STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. T.J.W
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2380-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
T.J.W.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted February 12, 2020 – Decided March 17, 2020
Before Judges Koblitz, Whipple and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Gloucester County, Indictment No. 13-08-
0798.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Al Glimis, Designated Counsel, on the
briefs).
Charles A. Fiore, Gloucester County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Michelle Resha Jeneby, Senior
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant T.J.W.1 appeals from his August 9, 2017 judgment of
conviction after pleading guilty to a second-degree sexual assault of a seven-
year-old girl, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b). He was sentenced to seven years in state
prison. Defendant argues that we should vacate his conviction and remand the
matter for further proceedings because the trial court abused its discretion in
denying: 1) his request for an adjournment to proceed with his choice of counsel;
2) his requests for recusal and a change of venue; 3) his motion to obtain the
addresses of the State's child witnesses; and 4) his pre-sentencing motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant argues in the alternative that we should
remand for resentencing because the court failed to find one mitigating factor
and failed to provide a statement of reasons when imposing a $1000 Sex Crime
Victim Treatment Fund (SCVTF) penalty. We affirm, remanding only for
reconsideration of the SCVTF penalty.
In August 2013, defendant was indicted for first-degree aggravated sexual
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); second-degree sexual assault; and third-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), occurring in October
2012.
1
We refer to defendant by initials because he, too, is the victim of a sexual
assault. R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
A-2380-17T4
2
On September 24, 2015, defendant filed a civil complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that on April 2,
2015, he was sexually assaulted by a corrections officer while incarcerated
pending trial. The corrections officer was ultimately convicted of sexual assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c), and official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(a). In May 2017
the officer was sentenced to a five-year aggregate term of incarceration with a
two-year period of parole ineligibility.
A year earlier, on May 19, 2016, defendant's fourth criminal attorney filed
a pretrial notice of substitution of attorney, which included certifications from
both defendant and the withdrawing attorney. Despite this substitution of
attorney, the third attorney represented defendant on the first day of trial five
days later, May 24, 2016. The third attorney asked for a two-week postponement
so that defendant could be represented by the fourth attorney at trial.
The judge stated that she met with the fourth attorney and assistant
prosecutor in chambers the week before. The fourth attorney advised the judge
that he would be unavailable for the start of trial because he had a meeting with
another prosecutor on a different case. She further stated that the fourth attorney
was "not aware of the discovery in this matter, had not seen the videos or the
A-2380-17T4
3
information regarding the [m]otions, was not aware of the [m]otions . . . and was
not prepared to be here in order to be able to proceed."
The judge stated: "This matter has been on the trial list for quite some
time. This last minute effort on the part of the [d]efendant to substitute a new
attorney, who is not only unprepared but unavailable, is not acceptable and the
[c]ourt is going to proceed with jury selection today." The judge noted,
however, that the fourth attorney is "welcome to appear" when the opening
statements were scheduled, on June 7, 2016, two weeks from the date of jury
selection.
Defendant stated to the court that he retained the fourth attorney because
the third attorney told defendant that he did not plan on calling either of
defendant's witnesses. Defendant asserted that he and the fourth attorney had
contacted those witnesses and made plans for them to come to court.
In response, the third attorney informed the court that he could not call
these witnesses because defendant would not turn over their names to counsel if
defense counsel was going to give the names to the State. The court then told
defendant that the disclosure of the names of potential witnesses was required
prior to jury selection because the court must screen jurors and the State is
entitled to discovery.
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Defendant asked the judge to postpone the trial until July 1, 2016, so that
defendant could speak with his witnesses. The court denied this request and
advised defendant that he had two weeks to prepare before the start of testimony
on June 7, 2016.
In addition to the request for an adjournment, defendant also
unsuccessfully requested the judge to recuse herself from his trial and for a
change of venue. Defendant asserted that because he made an unsuccessful
request to move to another jail, and then was sexually assaulted by a corrections
officer, the judge and the prosecutor may be called as witnesses in his civil case.
At this point in the hearing, defendant stated to the court that if the fourth
attorney "has an opportunity to discuss a plea bargain with [the prosecutor]," he
did not believe he was "going to be safe in a New Jersey State Prison." He also
said that "one of the only things stopping [him] from taking a plea deal is not
just the fact that the [c]ourt is trying to force [him] to go to trial without being
properly prepared, but [he] do[es] [not] want to risk [his] life going to a New
Jersey Prison."
