STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOSEPH A. FERRETTI
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4310-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH A. FERRETTI,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Argued December 16, 2019 – Decided April 30, 2020
Before Judges Rothstadt, Moynihan and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 16-05-0577.
Brian J. Neary argued the cause for appellant (Law
Offices of Brian J. Neary, attorneys; Brian J. Neary, of
counsel; Jane M. Personette, on the brief).
Ian C. Kennedy, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent (Mark Musella, Prosecutor, attorney;
Ian C. Kennedy, of counsel and on the brief; John J.
Scaliti, Legal Assistant, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Joseph Ferretti appeals from his conviction by jury for second-
degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5 (count one), 1 and his five-year
prison sentence, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7.2. Defendant and codefendant Joseph Meyer were driving two Ferraris to a
function at the Meadowlands Sports Complex when defendant's red Ferrari
crossed the double-yellow line on Berrys Creek Road and collided with a
motorcycle, causing the motorcyclist massive injuries that resulted in his death.
The State contended both defendants were traveling at a high rate of speed
before the collision with the motorcycle.
Meyer accepted the State's offer to plead guilty to second-degree vehicular
homicide, 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5, and provide truthful testimony if called as a
witness in defendant's trial, in exchange for the State's recommendation that he
be sentenced in the third-degree to a five-year probationary sentence
conditioned on 364 days in the county jail. Defendant opted to go to trial. The
1
The trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the
conclusion of the State's case and dismissed the other indicted charge, first -
degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a) (count two). R. 3:18-1.
2
The other indicted charge, first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-4(a) (count two), was dismissed pursuant to Meyer's plea agreement.
A-4310-17T1
2
defense theory, as set forth in his merits brief, was that neither defendant nor
Meyer was racing or
driving at "race speed." Rather, immediately preceding
the collision which occurred within a couple hundred
yards of his destination [at which the Ferraris were to
be delivered, defendant] was safely driving on a
relatively deserted, four-lane road, which had been
recently paved and for which no speed limit was posted.
. . . Meyer's loss of control of his own vehicle caused
him to enter [defendant's] lane of travel, thereby forcing
[defendant] to cross the double-yellow lines and enter
the lane of oncoming traffic, where he collided with
[the motorcyclist], whose recent use of marijuana had
the clear capacity to impact his ability to safely operate
his own vehicle.
Defendant averred the motorcyclist had smoked marijuana the prior evening and
still had two metabolites of marijuana in his system at the time of the accident,
evidenced by toxicology screens of blood and urine samples drawn at the
motorcyclist's autopsy. Defendant proffered Dr. Robert Pandina as an expert in
the field of psychopharmacology and toxicology, who opined the motorcyclist
was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the accident. The trial court
granted the State's motion to bar Dr. Pandina's testimony. On appeal, defendant
argues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT FROM TESTIFYING
A-4310-17T1
3
REGARDING THE [MOTORCYCLIST'S]
INTOXICATION AND ITS RELEVANCE TO
CAUSATION AS WELL AS RECKLESSNESS.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
B. THE MARKEDLY DEFICIENT AND
UTTERLY PREJUDICIAL NATURE OF
THE STATE'S APPLICATION ALONE
WARRANTED IT[]S DENIAL.
C. THE LEGAL INVALIDITY OF THE
APPLICATION, MOREOVER,
DEMANDED IT BE REJECTED.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON CAUSATION,
DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHTS TO AN
IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATION, DUE PROCESS,
AND A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT III
THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS COMM[I]TTED IN
THIS CASE WARRANT A REVERSAL OF
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION [AND] A NEW
TRIAL.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE MUST BE REDUCED.
Having reviewed the record, and in light of the applicable law, we affirm.
A-4310-17T1
4
Defendant argues the trial court erred in granting the State's motion, filed
during the trial, to bar Dr. Pandina's testimony because it was relevant to the
issues of causation and recklessness. Thus the linchpin to this argument, as well
as defendant's contention that the judge failed to properly instruct the jury on
causation, is the relevancy of the evidence to the State's contention that
defendant's guilt was based on one theory of causation: the actual result of
defendant's recklessness was within the risk of which he was aware.
Relevant evidence has "a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact
of consequence to the determination of the action." N.J.R.E. 401; see also State
v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 302 (App. Div. 1983). It "need only have some
tendency to prove a material fact." Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. at 302. The inquiry
is "whether the thing sought to be established is more logical with the evidenc e
than without it." Ibid.
