STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. KARIF FORD
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5095-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KARIF FORD, a/k/a
KARIF H. KING, and
KHYRE KING,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted March 10, 2020 – Decided April 21, 2020
Before Judges Yannotti and Hoffman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 14-09-2285
and 14-09-2286.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, on the
briefs).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat,
Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, defendant pled guilty
to carjacking, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2), a first-degree offense. The
court sentenced defendant in accordance with his plea agreement to a twenty-
year term of incarceration, with an eighty-five percent period of parole
ineligibility, pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
Defendant appeals from the amended judgment of conviction (JOC) dated April
10, 2018. We affirm.
I.
In the evening of December 15, 2013, defendant, Kevin Roberts, Hanif
Thompson, and Basim Henry traveled in Henry's GMC Suburban to The Mall at
Short Hills in Millburn to steal a car. When the group arrived at the mall, they
drove into the parking deck and came across a 2012 grey Range Rover.
Thompson and Roberts exited the GMC Suburban and approached Dustin
Friedland as he walked around the Range Rover. Roberts pushed Friedman and
a struggle ensued. Thompson hit Friedland in the head with a handgun and then
shot him in the head. Thompson and Roberts forced Friedman's wife to get out
of the Range Rover. They took the Range Rover and exited the parking deck.
A-5095-17T3
2
Defendant and Henry fled the scene in the GMC Suburban. The Millburn police
responded to the scene. Friedland was taken to Morristown Memorial Hospital,
where he was pronounced dead.
Thompson, Roberts, Henry, and defendant drove to Newark. At around
10:00 p.m., Henry dropped defendant off at his mother's house on Osborne
Terrace. Defendant called his brother and told him what had taken place at the
mall. Thereafter, defendant's brother contacted the Newark police and reported
what he knew of the carjacking and murder, apparently out of concern for
defendant's safety.
On December 19, 2013, defendant met with detectives at the Essex County
Prosecutor's Office (ECPO). He was informed of his Miranda1 rights and agreed
to be interviewed. The interview was recorded. Defendant provided a detailed
account of the carjacking and admitted he was involved. He told the detectives
he was staying at his mother's house, and that the clothes he was wearing during
the carjacking, including a burgundy vest, were at that location.
Defendant voluntarily turned his phone over to the detectives, and a search
of the phone revealed text messages from Thompson's phone. The text messages
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
A-5095-17T3
3
stated that defendant should not give anyone the phone number, and that he
should "stop running" his "mouth."
On December 20, 2013, Detective Miranda Mathis of the ECPO applied
to the court for a warrant to search three locations, one of which was defendant's
residence on Osborne Terrace in Newark. In the affidavit submitted in support
of the application, Mathis stated that detectives at the ECPO had interviewed
defendant, and defendant had provided a detailed account of the carjacking and
murder at The Mall at Short Hills. Mathis noted that defendant admitted that
he, Thompson, Roberts, and Henry were involved in the commission of the
offenses.
Mathis stated that based on his training and experience, there was probable
cause to believe carjacking, murder, felony murder, and weapons offenses had
been committed, and that evidence relating to those crimes could be found at
three locations, including defendant's residence on Osborne Terrace in Newark,
Thompson's residence in Irvington, and Henry's residence in South Orange. The
judge granted the application and issued the warrant authorizing the search of
the three locations.
On September 19, 2014, an Essex County grand jury returned Indictment
No. 14-09-2285, charging defendant, Thompson, Roberts, and Henry with
A-5095-17T3
4
second-degree conspiracy to commit carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:15-
2(a) (count one); first-degree carjacking by purposely or knowingly putting the
occupants in fear of immediate bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2) (count
two); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count three); first-
degree purposeful and/or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count four);
second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count
five); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count six). Defendant was separately charged in
Indictment No. 14-09-2286 with second-degree certain persons not to possess
weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during
the execution of the search warrant at the Osborne Terrace residence. Defendant
argued that Mathis's affidavit failed to state facts explaining how the ECPO
connected him to the address of the residence on Osborne Terrace. He therefore
argued that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the search. The
judge denied the motion for reasons stated in a written opinion dated December
1, 2015.
On October 10, 2017, defendant pled guilty to second-degree carjacking
under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2). The State agreed to dismiss the other charges in
A-5095-17T3
5 Indictment No. 14-09-2285 and Indictment No. 14-09-2286 and recommend a
custodial sentence not to exceed twenty years.
