive outpatient treatment, he
never engaged in that treatment.
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The judge factor eight weighed in favor of M.D. Although M.D.
represented that he was current with his rent payments, he told the Division that
his house was under construction and messy when a caseworker attempted to
conduct a home inspection. The judge did not give significant weight to this
factor because it was unable to confirm the condition of M.D.'s home. She noted
that a recent incident between D.L. and her mother caused D.L. to move out of
her mother's house where D.L. had resided with her two other children. Because
of D.L.'s housing instability at the time, the judge found factor eight weighed
slightly in M.D.'s favor.
The judge found factor one in equipoise because "the parties have been
unable to communicate and cooperate about matters relating to [J.L.]." She
found M.D.'s representations about D.L. to be false. While M.D. testified that
his communications with D.L. were strained, he spoke with J.L. weekly. The
judge found that M.D. had failed to inform D.L. about J.L. since he received
physical custody in April 2015. It was "only when [M.D.] was incarcerated that
[D.L.] was informed about [J.L.'s] status."
As to factor two, the judge found "[b]oth parties appear[ed] equally
willing to accept custody of [J.L.]." She explained that D.L. had sole legal
custody of J.L. for the first two years of his life and that M.D. had physical
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custody of J.L. from April 7, 2015 until July 10, 2019. As soon as D.L. lear ned
of M.D.'s incarceration, she drove to New Jersey and sought physical custody.
The judge found factor twelve in equipoise because both parents spent
time with J.L., with D.L. raising him in his early years and M.D. raising him in
his later years.
The judge found factor four inapplicable because there was no evidence
of any history of domestic violence between the parents. Similarly, she found
factor five inapplicable because there was no evidence of physical abuse. The
judge found factor six inapplicable because J.L. was "not capable of expressing
his preferences." She gave little weight to M.D.'s hearsay testimony that J.L.
wished to reside with him.
The judge found factor nine inapplicable because it was unable to properly
assess this factor given the lack of credible testimony concerning the quality of
the schools attended in New Jersey or Maryland. She also found factor eleven
inapplicable despite the distance the parents lived apart because the biological
grandmothers were able to arrange visitations and M.D. spoke to J.L. every
week. The judge found factor thirteen inapplicable because of the lack of
evidence concerning the employment of either parent. She factor fourteen
inapplicable because the parties had no other children together.
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The judge noted that D.L.'s unstable housing remained a concern but
explained that she arranged for J.L. to reside with her mother, who has been a
stable support system throughout his life. While D.L. had not shown she was
able to independently care for J.L., the judge concluded that it was in J.L.'s best
interests for physical custody to remain with D.L. in Maryland so long as she
received assistance from her mother. She advised that the custody factors may
need to be reassessed if D.L. removes J.L. from his grandmother's house.
In addition, the judge explained that M.D.'s parenting time would remain
supervised by either grandmother because of his untreated mental health
disorders and substance abuse. She noted that the parties would arrange
parenting time and that telephone communications between M.D. and J.L. would
remain liberal and unsupervised.
Lastly, the judge dismissed the Title 30 litigation, determining there were
no grounds to keep the case open since J.L. was no longer receiving services
through the Division in New Jersey, and M.D. had not availed himself of the
services offered by the Division. Consistent with her decision, the judge entered
an October 29, 2018 order terminating the Title 30 litigation. This appeal
followed.
M.D. raises the following points for our consideration:
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I. THE TRIAL COURT’S JULY 10, 2019 DECISION
TO TRANSFER CUSTODY TO THE MOTHER, D.L.,
WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE FATHER, M.D.,
WAS ONLY BRIEFLY UNAVAILABLE TO CARE
FOR HIS CHILD, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD THAT THE CAREGIVER WITH WHOM
THE CHILD WAS LEFT DURING M.D.’S
UNAVAILABILITY WAS NOT COMPETENT TO
PERFORM THAT TASK, AND BECAUSE M.D. HAS
NEVER HAD A FINDING OF ABUSE OR NEGLECT
ENTERED AGAINST HIM.