In a second-degree vehicular homicide prosecution, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) "defendant was driving a vehicle"; (2)
"defendant caused the death"; and (3) the death was caused by driving a vehicle
recklessly. State v. Eldridge, 388 N.J. Super. 485, 494 (App. Div. 2006). As to
the third element:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards
A-4310-17T1
5
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering
the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).]
Examination of the causation element involves a multi-step process
described by our Supreme Court in State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (2013). See
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(a). First, a jury must determine if a defendant's conduct was
"an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred ,"
characterized by the Court as the "but for" test under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(a)(1).
Buckley, 216 N.J. at 263. Next, inasmuch as vehicular homicide requires the
State to prove recklessness, the jury must "conduct[] a 'culpability assessment'
under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c)," id. at 263-64 (quoting State v. Pelham, 176 N.J. 448,
460 (2003)), which provides in part:
When the offense requires that the defendant recklessly
. . . cause a particular result, the actual result must be
within the risk of which the actor is aware or, . . . if
not, the actual result must involve the same kind of
injury or harm as the probable result and must not be
too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent
on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the
actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.
A-4310-17T1
6
[Id. at 263 (alterations in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c)).]
The "actual result" in a vehicular homicide case is the accident victim's death.
Id. at 264.
The Buckley Court recognized bifurcated prongs of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c)—
separated by the words, "if not"—in vehicular homicide cases. The first prong,
focusing on the first part of the subsection,
predicates a finding of causation upon proof that "the
actual result" was "within the risk of which the actor is
aware." N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c). Alternatively, causation
may be proven under the second component of the
statutory test: whether "the actual result" involves the
"same kind of injury or harm as the probable result,"
and whether it is "too remote, accidental in its
occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act to
have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the
gravity of his offense." Ibid.
[Id. at 254-55 (emphasis added).]
The Court, recognizing "the first prong of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c) requires the
jury to assess whether the defendant was aware that his allegedly reckless
driving gave rise to a risk of a fatal motor vehicle accident," held: "If the jury
determines that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant understood that the manner in which he or she drove created a risk of
A-4310-17T1
7
a traffic fatality, the element of causation is established under the first prong of
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c)." Id. at 264.
Defendant contends that the jury should have been allowed to consider
evidence related to the second prong and "determine whether intervening causes
or unforeseen conditions lead to the conclusion that it is unjust to find that the
defendant's conduct is the cause of the actual result." Pelham, 176 N.J. at 461
(quoting State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 13 (1990)). "'Intervening cause' is defined
as '[a]n event that comes between the initial event in a sequence and the end
result, thereby altering the natural course of events that might have connected a
wrongful act to an injury.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 212 (7th ed. 1999)); see also Buckley, 216 N.J. at 265 ("[A]n
'intervening cause' denotes an event or condition which renders a result 'too
remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act' to
fairly affect criminal liability or the gravity of the offense." (quoting N.J.S.A.
2C:2-3(c); Pelham, 176 N.J. at 461-62)). Defendant urges Dr. Pandina's opinion
that the motorcyclist was under the influence of marijuana and impaired when
he was operating the vehicle at the time of the accident was relevant to the
elements of recklessness and causation.
A-4310-17T1
8
Dr. Pandina explained his view at a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing. Relying on
Buckley, the trial court barred the doctor's testimony, finding it irrelevant to the
"but for" test and the first prong of the culpability assessment. We review that
ruling for an abuse of discretion and will "not 'substitute [our] own judgment for
that of the trial court' unless there was a 'clear error in judgment' —a ruling 'so
wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017) (quoting State v. Perry, 225 N.J. 222, 233 (2016)).
The Buckley Court recognized a clear demarcation in prosecutions
involving only the first prong of the culpability assessment from those under the
second prong. 216 N.J. at 266. Perpending the Legislature's inclusion of "if
not" between the two culpability assessments in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c), the Court
determined they were alternate theories, and if the State proved that a "defendant
understood that the manner in which he or she drove created a risk of a traffic
fatality," causation was established under the first prong. Id. at 264.