Thereafter, the judge sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea
agreement and imposed a twenty-year term of incarceration, with an eighty-five
percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to NERA. The judge filed a JOC
dated January 18, 2018. With the consent of the parties, the judge filed an
amended JOC dated April 10, 2018, which awarded defendant additional jail
credits. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT ONE
WHERE THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT
DID NOT STATE HOW THE RESIDENCE TO BE
SEARCHED WAS CONNECTED TO DEFENDANT
OR TO ANY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.
POINT TWO
BY NOT BEING SENSITIVE TO THE DIFFERENT
ROLES OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, THE SENTENCING
JUDGE FAILED TO IMPOSE A FAIR TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT ON DEFENDANT WHERE [THE
JUDGE] DID NOT CONSIDER THE REAL-TIME
CONSEQUENCES.
II.
We first consider defendant's contention that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress. Defendant argues the search warrant affidavit
A-5095-17T3
6
failed to include facts showing his connection to any criminal activity or the
residence to be searched. He therefore argues the search was invalid.
The Constitution of the United States and the New Jersey Constitution
protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend.
IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. The New Jersey courts "have announced a preference
for law enforcement to secure warrants from detached judges prior to a search,
and searches without a warrant are presumed unreasonable unless they fall
within an exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417,
426 (2017) (citing State v. Bryant, 227 N.J. 60, 69-70 (2016)).
The search warrant application "must satisfy the issuing authority 'that
there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, or is being
committed, at a specific location or that evidence of a crime is at the place sought
to be searched.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004)). A
search executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed to be valid and the defendant
"challenging the issuance of th[e] warrant has the burden of proof to establish a
lack of probable cause 'or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.'" Id. at
427 (quoting State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 513-14 (2015)).
A reviewing court gives "substantial deference to the discretionary
determination resulting in the issuance of the [search] warrant." Ibid. (quoting
A-5095-17T3
7
Jones, 179 N.J. at 388). The court considers the "totality of the circumstances"
and should find the search valid "only if the finding of probable cause re lies on
adequate facts." Ibid. (citing Jones, 179 N.J. at 388-89).
"[T]he probable cause determination must be . . . based on the information
contained within the four corners of the supporting affidavit, as supplemented
by sworn testimony before the issuing judge that is recorded
contemporaneously." Ibid. (quoting State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 611
(2009)). Probable cause exists when, considering the totality of the
circumstances, a person of "reasonable caution" would be justified in believing
that evidence of a crime exists in a certain location. Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 (2000).
"Probable cause is "a common sense, practical standard for determining
the validity of a search warrant." State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211 (2001)
(quoting State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 120 (1987)). When making that
determination, a court must consider "the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
Ibid. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)).
As stated previously, Detective Mathis submitted an affidavit in support
of the application for issuance of the search warrant. In the affidavit, Mathis
A-5095-17T3
8
stated that on December 15, 2013, the Millburn police responded to The Mall at
Short Hills after receiving a report of a carjacking with shots fired. The police
found Friedland suffering from a gunshot wound to the head. His wife also was
at the scene. Friedland was removed to a hospital, where he was pronounced
dead.
Mathis detailed the investigation that followed. Mathis noted that the
vehicle in which Friedland and his wife had travelled to the mall in was a 2012
grey Range Rover, which was recovered on December 16, 2013, on Renner
Avenue in Newark. On December 16, 2013, a judge had issued a warrant for a
search of that vehicle.
Mathis also stated that a review of surveillance footage captured a GMC
Suburban leaving the mall parking deck at a high rate of speed, being followed
by the carjacked Range Rover. Mathis said the vehicle was registered to a
person residing on Charlton Avenue in South Orange. On December 17, 2013,
the judge authorized the installation and monitoring of a mobile tracking device
on the GMC Suburban.
Mathis stated that a witness, whose identity was known to law
enforcement, had advised the ECPO that Henry was the primary operator of the
GMC Suburban. She also noted that a Millburn police officer had reported that
A-5095-17T3
9
on December 12, 2013, he observed a two-tone GMC Suburban traveling up and
down the aisles of parked vehicles at the mall. The officer saw three black males
in the vehicle.