II. THE TRIAL COURT’S JULY 10, 2019 DECISION
TO TRANSFER CUSTODY TO THE MOTHER, D.L.,
WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER LEGAL
STANDARD TO ITS DETERMINATION OF D.L.’S
APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF CUSTODY.
III. THE OCTOBER 15, 2019 BEST INTERESTS
HEARING WAS IMPROPERLY PREMATURE AND
INCOMPLETE AND THUS DENIED THE FATHER,
M.D., HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AS RELATED
TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE CARE
AND CUSTODY OF HIS CHILD.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S OCTOBER 29, 2019
DECISION TO DENY M.D.’S APPLICATION FOR
THE RETURN OF HIS CHILD TO HIS CARE WAS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
CONTAINED IN THE RECORD BELOW.
V. THE TRIAL COURT’S OCTOBER 29, 2019
DECISION TO PREMATURELY DISMISS THE FN
LITIGATION AMOUNTS TO A DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS BECAUSE M.D. WAS NOT AFFORDED
A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN
SERVICES TO WHICH HE IS LEGALLY ENTITLED
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AND WAS LEFT WITH NO PRACTICABLE LEGAL
RECOURSE TO EXERCISE AND ENFORCE HIS
LEGAL CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS.
II.
We are guided by well-established principles of review. "[W]e accord
great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges[,]" Milne v.
Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Donnelly v.
Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127 (App. Div. 2009)), in recognition of the
"family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters," N.J. Div. of
Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). An abuse of discretion occurs "when a
decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from
established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Milne, 428 N.J.
Super. at 197 (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561. 571
(2002)).
A reviewing court will defer to a judge's factual findings determinations
when "they are supported by 'adequate, substantial and credible evidence' on the
record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)
(quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)).
Additionally, we generally "grant deference to the trial court's credibility
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determinations." Ibid. However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and
the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any
special deference." Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 26 (2014) (citing
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995)).
"[T]he opinion of the trial judge in child custody matters is given great
weight on appeal." Terry v. Terry, 270 N.J. Super. 105, 118 (App. Div. 1994)
(citations omitted). However, the trial judge must consider the statutory criteria
enumerated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. Id. at 107. In turn, we "must evaluate that opinion
by considering the statutory declared public policy and criteria which a [judge]
must consider." Id. at 118.
The judge must "reference the pertinent statutory criteria with some
specificity and should reference the remaining statutory scheme at least
generally, to warrant affirmance." Id. at 119. The judge must also "consider
and articulate why its custody decision is deemed to be in the child's best
interest." Ibid. "[T]he paramount consideration is the safety, happiness,
physical, mental and moral welfare of the child." Ibid. (quoting Fantony v.
Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956)). "[T]hat analysis requires the court to
consider any and all material evidence." Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 317
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(1997) (citing In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 456 (1988)). "The 'best-interest-of-
the-child' standard . . . is an expression of the court's special responsibility to
safeguard the interests of the child at the center of a custody dispute because the
child cannot be presumed to be protected by the adversarial process." Id. at 317-
18.
III.
We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Haekyoung Suh
in her July 10, 2019 oral decision and comprehensive October 29, 2019 written
decision. We add the following comments.
In her decision, the judge made comprehensive findings of fact and
specific credibility findings. Those findings were amply supported by the
record. She also expressed her reasons for finding that keeping the Title 30 case
open in order to provide M.D. with additional opportunities to engage in services
was not required.
M.D. argues that the judge prematurely terminated the Title 30 case and
thereby denied his right to due process because he was not afforded a reasonable
opportunity to engage in services. We disagree. The judge scrupulously
attended to the parties' rights throughout the entire proceedings and M.D. had
the benefit of counsel at all stages of the litigation. Although the judge could
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have conducted another dispositional hearing before dismissing the Title 30
case, the Division had repeatedly requested dismissal, the Title 30 case was then
nine months old, and M.D. had still not complied with services aimed at
addressing his mental health and substance abuse issues.