The Court's ruling recognized each prong "as a basis to convict [a]
defendant." Id. at 266. Thus, if the State chooses to narrow its prosecution to
the first prong, as it did in Buckley and this case, a reviewing court need "not
consider the potential import of [a] defendant's arguments with regard to the
statute's second prong." Ibid. The Court was cognizant of earlier decisions it
A-4310-17T1
9
described as focusing on the second prong, including our 2006 holding in
Eldridge, 388 N.J. Super. at 499-500, that "keeping with the teaching of Martin,
whenever causation is in dispute and whenever the State and defendant offer
contrasting theories of causation, the court's charge to the jury must explain the
legal consequences of accepting not only the State's theory, but also the
defendant's theory of causation," Buckley, 216 N.J. at 265-66. The Court
distinguished those and other cases3 it said focused on the second prong, and
endorsed the State's prosecution under the first prong of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c)
without entailing the second prong. Ibid.
The State's choice to restrict its prosecution to the first prong limited the
admissible evidence to that relevant to the narrower issue of causation. See id.
at 267 ("As we noted in Pelham, 'the jury may consider only that which the law
permits it to consider.'" (quoting Pelham, 176 N.J. at 466)). The Court observed:
"To be admissible on the issue of causation, the evidence at issue must be
relevant to the jury's inquiry under the first prong of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c)." Ibid.
3
The cases cited by the Court were: Pelham, 176 N.J. at 450-52; State v.
Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318, 335-36 (1998); Martin, 119 N.J. at 9-10; Eldridge, 388 N.J. Super. at 487-88; and State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557, 570 (App.
Div. 1989), aff'd o.b., 121 N.J. 527, 528 (1990). Buckley, 216 N.J. at 265-66.
A-4310-17T1
10
The Buckley Court focused on the determinations the jury would have to
make in deciding the causation issue: first, the "but for" test; then, under the
first prong, "whether 'the actual result' was 'within the risk of which the actor is
aware.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c)). That analysis is apropos to this
case.
Defendant's contention, advanced by Dr. Pandina, that the motorcyclist
was under the influence at the time of the accident, was irrelevant to the jury's
inquiry if the manner in which he drove his vehicle was the antecedent cause of
the accident that resulted in the motorcyclist's death. "The 'but for' test of
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(a) focuses the jury entirely upon the role of the defendant's
conduct—the manner in which he drove before and during the collision." Ibid.
As in Buckley, the State was required to "demonstrate nothing more than that
the fatal accident would have been avoided had defendant not driven [the red
Ferrari] in the manner in which he did." See ibid. Dr. Pandina's opinion about
the effect of the metabolites in the motorcyclist's blood and urine bear no
relevance to that issue.
So too, his opinion was irrelevant to the jury's first-prong analysis of
whether defendant was aware that the manner in which he operated the Ferrari
created a risk of the fatal collision. See id. at 267-68. "If the jury determines
A-4310-17T1
11
that defendant was aware that his conduct gave rise to such a risk, it need not
assess the exact degree of that risk, or the variables that could affect its
magnitude." Id. at 268.
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that there was no nexus between
Dr. Pandina's expert testimony and either the "but for" test or the first statutory
prong. In fact, neither the motorcyclist's alleged impairment from marijuana
ingestion the night before the accident nor his failure to come to a complete stop
at the stop sign before he turned and travelled three-hundred feet—without any
further evidence of improper operation—before defendant's vehicle crossed into
his lane and hit him head-on, was relevant to the jury's determination if the State
met its burden with regard to those issues. We, therefore, discern no abuse of
discretion in the judge's decision to preclude the evidence proffered by Dr.
Pandina. Scott, 229 N.J. at 479.
We determine defendant's argument that the timing of the State's motion
to preclude Dr. Pandina's testimony was improper and "expose[d] its inherent
lack of validity," is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(2). The ongoing trial provided better context for the trial court's
consideration of the proffered testimony's relevance. See State v. Cary, 49 N.J.
343, 352 (1967) (cautioning a trial court "generally should not rule on t he
A-4310-17T1
12
admissibility of particular evidence until a party offers it at trial"); see also State
v. Cordero, 438 N.J. Super. 472, 484 (App. Div. 2014). Defendant does not
allege or show any prejudice from the timing of the motion. His counsel met
and ably argued against the State's motion.
Consistent with the trial court's adherence to the holding in Buckley, it
instructed the jury on the first prong of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c) and, over defendant's
objection, omitted the instruction regarding the second prong.4 See Buckley,
216 N.J. at 266.
The trial court instructed the jury:
Causation has a special meaning under the law.
