STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DONALD C. RANDALL
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4105-19T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DONALD C. RANDALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted September 23, 2020 – Decided October 21, 2020
Before Judges Accurso and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 12-09-2295.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Timothy W. Dalton Jr., Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Jill S. Mayer, Acting Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Rachel M. Lamb, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Donald C. Randall appeals from a June 22, 2020 denial of his
Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion to be released from custody. We affirm, substantially
for the reasons set forth in the cogent written opinion of Judge Francisco
Dominguez.
On April 19, 2013, following a jury trial, defendant received an aggregate
ten-year prison sentence for first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1A(2);
second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
4(a); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4); and fourth-
degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). With respect to the armed robbery charge,
defendant received a ten-year prison term, subject to a mandatory parole
ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7.2. We affirmed defendant's conviction in 2014 but remanded for resentencing.
When defendant was resentenced, his aggregate term continued to be ten years,
with the same parole ineligibility period for the armed robbery offense.
Due to COVID-19, as well as a claim that defendant is "pre-diabetic" and
suffers from hypertension and respiratory issues, he filed a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)
motion to permit his release from prison. This Rule allows a trial court to
"amend[] a custodial sentence to permit the release of a defendant because of
illness or infirmity."
A-4105-19T4
2
Judge Dominguez denied defendant's application, concluding he was not
entitled to relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), as defendant had "not yet served his
period of parole ineligibility." The judge also noted that defendant withdrew
his alternative argument for suspension of his sentence under State v. Boone,
262 N.J. Super. 220, 221 (Law Div. 1992).
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF
DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION FOR
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
SENTENCE PURSUANT TO RULE
3:21-10(b)(2) DUE TO HIS SERVING A
PERIOD OF PAROLE INELIGIBIIITY
CONSTITUTED ERROR AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IS A
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT HAS RESULTED IN
INCARCERATION HAVING A
DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON THE
DEFENDANT'S HEALTH BECAUSE
HIS UNDERLYING MEDICAL
CONDITIONS MAKE HIM
PARTICULARLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO
DEATH OR SERIOUS HEALTH
COMPLICATIONS FROM THE
VIRUS.
A-4105-19T4
3
A Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion "is committed to the sound discretion of the
court." State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 135 (1985). "It is an extension of the
sentencing power of the court, involving the same complexity as the sentenc ing
decision and the same delicate balancing of various factors." Ibid. Because the
benefits an inmate enjoys from the provisions of this Rule are extraordinary, it
"must be applied prudently, sparingly, and cautiously." Ibid. Accordingly, to
succeed on a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion, it is the prisoner's burden to
demonstrate that an amendment of a custodial sentence is warranted because
"medical services unavailable at the prison . . . are essential to prevent further
deterioration in [the inmate's] health." Ibid.
It is well established that Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) must be construed in a
manner consistent with the Code of Criminal Justice. State v. Mendel, 212 N.J.
Super. 110, 113 (App. Div. 1986). Thus, much like the constraints on a movant
who seeks to attend a drug rehabilitation program under Rule 3:21-10(b)(1),
relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), due to the illness or infirmity of a defendant,
"may not be accorded until a mandatory period of parole ineligibility has been
served." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.2 on R. 3:21-10
(2021). In Mendel, a Rule 3:21-10(b)(1) case, Judge Edwin H. Stern wrote:
There is a distinction between an ineligibility term
required by statute and one imposed as a matter of
A-4105-19T4
4
discretion by the court . . . . An application may be
made under R[ule] 3:21-10 when the defendant is
serving a parole ineligibility term imposed by the court
but not required by statute as a mandatory sentence.
When defendant is serving a period of parole
ineligibility imposed as a matter of discretion, the court
can consider an application under R[ule] 3:21-10(b) in
accordance with the standards for consideration of such
an application. See[,] e.g., State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123
(1985); State v. Tumminello, 70 N.J. 187 (1976); State
v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 84-86 (1975)[;] State v.
McKinney, 140 N.J. Super. 160, 163 (App. Div.
1976). The court should also, of course, consider the
aggravating and mitigating factors which led to the
sentence originally imposed including an ineligibility
term.