Mathis also stated that the ECPO obtained information that Thompson was
involved in the carjacking and murder and that there were numerous t elephone
contacts between Thompson's and Henry's phones. On December 18, 2013, and
December 19, 2013, the judge granted applications for communications data
warrants (CDWs) for Thompson's and Henry's phones and authorized the seizure
of the GMC Suburban.
Mathis further stated that the ECPO had interviewed Ford. Mathis
explained that defendant had come voluntarily to the ECPO because he felt
threatened by text messages Thompson sent to him. Defendant turned over his
cellphone to the ECPO. The detectives reviewed the messages on the phone, and
on December 20, 2013, the judge granted an application for a CDW for
defendant's phone.
Moreover, Mathis said that in the interview, defendant admitted he went
to The Mall at Short Hills with Henry, Thompson, and Roberts on December 15,
2013. Defendant said they were able to steal the 2012 Range Rover during the
A-5095-17T3
10
course of the carjacking. Defendant said the four men left the mall and drove to
Renner Avenue in Newark in two vehicles.
Mathis asserted that based on her training and experience, she believed
there was probable cause that the crimes of carjacking, murder, felony-murder,
and additional weapons offenses, had been committed, and that evidence related
to these crimes could be found at Henry's residence on Charlton Avenue in South
Orange, defendant's residence on Osborne Terrace in Newark, and Thompson's
residence on Myrtle Avenue in Irvington. The judge granted the application and
issued the warrant.
On appeal, defendant argues that the affidavit was deficient because
Mathis did not state how she had obtained defendant's "purported" address.
Defendant contends the affidavit failed to connect him or any criminal activity
to the specific residence on Osborne Terrace.
We are convinced, however, that Mathis set forth sufficient facts to
connect defendant to the criminal activity at the mall and to the specific
residence on Osborne Terrace in Newark. As we have explained, in the
affidavit, Mathis noted that defendant had voluntarily appeared at the ECPO and
admitted he was involved in the carjacking and murder that took place at the
A-5095-17T3
11
mall on December 15, 2013. The affidavit stated that a specific residential unit
on Osborne Terrace in Newark was defendant's residence.
The transcript of defendant's recorded interview indicates that defendant
told the detectives that after the carjacking and murder, he was dropped off at
his mother's house, which he described as his "home." Defendant also described
the clothes he was wearing when the offenses were committed, which included
a burgundy vest. He said the vest was at his mother's house.
Although Mathis did not state in his affidavit how the ECPO came to know
that defendant was residing at his mother's house on Osborne Terrace, the
conclusion is inescapable that the ECPO obtained that information from
defendant himself, when he came to the ECPO and provided his recorded
statement about the carjacking and murder.
Indeed, defendant never claimed he did not provide his address to the
detectives at the ECPO when he appeared for the interview, nor did he claim
that the residence on Osborne Terrace was not his home. Moreover, since
defendant admitted he was involved in the offenses committed at the mall on
December 15, 2013, the affidavit established a reasonable basis for the belief
that evidence pertaining to those crimes could be found at defendant's residence.
A-5095-17T3
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We therefore conclude there were sufficient facts within the four corners of the
affidavit to establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
We also conclude defendant did not assert a valid claim under Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), based on the alleged omission of material facts
from the warrant affidavit. To pursue such a claim, the defendant first must
show the affiant made a false statement and that the statement was made
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 171. "Allegations of
negligence or innocent mistake" on the part of the affiant are insufficient. Ibid.
The Franks standard applies not only to false statements, but also to the
omission of material facts from the warrant affidavit. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 193 (1997) (citing State v. Stelzner, 257 N.J. Super. 219, 235 (App.
Div. 1992)). As stated previously, we are not convinced that Mathis omitted
material facts from the affidavit. However, assuming Mathis omitted material
facts, defendant has not shown the omission was anything other than an innocent
mistake.
Furthermore, defendant failed to make the required "substantial
preliminary showing" that the detective "deliberately or with reckless disregard
for the truth, failed to apprise the issuing judge of material information which,
had it been included in the affidavit, would have militated against issuance of
A-5095-17T3
13
the search warrant." State v. Sheehan, 217 N.J. Super. 20, 25 (App. Div. 1987).
Clearly, if Mathis had included additional facts in the affidavit explaining how
the ECPO learned of defendant's address, it would have provided further support
for, rather than militate against, issuance of the warrant.
