CHABAD OF OLD TAPPAN INC v. BOROUGH OF OLD TAPPAN
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4375-18T3
CHABAD OF OLD TAPPAN,
INC.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOROUGH OF OLD TAPPAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
___________________________
Submitted March 26, 2020 – Decided April 27, 2020
Before Judges Alvarez and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-8946-18.
Morton R. Covitz, attorney for appellant.
Jacobs and Bell, PA, attorneys for respondent (Allen M.
Bell, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Chabad of Old Tappan, Inc. (Chabad) appeals from the May 10,
2019 order of the Law Division denying its motion for attorney's fees and costs.
We affirm.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. Chabad, a non-profit
religious organization, owns a single-family residential property in defendant
Borough of Old Tappan. Chabad applied for an exemption from local property
tax for tax year 2017 for its property, claiming it is used as a parsonage for the
officiating clergyman of Chabad's congregation as defined by N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6.
The home is occupied by Rabbi Menachen M. Lewis, the appointed rabbi and
president of Chabad.
Chabad's congregation meets in space it leases in a non-exempt
commercial building in Old Tappan. Several years before applying for the
parsonage exemption, Chabad applied to the zoning officer for occupancy
approval for the rented commercial space. The zoning officer denied the
application on the basis that Chabad intended to use the space as a house of
worship, a use not permitted in the zone. At a Planning Board hearing after
Chabad appealed the zoning officer's decision, Rabbi Lewis testified that
Chabad "is not a church, synagogue or house of worship, but rather a 'fraternal
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outreach organization' engaging in educational, counseling and related
community activities." Based in part on Rabbi Lewis's testimony, the Planning
Board found Chabad's use of the rented property was permissible because it
"does not satisfy the criteria for being characterized as a house of worship."
At the time that Chabad applied for an exemption for Rabbi Lewis's
residence, the Tax Assessor's Handbook issued by the Division of Taxation
provided that the parsonage exemption is a derivative exemption that must be
connected to an exempt house of worship. The Old Tappan tax assessor denied
Chabad's application, finding the residential property did not qualify as a
parsonage because the building in which Chabad claimed to operate a house of
worship was not exempt. At the time he denied the application, the assessor was
not aware of Rabbi Lewis's testimony before the Planning Board. The assessor
subsequently certified that when he became aware of Rabbi Lewis's testimony
and the Planning Board's decision, those factors became additional bases for
denying the parsonage exemption.
Chabad appealed the assessor's decision to the Bergen County Board of
Taxation (CBT). The CBT issued a judgment affirming the denial of the
exemption.
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Chabad thereafter initiated this action through the filing of a complaint in
the Tax Court. In addition to alleging its residential property qualifies for the
parsonage exemption, Chabad alleged the assessor's denial of the exemption
violated Chabad's religious freedom under the federal and state constitutions and
constituted an act of discrimination under "the anti-discrimination provisions"
of unspecified federal and state statutes. Chabad alleged it is entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and costs as a result of the violation of its civil rights.
Following trial, Tax Court Presiding Judge Joseph M. Andresini issued a
comprehensive written opinion in which he concluded Chabad's property
qualified for the parsonage exemption for tax year 2017. Judge Andresini found
that while Chabad does not maintain a synagogue in the rented space, it has a
congregation that participates in scheduled assemblages for prayer services and
community activities at that property, over which Rabbi Lewis officiates. In
addition, the court noted that after the assessor denied Chabad's application, the
Tax Court issued its opinion in Congregation Chateau Park Sefard v. Township
of Lakewood, 30 N.J. Tax 225, 237-38 (Tax 2017), holding the parsonage
exemption is available to any congregation who "worship and exercise their
religion in New Jersey, regardless of the tax exempt status of any building in
which they may gather." Adopting the holding in Congregation Chateau Park
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Sefard and noting our holding in Society of the Holy Child Jesus v. City of
Summit, 418 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2011), that a zoning violation cannot
be used to strip a property tax exemption granted by N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, Judge
Andresini concluded Chabad's property qualified as a parsonage. As a result,
the assessor listed the property as exempt and refunded Chabad $23,915.1 3 in
local property taxes it paid on the property for tax years 2017 and 2018. See
N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2 (providing a taxpayer who successfully appeals local
property tax assessment is entitled to a refund of excess taxes paid).
Chabad subsequently moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs on
the theory defendant violated Chabad's civil rights by denying the parsonage
exemption. Judge Andresini, having determined Chabad's application was
outside the statutory jurisdiction of the Tax Court, see N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2,
transferred the matter to the Law Division.