"Where an order of care and supervision has been entered pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12, it is only effective for six months." N.J. Div. of Youth and
Fam. Servs. v. T.S., 426 N.J. Super. 54, 66 (App. Div. 2012). "Absent a showing
that services or supervision or both appear to be in the best interests of the child
because the services are needed to ensure the child's health and safety, a case
should be dismissed." Ibid. "[T]he Division and the court must not lose sight
. . . that the order expires after six months unless grounds for an extension of the
Division's authority to intervene are established as required by N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
12." Ibid.
The court has discretion in determining whether to extend the Title 30
litigation if the court is satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
best interests of the child require extension. N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs.
v. I.S., 214 N.J. 8, 37-38 (2013). "Parents do not have the right to extend
litigation indefinitely until they are able to safely care for their children." S.D.,
453 N.J. Super. at 524. M.D. completed psychological, psychiatric, and
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substance abuse evaluations but had failed to follow through with subsequent
treatment. J.L. was no longer receiving services through the Division. Given
the extended timeline of this case, J.L.'s residence in Maryland, and M.D.'s
proven lack of compliance and progress, the judge did not abuse her
considerable discretion in dismissing the Title 30 case. As we explained in T.S.,
the purpose of further hearing in a care and supervision case "is not to check -up
on and review a parent's compliance." 426 N.J. Super. at 66. Here, "continued
care and supervision" by the Division was no longer "need[e]d to ensure the
child's health and safety." Id. at 66-67.
M.D. further argues that the decision to award J.L. physical custody was
not supported by the evidence and that the judge did not apply the correct legal
standard when it transferred custody of J.L. to D.L. He contends that he was
able to care for J.L. despite struggling with his mental-health and substance-
abuse issues, and he characterized his criminal conduct as minor offenses. He
notes that there was no finding of abuse and neglect or any evidence presented
that indicated J.L. was harmed. We are unpersuaded.
The judge found that three statutory custody factors (factors three, seven,
and ten) favored D.L. Only factor eight favored M.D. The other factors were
found to be in equipoise or inapplicable. Implicit in the judge's decision is that
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the statutory factors in favor of J.L. outweighed the single factor in favor of
M.D. The record fully supports these findings.
In a Title 30 action for care and supervision, the Division may intervene
when "a child who, although not abused or neglected, [may be] in need of
services to ensure [his or her] health and safety." T.S., 426 N.J. Super. at 64.
Under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12, the Division is authorized to investigate complaints
that a person responsible for a child is unable "to ensure the health and safety of
the child[] or is endangering the welfare of such child." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A.
30:4C-12). "[S]ection 12 . . . is triggered by the appearance that a child's welfare
is endangered." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 33 (2013).
" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 provides the means for the Division to effectuate
services to children in need when a parent does not consent to the Division's
supervision, care, or custody." I.S., 214 N.J. at 33. Its "purpose is to protect
children." Ibid. (citing M.M., 189 N.J. at 293). Therefore, "the Division can
seek a court order to intervene and require a [parent or guardian] to undergo
treatment, or seek other relief, if the best interests of the child so require." A.L.,
213 N.J. at 9 (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12). The Division may obtain custody, care,
or supervision of a child under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 regardless of whether abuse
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or neglect is established under Title 9. I.S., 214 N.J. at 33 (citing M.M., 189 N.J. at 292).
"When custody issues become intertwined with child-protection actions,
then dispositional questions that lie at the intersection of the two matters become
complicated by a parent's delay in achieving circumstances that make it safe for
the child to return to the former custodial parent." Id. at 41. However, "a
noncustodial parent who obtains full-time care of a child after the initiation of
child-protection proceedings 'may always initiate a request for a change in
custody,' which involves a changed-circumstances inquiry and, ultimately,
becomes a best-interests analysis." Id. at 40 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 402 n.3 (2009)). The parent to whom custody was
temporarily transferred during the child-protection litigation has the burden of
proving placement with them under the best-interests standard. Id. at 40–41.