To establish causation the State must prove two
elements, each beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that
but for the defendant's conduct the result in question
would not have happened. In other words, without the
defendant's actions the result would not have occurred.
Second, for reckless conduct that the actual result must
4
The omitted portion of the model jury charge on second-prong
causation provides:
[I]t must involve the same kind of injury or harm as the
probable result and must also not be too remote, too
accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on
another’s volitional act to have a just bearing on the
defendant's liability or on the gravity of his/her offense.
[Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Causation (N.J.S.A.
2C:2-3)" (approved June 10, 2013).]
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13
have been within the risk of which the defendant was
aware.
In this case you've heard evidence that [the
motorcyclist] failed to completely stop at a stop sign,
had THC/[m]arijuana in his blood at the time of the
incident. And that . . . defendant's and . . . Meyer's
Ferraris may or may not have made contact at some
point before the incident. I instruct that those items are
not relevant to the issue of causation.
The issue of causation remains one that has to be
decided by you as instructed earlier in my charge.
However, the status of these items is not to be part of
your consideration on the issue [of] causation.
Defendant argues the omission deprived him of "his rights to an impartial
adjudication, due process, and a fair trial." "[A]ppropriate and proper charges
are essential for a fair trial." State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 158-59 (2016)
(quoting State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004)). "The trial court must give
'a comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must determine ,
including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may fi nd.'" Id.
at 159 (quoting State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287-88 (1981)). "Thus, the court
has an 'independent duty . . . to ensure that the jurors receive accurate
instructions on the law as it pertains to the facts and issues of each case,
irrespective of the particular language suggested by either party.'" Ibid.
(alteration in original) (quoting Reddish, 181 N.J. at 613). "Because proper jury
A-4310-17T1
14
instructions are essential to a fair trial, 'erroneous instructions on material points
are presumed to' possess the capacity to unfairly prejudice the defendant." Ibid.
(quoting State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541-42 (2004)).
"While '[c]ausation is a factual determination for the jury to consider . . .
the jury may consider only that which the law permits it to consider.'" Buckley
216 N.J. at 263 (alterations in original) (quoting Pelham, 176 N.J. at 466). Here,
the trial court properly excluded the second-prong jury instruction.
Defendant maintains that the second-prong instruction was required
because it was possible the jury could have found that evidence of one or more
of another's volitional act—the motorcyclist's marijuana impairment; the
motorcyclist's failure to come to a complete stop at the stop sign; Meyer's
operation of the silver Ferrari that caused defendant to travel into the oncoming
lane—were intervening causes that broke the chain of causation. As we have
already explained, that evidence is irrelevant and was properly excluded from
the jury's consideration which focused on the first prong, the State's only theory
of culpability.
Even if we set aside the Buckley Court's recognition of discrete theories
of liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c), and its approval of the State's prosecution
solely under the first prong, the motorcyclist's alleged transgressions are not
A-4310-17T1
15
intervening causes. Under the statutory second prong, "it is for the jury to
determine whether intervening causes or unforeseen conditions lead to the
conclusion that it is unjust to find that the defendant's conduct is the cause of
the actual result." Martin, 119 N.J. at 13.
An "'intervening cause'" occurs when an event "'comes
between the initial event in a sequence and the end
result, thereby altering the natural course of events that
might have connected a wrongful act to an injury.'"
Pelham, 176 N.J. at 461. "Generally, to avoid breaking
the chain of causation for criminal liability, a variation
between the result intended or risked and the actual
result of [the] defendant's conduct must not be so out of
the ordinary that it is unfair to hold [the] defendant
responsible for that result." Id. at 461-62. Thus, an
"intervening cause" denotes an event or condition
which renders a result "too remote, accidental in its
occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act" to
fairly affect criminal liability or the gravity of the
offense. See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c); Pelham, 176 N.J. at
461-62.
[Buckley, 216 N.J. at 265 (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).]
Neither the motorcyclist's stop-sign violation nor his marijuana use—both
of which occurred well prior to the collision—was "an independent intervening
cause capable of breaking the chain of causation triggered by defendant's
wrongful actions," Pelham, 176 N.J. at 468, where the motorcyclist was hit head-
A-4310-17T1
16
on in his own lane of travel some three-hundred feet after he turned left after
passing the stop sign.