The third attorney then informed the court that he spoke with the fourth
attorney who "indicated that there [was] some . . . potential of a plea occurring."
The third attorney stated that defendant "wanted to wait until tomorrow, until
A-2380-17T4
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[the fourth attorney] could be here . . . [t]o try to negotiate a plea." He further
stated that he was concerned that defendant was "not authorizing [him] to enter
into plea negotiations and [defendant] wants to wait for [the fourth attorney]."
The court responded:
[The fourth attorney] informed me not that he had court
today but that he had to meet with a Mr.[] from the
Prosecutor's Office. I believe it . . . [was] in reference
to going over discovery in another case. That doesn't
take priority over a trial so I certainly was not . . . going
to postpone a trial matter for the purposes of facilitating
the logical, what he thought to be, the logical flow of
his casework. If [the fourth attorney] is here tomorrow
and/or if you would like for me to give an opportunity
for you, [the third attorney] and [the prosecutor], to talk
about this case and for you to then discuss it with
[defendant], perhaps, if he feels comfortable talking
with you regarding it, or with [the fourth attorney], then
I will allow that.
Shortly thereafter, a recess was taken to give the parties an opportunity to
negotiate a plea agreement. After about a six-hour recess, defendant entered
into a plea agreement.
During his factual basis, defendant admitted that he was in a relationship
with the victim's mother, D.R.,2 who was living at a hotel. On October 16, 2012,
2
We use initials when referring to the child victim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:82-
46, as well as her mother and her brother to preserve the privacy of the victim.
R. 1:38-3(c)(9).
A-2380-17T4
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the day of the incident, defendant was at the hotel with D.R. and her daughter
and son. D.R. left the hotel during the day, leaving defendant to babysit the two
children. When asked to explain the incident in his own words, defendant stated
that he "touched [the victim] in her vaginal area" outside of her clothing with
his hand "to sexually gratify [himself]." At the time of the incident, defendant
was twenty-seven years old and the victim was under thirteen years old. The
judge accepted the guilty plea, finding that defendant "made a knowing,
intentional, voluntary waiver of his rights and has voluntarily entered into this
plea."
On March 3, 2017, before sentencing, defendant's fifth attorney filed
unsuccessful motions to vacate his guilty plea and compel the State to disclose
the addresses of the witnesses. In her written decision, the judge analyzed each
of the four Slater factors: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable
claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for
withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal
would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused."
State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157–58 (2009).
Regarding factor one, the court determined that defendant did not assert a
colorable claim of innocence, stating that "[n]either at the time of the guilty
A-2380-17T4
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plea . . . nor at the time of the argument of this motion to withdraw his plea, did
the defense ever submit specific, credible facts, nor point to facts in the record
to buttress their claim." See id. at 158. The judge noted that defendant "failed
to submit affidavits or certifications from . . . witnesses that would substantiate
his claim." The court also rejected defendant's argument that he "only plead out
of fear," citing to a colloquy between defendant and the court during his plea.
Regarding factor two, the court concluded that defendant "failed to
demonstrate a strong substantiated reason to withdraw his plea." The court
found that defense counsel had not shown that "defendant was misinformed
about a material element of the plea negotiation." Quoting Slater, she found
defendant had also not presented "a plausible showing of a valid defense and
credibly demonstrated why the defense was 'forgotten or missed' at the time of
the plea." See id. at 160. Furthermore, the court rejected defendant's argument
that he was unable to have his attorney of choice. Not only did defendant hire
the fourth attorney "on the eve of trial in a matter that had been on the trial list
for almost [seven] months," but the court also welcomed the fourth attorney to
appear by not starting opening statements until two weeks after jury selection.
The court stated that the fourth attorney's "failure to appear is evidence of his
unwillingness to do so."
A-2380-17T4
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Regarding factor three, the court rejected defendant's argument that he
took the plea out of fear. In support of this finding, the court compared the
initial charges and potential sentence with the negotiated plea. The court pointed
out that defendant was given a lengthy recess to discuss the negotiated plea.
Regarding factor four, the court determined that withdrawal of the plea
would result in an unfair advantage to defendant. Quoting Slater, the court
stated that "the critical inquiry is 'whether the passage of time has hampered the
State's ability to present important evidence.'" Id. at 161. At the time of the
incident, the victim was seven years old and told her nine-year-old brother what
had happened. They were homeless. The mother, defendant's former girlfriend,
has since died. The children were in a Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (DCPP) placement following the loss of their mother. The court
stated: "To vacate the plea would be unfair to the victim and her brother, who
have moved on with their young lives." The judge denied the motion "based on
the totality of the circumstances."