In support of his arguments regarding the warrant, defendant relies upon
Boone. In that case, the police suspected that the defendant was distributing
crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Boone, 232 N.J. at 422. The police had
observed the defendant drive to a parking lot in River Edge, retrieve a duffle bag
from an unoccupied vehicle, and then drive to an apartment building on Johnson
Avenue in Hackensack, where the police suspected he was living. Ibid.
An hour later, the defendant went to retrieve the bag from his car but
noticed the vehicle from which the police were engaged in surveillance. Ibid.
The defendant left the bag in the car and drove away. Ibid. The police noted
that the defendant returned to the Johnson Avenue apartment building several
times that day. Ibid. That evening, the police followed the defendant from the
apartment building to another location in Hackensack, where they observed what
they believed was a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Ibid. Thereafter, the
defendant returned to the apartment complex on Johnson Avenue. Ibid.
A-5095-17T3
14
A detective from the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office applied for a
warrant to search the defendant, his car, and a specific unit in the Johnson
Avenue apartment building. Ibid. The building has thirty units, and in the
affidavit, the detective did not provide any details about the unit to be searched
or how the police knew the defendant was residing there. Ibid. The judge issued
the warrant. Id. at 423.
The police executed the warrant and found between one-half and five
ounces of cocaine and an illegal handgun in the apartment. Ibid. The defendant
was charged with operating a facility for the manufacture of a controlled
dangerous substance, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4, and other offenses. Ibid.
The defendant challenged the warrant, arguing that the application was
deficient because it stated that the specific unit in the Johnson Avenue apartment
complex was the defendant's residence. Id. at 425. However, the application
did not set forth facts showing that the defendant was residing there or establish
a factual nexus linking the drug transaction to the residence. Ibid.
The Court held the judge erred by issuing the warrant because the
application did not include sufficient facts to justify the issuance of the warrant.
Id. at 431. The Court noted that the application did not include independent
documentary evidence, such as a voting record, utility bill, or lease, to establish
A-5095-17T3
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the defendant's residence. Id. at 429. The Court also pointed out that no
neighbor, informant, or controlled transaction showed the defendant was
residing in the Johnson Avenue apartment. Ibid.
The Court noted that the State had argued the police could have learned
the defendant's address from past arrests, but the Court stated that the
defendant's criminal record apparently included an address in Englewood. Ibid.
The Court added that there was nothing in the affidavit which tied the specific
apartment unit to the criminal activity. Ibid.
We are convinced, however, that defendant's reliance on Boone is
misplaced. In the affidavit, Mathis stated that defendant had voluntarily come
to the ECPO and admitted his involvement in the carjacking and shooting.
Based on that statement, the issuing judge could reasonably assume defendant
had provided his address to the detectives at the ECPO, and that evidence
pertaining to the carjacking and shooting would be found at that location.
III.
Defendant also argues that his sentence is excessive. He contends the
sentencing judge failed to consider the real-time consequences of the sentence
and did not impose a fair term of imprisonment.
A-5095-17T3
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"An appellate court's review of a sentencing court's imposition of sentence
is guided by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318
(2018). In reviewing a sentence, the court must determine whether: "(1) the
sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and
mitigating factors were . . . 'based upon competent credible evidence in the
record;' [and] (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts' of the case
'shock[s] the judicial conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014)
(third alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).
"An appellate court is bound to affirm a sentence, even if it would have
arrived at a different result, as long as the trial court properly identifies and
balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by competent
credible evidence in the record." State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989)
(citing State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 400-01 (1989); Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65).
Here, the sentencing judge found aggravating factors three, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(3) (risk that defendant will commit another offense); six, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(6) (extent of defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of
the offenses for which he has been convicted); and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9)
(need to deter defendant and others from violating the law). The judge found
no mitigating factors. As stated previously, the judge sentenced defendant in
A-5095-17T3
17
accordance with the plea agreement and imposed a twenty-year term of
incarceration, with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility, pursuant
to NERA.
On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred by finding aggravating factor
nine. Here, the judge noted that defendant had expressed some remorse for his
role in the commission of the offenses but gave the expression of remorse little
weight because defendant still refused to take full responsibility for his crimes.
The judge told defendant:
[Y]ou seem to distance yourself from your own
admitted criminality. In other words, it[ is] true. You
did[ not] get out of the car and it may be that you did
not intend Mr. Friedland to die, but by your own
admission, you and your co-defendants and you in
particular, . . . went on a mission that day and that
mission was to steal a car.