Judge Christine A. Farrington issued a written opinion denying Chabad's
application. Judge Farrington held Chabad's claim for attorney's fees and costs
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was barred by the holding in General Motors
Corporation v. City of Linden, 143 N.J. 336, 349-50 (1996). In that case, the
Court held a taxpayer is precluded from asserting discrimination claims against
a municipality and its officials under federal law arising from the assessment
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and taxation of real property because New Jersey law provides an adequate legal
remedy for aggrieved taxpayers. Ibid.
Judge Farrington analyzed Chabad's state law claim for attorney's fees and
costs under N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(e) and (f), provisions of the New Jersey Civil Rights
Act, which authorize the award of attorney's fees and costs against a person who
"deprives, interferes or attempts to interfere" with the "substantive due process
or equal protection rights, privilege or immunities" of any person under the
federal or state constitutions or laws. The court concluded Chabad did not
establish the denial of a substantive legal right under either the federal or state
constitutions or laws. As Judge Farrington observed,
[n]owhere in Judge Andresini's opinion is it suggested
that plaintiff claimed or in fact endured the violation of
a substantive right. The Chabad has continued to
operate during the litigation. As a result of Judge
Andresini's decision the Chabad will recoup any tax
payments it made which are contrary to his
determination.
The court entered a May 10, 2019 order denying Chabad's application.
This appeal followed. Chabad raises the following arguments for our
consideration:
POINT ONE
THE ACTIONS OF THE BOROUGH ASSESSOR IN
DENYING THE TAX EXEMPTION VIOLATED THE
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RELIGIOUS SUBSTANTIVE CIVIL RIGHTS
GRANTED TO THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT TWO
CONTRARY TO THE DECISION OF THE LAW
DIVISION BELOW, PURSUANT [TO] THE
PROVISIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, DEFENDANT'S
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF TO
THE RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTION FOR ITS
PARSONAGE IS A SUBSTANTIVE RELIGIOUS
CIVIL RIGHT, GRANTS [SIC] TO PLAINTIFF THE
RIGHTS TO PAYMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEY[']S FEES AND LITIGATION COSTS.
II.
Although New Jersey generally disfavors the shifting of attorney's fees, a
prevailing party may recover attorney's fees if expressly provided by statute,
court rule, or contract. Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427,
440 (2001) (citing North Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 569 (1999) and Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473,
504 (1983)). Rule 4:42-9(a)(8) permits the award of attorney's fees "[i]n all
cases where attorney's fees are permitted by statute."
No statute authorizes the award of attorney's fees and costs to a successful
property owner in a local property tax appeal. N.J.S.A. 54:51A-22(a), a
provision of the State Uniform Tax Procedure Law (SUTPL), N.J.S.A. 54:48-1
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to 54-6, authorizes an award of attorney's fees and costs, not to exceed $15,000,
to "[a] prevailing taxpayer in a court proceeding in connection with the
determination, collection or refund of any tax . . . ." SUTPL, however, applies
only to state taxes, N.J.S.A. 54:48-4, which is defined as a tax "payable to or
collectible by" the "Director of the Division of Taxation." N.J.S.A. 54:48- -2.
This limitation is incorporated in N.J.S.A. 54:51A-22(e), which defines
"prevailing taxpayer" as "a taxpayer that establishes that the position of the State
was without reasonable basis in fact or law."
Chabad's application for attorney's fees and costs relies on 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and N.J.S.A. 10:6-2. Having carefully reviewed the record and the
precedents interpreting those statutes, we affirm the Law Division's May 10,
2019 order. As Judge Farrington correctly concluded, Chabad's claim for relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by the holding in General Motors. Chabad
successfully exercised its adequate state law remedies to challenge the denial of
its parsonage exemption application. It has secured the refund of all local
property taxes it paid on Rabbi Lewis's residence.
In addition, there is ample support in the record for the trial court's finding
that Chabad did not establish a denial by defendant of its substantive rights under
the federal or state constitutions or laws. Chabad's exemption claim concerned
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Rabbi Lewis's residence, not the location at which Chabad held services. There
is no evidence in the record Chabad was in any way inhibited in conducting
religious activities at the property it rented for those purposes. In addition, the
record belies a claim of intentional discrimination by the tax assessor. It was
entirely reasonable for the assessor in the exercise of his official duties to rely
on the Tax Assessor's Handbook, issued before the holding in Congregation
Chateau Park Sefard, which expressly stated that a parsonage exemption was
derivative of an exempt house of worship. Moreover, the obvious inconsistency
between Rabbi Lewis's testimony before the Planning Board that Chabad did not
operate a house of worship at the rented property and Chabad's application
stating that it did was certainly a legitimate basis on which to rely in defending
the assessor's decision. The record reflects a routine dispute over the denial of
a local property tax exemption, not an interference with religious liberty.
Affirmed.
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