Even if this process is not followed "precisely," placement with the parent to
whom custody was temporarily assigned is suitable if returning the child to the
parent from whom she was removed "would not have been consistent with the
court's continued responsibility to act in the best interests of [J.L.]." Id. at 41.
In addition, "[j]udges who handle FN and FD dockets may choose to
handle the matters separately or at the same time." B.C. v. N.J. Div. of Child
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Prot. & Permanency, 450 N.J. Super. 197, 206 (App. Div. 2017). "Although it
is preferable for the court to ensure that there [are] separate and distinct
proceedings at which Title 30 actions are adjudicated to disposition and [FD]
custody matters are adjudicated," the "procedure may not always prevail" and a
"consolidated procedure" may not necessarily result in any cognizable harm to
the child. I.S., 214 N.J. at 41-42. Notably, "[a] court's technical designation of
a hearing as FD or FN should not hamper the court's mission to safeguard the
welfare of children." S.D., 453 N.J. Super. at 525. "When unusual procedures
are undertaken, however, it is crucial to ensure that the parents are represented
by counsel." Ibid.
Here, the Division filed the Title 30 complaint after attempting to address
concerns that had been raised by the February 25, 2019 referral, which alleged
that J.L. witnessed M.D. attempting to commit suicide with a knife. The
Division had the authority and duty to intervene to ensure J.L.'s health and safety
because Section 12 "is triggered by the appearance that a child's welfare is
endangered." A.L., 213 N.J. at 33; T.S., 426 N.J. Super. at 64.
During the pendency of the Title 30 litigation, D.L. applied for physical
custody under the FD docket after learning of M.D.'s arrest and the Division's
open Title 30 case. During the July 10, 2019 combined hearing, the judge
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admitted the June 27, 2019 Division report into evidence, which revealed that
M.D. had failed to participate in court ordered services.
The judge expressed great concern regarding M.D.'s "mental stability,
lack of candor to the [c]ourt," and "his ability to take care of [J.L.] on his own."
M.D. advised Easter Seals that he was no longer interested in receiving services,
and Kwenyan and Associates closed M.D.'s case due to his lack of compliance
with the program. M.D.'s drug screenings revealed the use of marijuana and that
he had not been taking his prescribed medications. She found that M.D. was
inconsistent with his mental-health regimen and therapy and failed to take his
psychotropic medications. In addition, on June 18, 2019, M.D. was arrested and
charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, bias crime, with purpose
to intimidate, and disorderly conduct.
The judge stated that M.D.'s pattern "of criminal conduct, lack of control
and his mental health is of grave concern to [the court] as he is unable to take
care of himself and his impulsivity indicates that he is clearly not in a stable
mental state." These findings of fact were fully supported by substantial
credible evidence.
We reject M.D.'s contention that the judge applied the wrong legal
standard in awarding physical custody to D.L. The judge granted D.L. physical
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custody because it was in J.L.'s best interests given M.D.'s unresolved mental-
health and substance-abuse issues. See I.S., 214 N.J. at 40. Even though the
FD and the Title 30 matters were intertwined in one hearing, transferring
physical custody to D.L. was suitable considering M.D.'s instability. Id. at 41.
See also S.D., 453 N.J. Super. at 525 (stating that "a court's technical designation
of a hearing as FD or FN should not hamper the court's mission to safeguard the
welfare of children").
Moreover, M.D. received adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be
heard regarding the best interests hearing. Designating the hearing as a
combined FD/Title 30 hearing "ensure[d] the participation of defense counsel
and the Law Guardian[.]" S.D., 453 N.J. Super. at 525. The consolidation of
the cases did not deprive M.D. of due process or result in any cognizable harm
to J.L. I.S., 214 N.J. at 41.
M.D.'s remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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