EKATERINA TOLSTOGUZOVA v. ARTEM ANTOSHKIN
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3423-18T1
EKATERINA TOLSTOGUZOVA,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ARTEM ANTOSHKIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
Argued telephonically April 2, 2020 –
Decided May 20, 2020
Before Judges Alvarez and Suter.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FM-09-2225-17.
Artem Antoshkin, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Michael H. Nieschmidt argued the cause for
respondent.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Artem Antoshkin appeals, pro se, from the February 27, 2019
Final Judgment of Divorce (FJOD). We affirm.
I.
Defendant and plaintiff Ekaterina Tolstoguzova were married in July
2009. They have two children: one born in 2014 and another in 2016. Defendant
moved to Idaho. Plaintiff filed for divorce in 2017. The trial court entered
multiple case management and discovery orders. In November 2018,
defendant's answer and counterclaim were stricken, and the case proceeded by
a default proof hearing in January 2019. The FJOD was entered on February
27, 2019, with supporting findings of fact, credibility determinations and
conclusions of law entered the same date.
The FJOD ordered the parties to share joint legal custody of the children.
Plaintiff was awarded residential custody. Defendant was ordered to participate
in "reunification therapy" with his children "due to the period of approximately
two years during which there has been extremely limited and nominal in person
and video contact." The court appointed a specific therapist "to serve as the
reunification therapist." Defendant was ordered to pay the costs associated with
the therapy. The FJOD directed the parties to "seek the reunification therapist's
recommendations regarding [d]efendant's access to, contact with and parenting
A-3423-18T1
2
time with [the children]." Notwithstanding that, the FJOD provided the parties
could agree to "mutually agreed upon parenting time [with the children]" with a
"mutually agreeable supervisor." In addition, and effective upon entry of the
FJOD, defendant "shall have phone/video contact [with the children] one day
per week on Wednesday" at certain times. If the parties could not agree on
parenting time after completion of the reunification therapy, defendant could
file a motion with the court.
The FJOD required defendant to pay child support based on the Child
Support Guidelines. His income was imputed "based upon his education, skills,
prior employment, and testimony of [p]laintiff's vocational expert."
The parties were each to receive fifty percent of the marital assets.
Plaintiff retained sole ownership of former marital residence and was to pay
defendant fifty percent of the net equity using a specific fair market value that
was set forth in the FJOD. There were other provisions regarding all of the
parties' property, including their businesses.
Defendant's appellate brief includes three point headings in the Table of
Contents. These are:
I. BOTH PARTIES MUTUALLY AGREED TO
LEGALLY SEPARATE, BUT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRORED [sic] IN GRANTING A FAIR FINAL
JUDGEMENT [sic] OF DIVORCE TO BOTH
A-3423-18T1
3
PARTIES AND, THEREFORE, ARTEM
ANTOSHKIN (APPELLANT) IS STILL UNABL [sic]
ETO [sic] REUNITE WITH HIS CHILDREN.
II. THE TRIAL CORT [sic] ALSO ERRORED [sic] IN
CORRECTLY CALCULATING THE EQUAL
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS, THE CORUNT [sic]
DOUBLE COUNTED THE SAME LOAN THAT
EKATERINA TOLSTOGUZOVA TOOK AND
ERRORED [sic] PROPERLY ASSIGNING THE
CHILD SUPPORT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED [sic] IN
PROPERLY HANDLING THE PARENTING
RESONSIBILITIES [sic] BETWEEN BOTH
PARENTS. CURRENTLY AS THE FATHER I AM
BLOCKED BY EKATERINA FROM ANY AND ALL
INTERACTIONS WITH MY KIDS.
In his preliminary statement, defendant argues he is unable to reunite with
his children. He contends the trial court decision was wrong as a matter of law
because it was entered following a default because he "refused" to supply
answers to questions, some of which he considered to be improper. Defendant
disagreed with the appraisal of their marital property. He contends the trial court
erred in calculating equitable distribution because the court "double counted"
the same loan and erred in determining child support and by imputing income to
him. Defendant argues the trial court erred in allocating the "parenting
responsibilities" and that plaintiff blocked all his communications to the
children.
A-3423-18T1
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The argument portion of the brief states only the following: "[t]he Hudson
Trial court erred in granting Final Judgment of Divorce without reconciling and
evaluating all the facts and issues." Defendant did not make any legal argument
in support of the three point headings, cite any cases, explain how the court
abused its discretion, or why we should reverse the FJOD.