Evidence that Meyer lost control of the silver Ferrari causing defendant to
travel into the motorcyclist's lane, likewise, does not "lead to the conclusion that
it is unjust to find that the defendant's conduct is the cause of the actual result."
Buckley, 216 N.J. at 265 (quoting Pelham, 176 N.J. at 461). The source of that
evidence was two witnesses present at the scene.
Michael Demkowicz said he saw both Ferraris line up side-by-side and
come to a complete stop. He heard motors revving, describing the sound as
similar to what would be heard at a racetrack. He then saw the vehicles travel
at a high rate of speed—which he estimated was over eighty miles an hour—
down Berrys Creek Road, lose control and "bump each other." Another witness
present at the scene, Forest Harrell, heard engines revving—a noise familiar to
him from his experience working at NASCAR events—then saw two cars line
up very close to one another and travel down Berrys Creek Road at a high rate
of speed, which he estimated was over one hundred miles per hour. Within
"milliseconds," he saw "the silver and red car" spin out, heard a large bang and
saw smoke and debris flying. From where he was standing, there appeared to
be a collision between the silver and red cars.
A-4310-17T1
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Under the circumstances described by the witnesses, the loss of control
cannot be viewed as "an event or condition which renders a result 'too remote,
accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act' to fairly
affect criminal liability or the gravity of the offense." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A.
2C:2-3(c)). The record amply demonstrates that the Ferraris were high-
performance motor vehicles capable of quick acceleration and high speeds. The
risk of bumping and losing control during the operation of those vehicles as
described by Demkowicz and Harrell is not "so out of the ordinary that it is
unfair to hold defendant responsible for that result." Pelham, 176 N.J. at 461-
62.
Under the first prong of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c), the jury determines whether
a fatal accident was within the risk of which defendant was aware. Buckley,
216 N.J. at 267-68. The jury, therefore, was properly instructed to consider that
risk in light of defendant's operation of the red Ferrari, part of which involved
defendant's awareness of the risk created by his operation next to the silver
Ferrari. Thus, Meyer's operation of the silver Ferrari is not an intervening cause
that necessitated the judge to instruct the jury on the second-prong theory of
causation.
A-4310-17T1
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The trial court's charge, consistent with the holding in Buckley, correctly
instructed the jury on only the first prong, providing "a road map to guide the
jury" so that it did not "take a wrong turn in its deliberations." State v. Galicia,
210 N.J. 364, 386 (2012) (quoting Martin, 119 N.J. at 15). The trial court did
not err by omitting the second-prong instruction.
Finally, we address defendant's challenge to his sentence. Defendant
argues the five-year prison sentence imposed by the trial court "was manifestly
excessive and a clear abuse of discretion." He contends the sentence was grossly
disproportionate to that imposed upon Meyer. He also avers the trial court
should have found mitigating factors eight, nine and ten, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8),
(9) and (10); because he offers no explanation in his merits brief why those
factors should have been found, we deem that argument abandoned. See N.J.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Township, 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505-06 n.2
(App. Div. 2015) (holding that an issue raised "[i]n a single sentence in its brief"
is deemed waived).
We review sentencing determinations with a deferential standard, see
State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989), and will disturb a trial court's
sentence only in instances where the sentencing guidelines were not followed,
the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the trial judge were unsupported
A-4310-17T1
19
by the evidence, or the judge's application of the sentencing guidelines rendered
the sentence clearly unreasonable, State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984).
Under that deferential standard, only when the facts and law show "such a clear
error of judgment that it shocks the judicial conscience" will we modify a
sentence on appeal. Id. at 364.
Our analysis of a sentence is heightened, however, when a defendant
claims sentencing disparity. Our Supreme Court observed in State v. Roach that
"uniformity [is] one of the major sentencing goals . . . [as] '[t]here can be no
justice without a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing.'" 146 N.J. 208,
231 (1996) (quoting State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 379 (1984)). "'The central
theme' of our sentencing jurisprudence is the exercise by courts of 'a structured
discretion designed to foster less arbitrary and more equal sentences.'" Id. at
232 (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 345).