Defendant was sentenced to seven years in state prison, with eighty-five
percent parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, as well as parole
supervision for life pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. The court imposed
mandatory penalties and an SCVTF penalty of $1000.
A-2380-17T4
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Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT I: THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING [DEFENDANT'S]
APPLICATION FOR A SHORT ADJOURNMENT TO
PROCEED WITH THE COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE.
POINT II: SINCE JUDGE [] WAS POTENTIALLY A
FACT WITNESS IN [DEFENDANT'S] PENDING
FEDERAL LAWSUIT IN WHICH GLOUCESTER
COUNTY WAS A NAMED DEFENDANT, SHE
ERRED IN DENYING [DEFENDANT'S] REQUESTS
THAT SHE RECUSE HERSELF AND FOR A
CHANGE OF VENUE.
A. JUDGE [] ABUSED HER DISCRETION WHEN
SHE REFUSED TO DISQUALIFY HERSELF
FROM SITTING ON THIS CASE.
B. JUDGE [] ABUSED HER DISCRETION WHEN
SHE DENIED [DEFENDANT'S] MOTION FOR
A CHANGE OF VENUE.
POINT III: DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO PRESENT
A COMPLETE DEFENSE, TO DUE PROCESS, AND
TO A FAIR TRIAL WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE
TRIAL COURT DENIED HIS MOTION TO OBTAIN
THE ADDRESSES OF THE STATE'S MAIN
WITNESSES.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S PRE-SENTENCING
MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS GUILTY
PLEA.
POINT V: ALTERNATIVELY, THIS CASE SHOULD
BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING BECAUSE
THE SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO FIND
A-2380-17T4
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MITIGATING FACTORS CLEARLY PRESENT IN
THE RECORD, AND FAILED TO MAKE THE
FACTUAL FINDINGS REQUIRED WHEN
IMPOSING A[N SCVTF] PENALTY.
We affirm substantially for the reasons stated in the trial judge's
thoughtful written opinion. We add the following.
I. Denial of Adjournment for New Counsel.
"[A] trial court's decision to deny a request for an adjournment to permit
a defendant to retain counsel of his [or her] choice will not be deemed reversible
error absent a showing of an abuse of discretion which caused defendant a
'manifest wrong or injury.'" State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 537 (2011) (quoting
State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242, 259 (App. Div. 1998)).
When a defendant requests an adjournment in order to substitute counsel,
"the trial court must strike a balance between its inherent and necessary right to
control its own calendar and the public's interest in the orderly administration
of justice, on the one hand, and the defendant's constitutional right to obtain
counsel of his own choice, on the other." Id. at 538 (quoting State v. Furguson,
198 N.J. Super. 395, 402 (App. Div. 1985)).
Although defendant's first two attorneys may have withdrawn due to their
own conflicts, it was within the trial judge's discretion not to allow an
unprepared fourth attorney to substitute in on the eve of the trial of a man
A-2380-17T4
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charged with assaulting a child in October 2012, more than three and one-half
years before the trial date. Defendant also represented that he was exploring a
guilty plea with the fourth attorney, so his guilty plea was not the result of not
being afforded the adjournment.
II. Denial of Recusal and Change of Venue.
A motion for disqualification or recusal is "entrusted to the sound
discretion of the judge" and the decision is "subject to review for abuse of
discretion." State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010). Rule 3.17(B) of the Code
of Judicial Conduct states that "[j]udges shall disqualify themselves in
proceedings in which their impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." The Code includes the following instances:
personal bias, prejudice, or knowledge; financial interest; personal
relationships; prior professional relationships; post-retirement employment; or
a "continuing social relationship" that "would give rise to partiality or the
appearance of partiality." Ibid. The judge was not a witness to any behavior
that was the subject of defendant's lawsuit. She did not abuse her discretion by
continuing to preside over the matter.
We review a trial court's decision on a motion to change venue under an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 476–77 (2002).
A-2380-17T4
12 Rule 3:14-2 provides that a motion for change of venue "shall be granted if the
court finds that a fair and impartial trial cannot otherwise be had." Defendant
did not sue the local prosecutor's office. It was not an abuse of discretion to
deny a change of venue.