We conducted oral argument on April 2, 2020, at defendant's request,
allowing defendant to explain why the trial court erred. He contended the main
error was that the trial court gave sole custody to plaintiff and that he did not
need therapy with his children. He also argued the trial court erred by imputing
income to him.
II.
A.
A self-represented party is not "entitled to greater rights than are litigants
who are represented." Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div.
1982). "Lack of familiarity with appellate court procedures is no excuse."
Miraph Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Paterson, 150 N.J.
Super. 504, 508 (App. Div. 1977).
Our Rules require that an appellant's brief is to include legal argument.
Rule 2:6-2(a)(6) states in relevant part:
A-3423-18T1
5
(a) Formal Brief. Except as otherwise provided . . . the
brief of the appellant shall contain the following
material, under distinctive titles, arranged in the
following order:
....
(6) The legal argument for the appellant, which shall be
divided, under appropriate point headings, distinctively
printed or typed, into as many parts as there are points
to be argued.
The purpose of the appellate brief is to provide the court "an orderly and
considered presentation of the matter on appeal so that the court 'may have
before it such parts of the record and such legal authorities as will be of help in
arriving at a proper determination.'" Hayling v. Hayling, 197 N.J. Super. 484,
488-489 (App. Div. 1984) (quoting Abel v. Elizabeth Bd. of Works, 63 N.J.
Super. 500, 509 (App. Div. 1960)). It is the responsibility of the parties to
provide the court with their arguments, the legal authority to support them and
then to cite to the portions of the record in support. See Spinks v. Twp. of
Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 474 (App. Div. 2008). "[F]ailure to address any
legal issues relevant to the permissible subject matter of [the] appeal plainly
amounts to the equivalent of failing to file a brief at all." Hayling, 197 N.J.
Super. at 489.
A-3423-18T1
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Because defendant failed to make any arguments in the legal section of
his brief, cite to the record, or cite to any legal authority, he has failed to show
how the trial court erred. In fairness to the respondent, we cannot make
arguments for defendant or scour the record for errors he has not argued.
B.
Even were we to consider defendant's preliminary statement as his
arguments, he did not explain how the trial court abused its discretion by
entering the FJOD. We accord "great deference to discretionary decisions of
Family Part judges[,]" Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App.
Div. 2012), in recognition of the "family courts' special jurisdiction and
expertise in family matters[.]" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III,
201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)).
However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences
that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."
Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 26 (2014) (quoting Manalapan Realty,
L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Defendant contends in his preliminary statement that the FJOD does not
permit him to reunite with his children. This statement is not consistent with
the terms of the FJOD. The FJOD requires defendant to attend "reunification
A-3423-18T1
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therapy" with the children because of the length of his absence and their young
ages. The parties also can agree on parenting time with a "mutually agreeable
supervisor." Defendant is afforded weekly phone or video contact with the
children and he has access to the court for enforcement or modification upon
changed circumstances.
Scheduling parenting time based upon a determination of children's best
interests is a matter of sound judicial discretion. See Abouzahr v. Matera-
Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. 135, 157 (App. Div. 2003). Defendant did not argue
there was an abuse of discretion—nor was there—given the age of the children
and the time since he last saw them. Defendant acknowledged in oral argument
he had not complied with the reunification provisions of the FJOD.
Defendant objects to the trial court's order that imputed income to him for
purposes of calculating child support. The imputation of income, however, is a
decision left to the sound discretion of the trial court that is "not capable of
precise or exact determination[,] but rather require[es] a trial judge to
realistically appraise capacity to earn and job availability." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Gnall v.
Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 158 (App. Div. 2013)).
A-3423-18T1
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The trial court relied upon the testimony of the vocational expert, who was
found to be credible. Defendant does not explain how the trial court abused its
discretion in doing so.
Defendant's answer and counterclaim were stricken pursuant to Rules 5:1-
1 and 4:23-5, which then allowed the case to proceed by a proof hearing. See
R. 4:43–2(b). (1T9). Defendant was permitted to cross-examine witnesses, but
not to introduce affirmative proofs. This was consistent with the Rules. See
Chakravarti v. Pegasus Consulting Grp. 393 N.J. Super. 203, 210-11 (App. Div.
2007) (noting that a defaulting defendant has "relinquished the right to present
affirmative proofs . . . [but] cross-examination and argument should not
ordinarily be precluded").
Affirmed.
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