The Court recognized the legislative basis for that structure:
To minimize disparity, a sentencing court exercises its
discretion in the structured setting prescribed by the
[Criminal] Code. Our statutes provide a "'general
framework to guide judicial discretion in imposing
sentences' to ensure that similarly situated defendants
[do] not receive dissimilar sentences." [State v. Natale,
184 N.J. 458, 485 (2005)]. When an ordinary term of
incarceration is warranted, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)
prescribes statutory ranges for that term based upon the
degree of the offense: ten to twenty years for a first-
A-4310-17T1
20
degree crime, five to ten years for a second-degree
crime, three to five years for a third-degree crime, and
up to eighteen months for a fourth-degree crime.
[State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 72 (2014) (second
alteration in original).]
The purpose of the statutory guidelines "is to promote fairness and public
confidence in the 'even handed justice of our system.'" Roach, 146 N.J at 232-
33 (quoting State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 (1969)). The ultimate determination
"is whether the disparity is justifiable or unjustifiable." Id. at 233.
"[A] sentence of one defendant not otherwise excessive is not erroneous
merely because a co[]defendant's sentence is lighter." Hicks, 54 N.J. at 391; see
also Roach, 146 N.J. at 232. "The trial court must determine whether the
co[]defendant is identical or substantially similar to the defendant regarding all
relevant sentencing criteria." Roach, 146 N.J. at 233.
The trial court comprehensively explained the difference between the
sentences:
[D]efendant and [Meyer] are neither identically nor
substantially similarly situated for the following
reasons:
1) At Meyer's sentencing [that sentencing judge]
found that Meyer was remorseful, and even relied upon
his remorse to find mitigating factors [eight, nine and
ten] additionally. Meyer took responsibility for his
actions and admitted fault, when he pleaded guilty.
A-4310-17T1
21
Defendant has not taken any responsibility for his
actions, and does not appear, other than this brief
statement to the [c]ourt today, to be . . . remorseful.
2) At the time of the accident Meyer was
[nineteen] years of age, and defendant was [twenty-
eight] years of age. Meyer was ten years younger than
. . . defendant, and was following . . . defendant, his
employer, to a job site the morning of the accident.
In fact, counsel for the State has pointed this out
to the [c]ourt in [Meyer's] sentencing transcript [of]
February 24th, 2017, and I'll quote it again. The [j]udge
[said], "Lastly, the conduct of a youthful defendant was
substantially influenced by another person more mature
than the defendant, and I'm relying on this. Although,
your co[]defendant is only [ten] years older than you, I
think it's a significant [ten] years. I think he prevailed
upon you, goaded you into this, in [a] way, and I'm
relying on that." She also specifically mentioned,
"Again you are to cooperate fully in this ongoing
companion case. If you fail to show up here, or once
fail to cooperate in any way, I invite the Prosecutor's
Office to come back to court for a violation of
[p]robation, and you will be in Bergen County [j]ail."
Which brings me to the next distinguishing
factor. Meyer pleaded guilty two years ago and agreed
to cooperate with the State as to the involvement of . . .
defendant in exchange for a reduction in his sentence to
the third-degree range.
And four, defendant's vehicle was the vehicle that
struck and killed [the motorcyclist].
And finally, defendant was offered a plea deal,
under which the State agreed to recommend a sentence
in the third-degree range, but that offer was rejected by
A-4310-17T1
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defendant. And therefore, defendant is not now entitled
to seek the benefit by the plea bargain.
We went through a full trial. The jury came back,
convicted defendant of [v]ehicular [h]omicide, second-
degree.
Defendant, for all of the foregoing reasons is not
entitled to a downward departure, and will sentence in
the second-degree range[.]
Although uniformity in sentencing is a major objective of the criminal
justice system, not all divergent sentences are unfair or unjust. Id. at 231-32.
Here, the trial court's reasoning fully justified the disparate sentence. Meyer
was not similarly situated to defendant, and thus, the court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing defendant to a five-year term of imprisonment, the
lowest ordinary-term sentence for a second-degree conviction.
We determine the balance of defendant's arguments, including that
reversal is required because of cumulative errors and that the trial court erred by
declining to sentence him in the third-degree range pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(f)(2), are without sufficient merit to warrant any discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
We perceive no violation of the sentencing guidelines; the aggravating and
mitigating factors found by the judge were based upon credible evidence in the
record; and the sentence imposed for these multiple crimes is not "clearly
unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70
A-4310-17T1
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(quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 365). Finally, there were no compelling reasons for a
downgraded sentence. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 505 (1996).
Affirmed.
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