But that[ is] not all. Your mission was to use
force against somebody to get that car. And you do[
not] seem to really take full responsibility even for your
role in this. Yes, you may not have been the killer,
. . . [b]ut for what you have done, you must pay.
The judge noted that defendant had twelve prior arrests, including arrests
for simple assault, resisting arrest, and unlawful possession of a handgun. The
judge also noted that defendant had seven prior indictable convictions, including
convictions for eluding and resisting arrest. The judge pointed out that
A-5095-17T3
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defendant had the benefit of dismissals, downgrades, probation, and parole, but
this had not deterred defendant from violating the law. The record supports the
judge's findings and his conclusion that there was a need to deter defendant and
others from violating the law.
Defendant further argues that the judge erred by failing to find mitigating
factor twelve, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12) (willingness of defendant to cooperate
with law enforcement authorities). He suggests he should not have received the
same sentence as Roberts. We note that, at sentencing, defendant did not ask
the judge to find mitigating factor twelve. It is clear, however, that the record
does not support a finding of this factor.
The record shows that defendant and Roberts both pled guilty and were
sentenced to agreed-upon twenty-year NERA sentences. Roberts's plea
agreement called for his cooperation in the form of truthful testimony against
his co-defendants, if required. That condition was not a part of defendant's plea
agreement and, as noted, he did not take full responsibility for his role in the
commission of the offense.
In addition, defendant contends the judge did not consider the real-time
consequences of his sentence. Again, we disagree. At sentencing, the judge
told defendant he had considered his earliest possible parole date, based on the
A-5095-17T3
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published parole-eligibility tables. The judge noted that defendant would
become eligible for parole in seventeen years and recited the number of days
defendant had already been incarcerated. Thus, the judge took into account the
"real-time consequences of NERA and the role that [NERA] customarily plays
in the fashioning of an appropriate sentence." State v. Marinez, 370 N.J. Super.
49, 58 (App. Div. 2004).
In support of his argument, defendant relies upon State v. Berardi, 369 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2004). There, the jury found the defendant guilty of
first-degree carjacking under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2, and other offenses, and the
judge sentenced the defendant to a twenty-year term of incarceration, and a
concurrent four-year term, subject to NERA. Id. at 447-48. We noted that a
person convicted of carjacking may be sentenced to an ordinary custodial term
of between ten and thirty years. Id. at 451; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(b).
In Berardi, we stated that the alternative elements of carjacking should
guide the trial court's sentencing discretion and that "the high end of the
sentencing range" should "be reserved for carjackings that involve the most
serious accompanying elements." 369 N.J. Super. at 451 (quoting State v.
Zadoyan, 290 N.J. Super. 280, 291-92 (App. Div. 1996)). Under the carjacking
statute, there are four categories of carjacking, and the most serious additional
A-5095-17T3
20
fact is "the infliction of bodily injury or the use of force." Zadoyan, 290 N.J.
Super. at 291.
The defendant in Berardi was found guilty of "a category of carjacking
that is next to the 'least serious carjacking' as articulated in Zadoyan." Berardi,
369 N.J. Super. at 453. The defendant had an argument with his girlfriend's
father, in which "the latter was injured." Id. at 447. He fled and obtained a ride
from a limousine service. Ibid. He put the limousine driver in fear of injury,
the driver fled from the car, and defendant drove off with the car. Ibid.
We vacated the twenty-year sentence for carjacking and remanded the
matter for resentencing so that the defendant and the State could "argue for
an appropriate sentence" based on the category of carjacking "that is quite close
to the lowest in sentencing severity." Id. at 454. It is abundantly clear, however,
that Berardi has no application to this case.
Here, defendant pled guilty to carjacking under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2).
The statute provides in pertinent part that a person is guilty of the offense if, "in
the course of committing an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle," the person
"threatens an occupant or person in control with, or purposely or knowingly puts
an occupant or person in control of the motor vehicle in fear of, immediate
bodily injury . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a).
A-5095-17T3
21
Thus, defendant was not convicted of a category of carjacking that is
"quite close to the lowest in sentencing severity." Berardi, 369 N.J. Super. at
454. Defendant's sentence was commensurate with the serious nature of this
carjacking, in which Friedland was not merely put in fear of immediate bodily
injury but was murdered. Defendant's contention that he should be sentenced to
the lower end of the sentencing range for the carjacking offense is patently
without merit.
Affirmed.
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22
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