III. Addresses of Young Children.
We "defer to the trial judge's discovery rulings absent an abuse of
discretion or a judge's misunderstanding or misapplication of the law." Capital
Health System, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 230 N.J. 73, 79–80
(2017).
Defendant relies on Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(F), which requires the disclosure of
the "names, addresses, and birthdates of any persons whom the prosecutor
knows to have relevant evidence or information including a designation by th e
prosecutor as to which of those persons may be called as witnesses." When
denying defendant's request for the addresses 3 of the two child witnesses for
interview purposes, the judge stated:
[A] request for the addresses of those children that at
one point had been placed by DCPP as a result of one
victim being sexually assaulted by [defendant] and the
other being her brother that she reported it to at age
seven for her and age nine for him. . . . Their mother
has since unfortunately passed away or expired and the
3
We were not informed whether the children were placed in the same home.
A-2380-17T4
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request for that information is denied. . . . Their
addresses are protected.
The court further stated that "[d]efendant has received full copies of not
only the transcript of their statements, but the video statements themselves, as
well as the summary from the police interviews." No defense request was made
to interview the children at another location or for a defense expert such as a
child psychologist to interview the children. The court acted within its
discretion in denying defendant's request for discovery of the young witnesses'
addresses.
IV. Slater Issue.
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea. State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 135 (2003). The timing of a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea triggers different standards of proof. Slater, 198 N.J.
at 160. "[E]fforts to withdraw a plea after sentencing must be substantiated by
strong, compelling reasons," while "a lesser showing is required for motions
raised before sentencing." Ibid.
In deciding defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to
sentencing, the trial judge analyzed each of the four factors established by Slater,
198 N.J. at 157–58. Defendant argues that he could not provide exculpating
certifications from the children because he did not have their addresses. His
A-2380-17T4
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argument is speculative. Given their young age, the passage of time and the fact
that the children's mother was deceased, the judge did not abuse her discretion
in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
V. Sentencing.
In reviewing a trial judge's sentencing decision, we (1) "require that an
exercise of discretion be based upon findings of fact that are grounded in
competent, reasonably credible evidence"; (2) "require that the factfinder apply
correct legal principles in exercising its discretion"; and (3) "exercise that
reserve of judicial power to modify sentences when the application of the facts
to the law is such a clear error of judgment that it shocks the judicial
conscience." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363–64 (1984).
Defendant argues that the court should have found mitigating factor
eleven, that imprisonment would cause serious hardship, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(b)(11). In support of this argument, defendant cites to the Adult Diagnostic
and Treatment Center report4 indicating that he suffers from post-traumatic
stress disorder as a result of his history of childhood sexual abuse. He asserts
that he was further traumatized when he was sexually assaulted by a corrections
4
Defendant's conduct was found not to be "characterized by a pattern of
repetitive, compulsive behavior." N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a).
A-2380-17T4
15
officer and "subjected to a pattern of harassment and violence" while
incarcerated.
In determining defendant's sentence, the judge found aggravating factor
three, "[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another offense"; factor six,
"[t]he extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the
offenses of which he has been convicted"; and factor nine, "[t]he need for
deterring the defendant and others from violating the law." N.J.S.A. 2C:44- -
1(a)(3), (6), (9). She did not find any mitigating factors. The judge stated:
I do find that [defendant] does not accept personal
responsibilities and his shortcomings have been blamed
on others. . . . There's a strong presumption of
incarceration that's applicable for a second-degree
crime, it has not been overcome by any factors.
Aggravating [f]actors substantially outweigh any
[m]itigating [f]actors and unless there's a substantial
change in attitude, there's a high likelihood of
reoffending.
The judge rejected mitigating factor eleven, which was not "a clear error
in judgment." Many defendants have psychiatric difficulties. The sentence does
not "shock the judicial conscience." Roth, 95 N.J. 364–65.
In State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 224 (2014), our Supreme Court stated:
In setting an SCVTF penalty, the sentencing court
should consider the nature of the offense, as well as the
defendant's ability to pay the penalty during any
A-2380-17T4
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custodial sentence imposed and after his or her release.
We further hold that the sentencing court should
provide a statement of reasons as to the amount of any
penalty imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10(a).
Because the judge did not provide a statement of reasons, we remand for
reconsideration of the SCVTF penalty, especially in light of defendant's
incarceration.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded for further proceedings
regarding the SCVTF penalty only. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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