WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. PAUL HAUKE
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3366-18T2
WELLS FARGO BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
as Trustee for Certificate Holders
of Bear Stearns Asset Backed
Securities I LLC, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-AC6,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PAUL HAUKE,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MRS. PAUL HAUKE, his wife,
and SOPHIE HENRY,
Defendants.
___________________________
Submitted March 25, 2020 – Decided April 23, 2020
Before Judges Mayer and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket No.
F-015317-17.
Paul R. Hauke, appellant pro se.
Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLP, attorneys for respondent
(Ben Zev Raindorf and Robert D. Bailey, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Paul Hauke appeals from the following: a March 16, 2018 order
denying his motion to vacate default entered in favor of plaintiff Wells Fargo,
National Association, as Trustee for Certificate Holders of Bear Stearns Asset
Backed Securities I LLC, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-AC6 (Bank);
orders dated June 8, 2018, August 3, 2018, and October 12, 2018 denying
reconsideration of the March 16, 2018 order; a January 25, 2019 order
overruling defendant's objection to the Bank's motion for Final Judgment; a
February 15, 2019 order denying reconsideration of the January 25, 2019 order;
and a February 27, 2019 Final Judgment. We affirm all orders on appeal.
The facts are undisputed. In June 2007, defendant executed a note in the
amount of $550,000. The note was secured by a mortgage on defendant's
property in Point Pleasant. The Bank became an assignee of the note and
mortgage through a valid assignment. Defendant defaulted on payments due
under the note as of June 1, 2008.
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The Bank mailed the required notice of intent to foreclose to defendant at
the mortgaged premises and a post office box provided by defendant more than
thirty days prior to filing a foreclosure action. On June 21, 2017, the Bank filed
its foreclosure complaint.
The Bank claimed defendant evaded attempts to personally serve the
foreclosure complaint. The Bank then served the foreclosure complaint on
defendant by regular and certified mail directed to the mortgaged premises and
the post office box used by defendant. The Bank filed a certification of diligent
inquiry with the trial court, detailing the efforts made to personally serve the
complaint upon defendant and the mailing of the documents to defendant by
regular and certified mail. Because defendant failed to timely answer or respond
to the Bank's foreclosure complaint, on January 23, 2018, the court entered
default.
On February 12, 2018, defendant moved to vacate default. 1 In a March
16, 2018 order, the judge denied defendant's motion. The judge then denied
defendant's three subsequent motions seeking reconsideration of the March 16,
2018 order.
1
The Bank sent the notice of default by regular mail to the mortgaged premises
where defendant resides.
A-3366-18T2
3
In October 2018, the Bank applied for entry of final judgment. Defendant
objected to the amount the Bank claimed to be due on the note. In a January 25,
2019 order, the judge rejected defendant's objection to the amount due and
owing to the Bank and returned the matter as uncontested to the Office of
Foreclosure for entry of a final judgment. Defendant sought reconsideration of
the January 25, 2019 order, which the judge denied. A Final Judgment was
entered on February 27, 2019.
Defendant appealed. Upon receipt of defendant's notice of appeal, on May
6, 2019, Judge Francis R. Hodgson, Jr. issued a thirty-page, single-spaced
amplification of his prior oral decisions pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b).
The following are defendant's arguments on appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR AND ABUSE IT[]S
DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO VACATE THE JANUARY 2, 2018
DEFAULT.
i. The court improperly denied [d]efendant's [m]otion[]
to vacate the January 2, 2018 default.
ii. Defendant-Appellant did demonstrate good cause
under R[.] 4:43 to justify vacating the default in this
matter and reverse the Entry of Final Judgment.
iii. Defendant-Appellant has complied with R[.] 4:43
by fully articulating legally recognized defenses to the
A-3366-18T2
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underlying foreclosure action as required to justify
vacating such an improperly entered default.
POINT II
HONORABLE JUDGE HODGSON, JR. ERRED IN
REGARD TO HIS "TILA" [2] RULING.
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S "TILA" ARGUMENT
ESTABLISHES NOT ONLY A VALID
COUNTERCLAIM BUT A MERITORIOUS
DEFENSE.
POINT III
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DOES NOT NEED
MERITORIOUS DEFENSES, EVEN THOUGH HE
HAS THEM, TO REVERSE A DEFAULT WHEN
DUE PROCESS IN SERVICE HAS NOT BEEN
EFFECTED.
POINT IV
THE LEGAL STANDARD ON A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AS PER R[.] 4:49-2 HAS
BEEN MET.
POINT V
JUDGE AMPLIFICATION IMPROPER AS IT IS
FILED LATE AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
[R.] 2:5-1(b) AND IS NOT JUST AN
AMPLIFICATION BUT IS A WRITTEN OPINION
STATING FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT ARE
NOT PART OF THE RECORD. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED.
2
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1667f.
A-3366-18T2
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POINT VI
LACHES IS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE.
Having reviewed the record, we affirm all orders on appeal substantially
for the reasons expressed in the thorough and well-stated May 6, 2019 written
amplification provided by Judge Francis R. Hodgson, Jr., as well as his reasons
placed on the record on March 13, 2018; June 8, 2018; August 3, 2018; October
12, 2018; January 25, 2019; and February 15, 2019. We add only the following
comments.
Rule 2:5-1(b) allows a trial judge to supplement a prior opinion, providing
fifteen days from receipt of a party's notice of appeal to "file and mail to the
parties an amplification of a prior statement, opinion or memorandum made
either in writing or orally and recorded pursuant to R[ule] 1:2-2." Defendant
contends the amplification was untimely because it was served thirteen days
beyond the time period set forth in Rule 2:5-1(b). He also argues the judge's
amplification "stat[ed] facts and conclusions that are not part of the record."
We reject these arguments. There is nothing in the Court Rules, or case
law, that prevents this court from considering a trial judge's amplification filed
beyond the fifteen-day timeframe. Here, defendant suffered no prejudice as a
result of the brief delay in service of the judge's amplification because defendant
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received the letter several months prior to filing his merits brief. In addition,
defendant failed to identify any portion of the judge's amplification that was
inconsistent with the prior oral rulings.
The remainder of defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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