However, a sentence cannot be changed or reduced
under R[ule] 3:21-10(b) below the parole ineligibility
term required by statute. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c. See
also State v. DesMarets, 92 N.J. 62 (1983). R[ule]
3:21-10(b) was never intended to permit the change or
reduction of a custodial sentence which is required by
law. See State v. Stanley, 149 N.J. Super. 326, 328
(App. Div. 1977); . . . Where a parole ineligibility term
is required or mandated by statute, an application may
not be granted under R[ule] 3:21-10(b) so as to change
or reduce that sentence.
[ 212 N.J. Super. at 112-13.]
Our Supreme Court recently instructed that "[t]o prevail on a [Rule 3:21-
10(b)(2)] motion, inmates must . . . present evidence of both an 'illness or
infirmity' -- a physical ailment or weakness -- and the increased risk of harm
incarceration poses to that condition. A generalized fear of contracting an
A-4105-19T4
5
illness is not enough." In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, Expedite
Parole Hearings, and Identify Vulnerable Prisoners, 242 N.J. 357, 379 (2020).
Although the Court did not directly address the application of Rule 3:21-
10(b)(2) to defendants serving mandatory periods of parole ineligibility
in Request to Modify Prison Sentences, it is notable the Court concluded
that Boone "cannot be read as a basis for courts to order and oversee a wide -
ranging furlough program in place of the Commissioner," adding that Boone
"does not afford a basis for a broad-based judicial furlough process." Id. at 378.
In Boone, the inmate had not completed the period of mandatory
ineligibility at the time he sought a "judicial furlough." 262 N.J. Super. at 221.
The trial court held that a mandatory sentence did not preclude the grant of such
a furlough. Id. at 222-24. However, in Request to Modify Prison Sentences, the
Court explained that "Boone involved an extraordinary situation," an inmate
with a rare, threatening condition which required that he be promptly assessed
for possible aortic replacement surgery, a surgery which could be performed
only at a certain Texas hospital. Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J.
at 378. The Court further noted that in Boone, the Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections sought a furlough and the trial court "relied on the
court's 'inherent authority to preserve life' and 'granted a judicial furlough[,]'
A-4105-19T4
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. . . [aware] 'this power should be sparingly utilized in the very rarest of cases.'"
Ibid. (quoting Boone, 262 N.J. Super. at 223-24).
As the Court distinguished Boone and determined "Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)
. . . does not give the Judiciary broad authority to oversee a furlough program,"
Ibid., we likewise decline to read the Court's declaration that "Rule 3:21-
10(b)(2) gives all inmates an opportunity to seek direct relief in court," id. at
380, as permitting relief from mandatory minimum parole ineligibility terms
imposed under NERA. While all inmates may be able to seek relief under this
Rule, we are satisfied such relief should only be available to inmates who have
served their mandatory parole ineligibility term. 1
Regarding defendant's Point II, our Supreme Court recently acknowledged
that the impact of COVID-19 on "New Jersey and its prison system amounts to
a change in circumstances" under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). Request to Modify Prison
Sentences, 242 N.J. at379. But this acknowledgment does not permit defendant
to vault his parole disqualifier and obtain relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) for the
reasons we have discussed. Moreover, even if defendant had completed his
1
Our conclusion is consistent with Executive Order 124, issued by Governor
Philip Murphy on April 10, 2020, which offered relief to inmates possessing an
underlying medical condition that increased their risk of death or serious illness
from COVID-19. That Executive Order specifically excluded inmates serving
terms of incarceration pursuant to NERA.
A-4105-19T4
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period of parole ineligibility, and the trial court acknowledged his circumstances
changed as a result of the pandemic, he still would need to prove the serious
nature of his illness and the "deleterious effect of incarceration on [his] health ,"
since a "generalized fear of contracting an illness is not enough." Ibid. Further,
defendant would be required to demonstrate that the "medical services
unavailable at the prison would be not only beneficial . . . but . . . essential to
prevent further deterioration in his health." Priester, 99 N.J. at 135.
Additionally, the motion judge would be required to consider other Priester
factors, such as the "nature and severity of the crime, the severity of the
sentence, the criminal record of the defendant, the risk to the public if the
defendant is released, and the defendant's role in bringing about his current state
of health." Priester, 99 N.J. at 137.
We decline to speculate about whether defendant will be entitled to the
extraordinary relief afforded under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) once he becomes eligible.
In the interim, we are satisfied there is no basis to disturb Judge Dominguez's
June 22, 2020 order.
Affirmed.
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